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Speaking several years ago of Nathan Edelman, Jules Brody remarked 
that some writers are superior to their books, and others inferior, while 
a few—by some miracle of inner harmony—are equal. To the third cat­
egory belongs Hugh M. Davidson, whose qualities as a colleague, 
teacher, and friend as well as a scholar and critic have inspired this gar­
land of essays, presented to him with affection and esteem on his seventy-
second birthday. 
T H  E M A  N 
BY MAR Y B. M C K I N L E  Y 
A skillful balance of the art of listening and the art of questioning con­
tributes to Hugh Davidson's esteemed success as a teacher and colleague. 
During his years at Chicago, Dartmouth, Ohio State, Yale, and, since 
1973, Virginia he has developed an educational philosophy as distinctive 
as his signature. In the classroom he helps his students to discover knowl­
edge by an ongoing process of dialogue, a process constantly nourished 
by the unfailing respect that characterizes his attitude toward them. 
Whether in his French composition classes, in his advanced undergradu­
ate literature courses or in his doctoral seminars, Hugh tries to discern 
the individual strengths of each person in the group and encourages them 
to value and to question their ideas while learning to articulate them. His 
course on the moralists has become a cherished tradition among French 
majors. Students who approached the reading of Descartes, La Bruyere, 
La Rochefoucauld, and Pascal with trepidation find that those writers 
offer fascinating perspectives on the human mind and soul. They seem to 
engage each other in dialogue under Hugh's direction and gradually to 
entice the students into their discussions. A recurring topic in those col­
loquia is the continuity prevailing behind the appearances of change, a 
concern that reappears regularly in Hugh's teaching and scholarly writ­
8 a v  e aing. In 1975 n  e  post-doctoral seminar sponsored by the National 
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Endowment for the Humanities on "Underlying Constants in the Chang­
ing Methods of Literary Study." The title, like the attitude toward criti­
cism that it implies, characterizes his approach to literature in his 
graduate courses. Unfazed by the latest critical fad but willing to consider 
its possible merits, he likewise eschews imposing rigid methodologies on 
his students while welcoming their cogent proposals for any critical ap­
proach. That open attitude represents an enduring conviction about crit­
ical discourse. In an article published in the Bucknell Review in 1965, 
"Yet Another View of French Classicism," Hugh argued that the survival 
of humanistic studies today depends upon the willing acceptance of a 
variety of critical approaches to literature. He emphasizes the need for 
continuing dialectical confrontation between various methods and 
schools if criticism is to thrive as a vital tool of scholarship. The perfect 
setting for such dialogue is Hugh's doctoral seminar on Pascal, a true 
locus amoenus for graduate students at Virginia. Discussions generated 
in it continue outside the seminar itself and flow naturally into courses 
on other writers and other centuries. It has helped to convert many stu­
dents to the seventeenth century and has planted the seeds for several 
excellent dissertations. Hugh's calm, quietly expressed confidence in his 
doctoral candidates acts as a catalyst, urging them to pursue intellectual 
challenges because that is their common endeavor. As one such student 
put it: "Monsieur Davidson voit dans chaque etudiant un potentiel intel­
lectuel a developper, et il s'occupe a le developper etape par etape jusqu'a 
ce que Petudiant puisse voler de ses propres ailes." Recognition of Hugh's 
teaching has taken him far beyond the university community of Char­
lottesville. In 1980 and 1989 the Folger Institute invited him to give post­
doctoral seminars on Pascal at the Folger Library in Washington, and in 
1984 he was invited to give a course on "Les Anciens dans la litterature 
du XVIIe siecle" at the Sorbonne. 
The arts of listening and questioning are not left behind when Hugh 
Davidson leaves the classroom. An artist attempting his caricature would 
do well to portray a man at lunch intently sketching with pen on paper 
napkin while an interested student or colleague looks on. Those familiar 
diagrams speak of his talent for gently taking another's awkward dis­
order of expression and deftly recasting it into an eloquent statement of 
compelling intellectual clarity—while giving the other full credit for both 
the idea and its eloquence. That generosity is particularly appreciated by 
junior colleagues, whose books and articles owe much to those lunches. 
I N T R O D U C T I O  N XV11 
In departmental and university affairs Hugh draws upon his characteris­
tic equilibrium and clear thinking to suggest innovative programs, to ar­
gue for the highest intellectual standards and to recall the voice of reason 
whenever necessary. As graduate student advisor from 1977 to 1985 he 
led the graduate program through a crucial period in its growth, chairing 
the committee that revised and restructured the M.A. and Ph.D. pro­
grams in 1985. As a highly respected consultant to deans and other ad­
ministrators, he frequently serves in roles that have a significant impact 
on the future direction of the university. His birthday provides a welcome 
opportunity for his students and colleagues to celebrate his career. Mod­
estly and unobtrusively Hugh Davidson has come to embody the highest 
ideals of intellectual inquiry and its promulgation. 
His WOR K 
BY D A V I  D LEE R U B I  N 
Tel arbre, tel fruit: if Hugh Davidson himself is a model of magnanimity, 
lucidity, and elegance, his contributions to the study of seventeenth-cen-
tury French literature possess corresponding qualities: broad learning 
and instinctive pluralism; incisiveness and rigor of thought; as well as a 
style whose polish is matched only by its naturalness. Ideally, of course, 
these remarks would do justice to his entire achievement. Space limita­
tions, however, preclude such exhaustiveness, and, as a result, we shall 
confine ourselves to an overview of the work that has exercised the widest 
and deepest influence. 
Audience, Words, Art (1965) 
The six exquisitely written essays that compose this volume recount, step 
by step, the official French effort to reinstate the discipline of rhetoric. 
After tracing rhetoric's Latin origins and its naturalization by Vaugelas 
and Rapin, Hugh discusses four other facets of the problem: cartesianism 
and its impact (especially on Port Royal, whose Logique sought to rede­
fine rhetoric in terms of logic); Pascal's shift from polemic to apology; 
and finally, the absorption of rhetorical theory into the widely diverging 
critical and programmatic statements of Corneille, Racine, and Moliere. 
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Methodologically, Audience, Words, Art achieves for its subject what Ber­
nard Weinberg's history did for Italian Renaissance criticism: it clarifies 
the subtly shifting assumptions and the diverse modes of argument mar­
shaled in a debate which compels our attention not only for its own sake 
and as a chapter in the history of ideas, but above all for its impact on 
the creative enterprise itself. 
One of the particular strengths of Audience, Words, Art is Hugh's 
treatment of the Provinciates and the Pensees. His analysis of these works 
in the light of the fragments, De Vesprit de geometrie and Uart de per­
suader, still stands, by common consent, as the best we possess. It is fit­
ting, then, that from the general question of rhetoric, Hugh passed, in his 
next four books, to the work of Blaise Pascal. 
Two Concordances 
Hugh recognized early that the daunting vastness and complexity of Pas-
cal's work had tempted more than one critic to launch incandescent, if 
tenuous theories. From the experience of writing Audience, Words, Art— 
in which he applied and extended the semantics of thought modes pro­
posed by Richard McKeon and Ronald Crane—Hugh also understood 
why such purely intuitive flights so frequently fall short: the author's key 
terms, in all their resonance and poly valence, are imperfectly known. To 
preserve intuition, yet impose needed controls, in both his own work and 
that of his fellow pascalisants, Hugh concluded that a concordance 
would be necessary—an instrument that would exhaustively, precisely, 
and accurately identify the verbal building blocks of Pascal's system as 
they appear in (and are modified by) their immediate contexts. A manu­
ally produced reference, however, was immediately ruled out: to achieve 
the desired degree of adequacy, its compilation would have left neither 
time nor energy for the more important work that the concordance was 
to support. Computerization and the assistance of programmer Pierre 
Bude overcame these obstacles, with spectacular results, in A Concor­
dance to Pascals Pensees (1975) a n d ^ Concordance to Pascal's Provin­
ciales (1980). With these tools, the analysis of Pascal's most important 
texts could, and did, proceed with greater confidence. 
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The Origins of Certainty (1979) 
If proof were needed of the uses to which a sound concordance might be 
put, this bold yet graceful volume would more than suffice. As Charles 
G. S. Williams wrote, "Davidson approaches] and promotes] the intel­
ligibility [of the Pensees] by the study of complexes of words, terms, and 
designations surrounding them, which establish, as they interact and con­
verge in the t e x t . .  . a matrix that w i l l . .  . fix any important [element] in 
Pascal's thought and . . . [reveal] some of its overarching principles, in­
cluding the relationship of faith to scientific certainty." What results is a 
diagrammatic treatment of the moyens de croire (reason, custom, and 
inspiration), by which Hugh transcends ancient and inconclusive debates 
concerning the completeness of sequential order of the Pensees to dis­
cover something far more essential: what Robert J. Nelson has called 
their "mfra-relatedness" or "symbiotic" connection. Through his recon­
structive readings, Hugh created a new, richly promising critical frame-
work—indeed a new hermeneutic genre—for exploration and 
elaboration by future students of the Pensees, to say nothing of other 
works which have come down to us in fragmentary form. 
Pascal (1983) 
Creation of new genres goes hand in hand with a revitalizing of the old. 
Thus in this volume—a contribution to the Twayne World Authors' Se-
ries—Hugh works within the limits of the "l'homme et l'oeuvre" format, 
but infuses it with extraordinary coherence, vigor, and depth. Conceding 
the doubleness of Pascal's formative experiences and the intensity of his 
commitment to scientific inquiry as well as religious faith and reflection, 
Hugh nevertheless insists on the unity of the author's spirit and method. 
This he then traces through a series of condensed, crystalline analyses of 
the major works and resumes of the opuscules. Particularly stimulating is 
a supplementary account of Pascal's changing image and presence in lit­
erature and scholarship not only during his own century but those to 
follow. 
* * * 
That, at this writing, Hugh is in the midst of other book-length projects 
on Pascal and nonrhetorical aspects of seventeenth-century French es­
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thetics makes this introduction incomplete in more senses than the one 
already mentioned: the authors and the editors honor Hugh Davidson 
not at the conclusion of a long and distinguished career, but at the very 
height of his powers and productivity. To paraphrase Mallarme, "nous 





Vraie et fausse beaute dans Pesthetique 
au dix-septieme siecle 
Jean Mesnard 
Au long du XVIIe siecle, si le terme de "beaute" est aussi couramment 
employe qu'a toute autre epoque, la categorie qui lui correspond n'a 
guere sollicite la reflexion des philosophes et des artistes. Le siecle s'est 
interesse aux regies de l'art plutot qu'a la theorie du beau. A s'en tenir au 
domaine des lettres, il a essentiellement constitue une rhetorique, prolon­
gee par une poetique dont Hugh Davidson se plait justement a souligner 
qu'elle est elle-meme penetree de rhetorique. L'esthetique demeure assez 
etrangere a Pepoque.1 Le terme n'apparaitra d'ailleurs qu'en 1750, avec 
le premier volume des Aesthetica de Pallemand Baumgarten. C'est au 
XVIIIe siecle, en France et en Allemagne, qu'on verra s'elaborer la disci­
pline. Au milieu du XIXe siecle, Victor Cousin pouvait composer "la phi­
losophie tout entiere" avec les "trois problemes du vrai, du beau et du 
bien." 2 II est clair que le XVIIe siecle, passionne de science rigoureuse et 
d'analyse morale, n'a pas mis le second terme sur le meme pied que les 
deux autres. 
Peut-etre lui a-t-il pourtant prete plus d'attention qu'il ne le semble. 
C'est sans doute l'importance qu'il accorde a l'etude des rapports entre le 
beau et le vrai qui constitue son originalite principale sur ce sujet. Mais 
ces rapports peuvent etre envisages de diverses manieres. La formule un 
peu tranchante de Boileau, "Rien n'est beau que le vrai,"3 n'est peut-etre 
pas celle qui repond le mieux a l'esprit de l'epoque. II y a plus de finesse 
dans les reflexions inspirees de divers cotes par le souci de distinguer une 
vraie et une fausse beaute. Notre propos est d'analyser le sens de cette 
distinction, en nous arretant aux divers auteurs qui l'ont pratiquee—du 
moins ceux que des sondages assez etendus nous ont permis de reperer— 
et en essayant de degager, des uns aux autres, les tendances communes et 
les positions originales. 
C'est un ecrivain de premier ordre, a propos d'une oeuvre majeure, qui, 
dans l'etat actuel des recherches, fournit notre plus ancien exemple, d'une 
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nettete remarquable. Dediant a Mme de Combalet, future duchesse 
d'Aiguillon, niece de Richelieu, sa tragi-comedie du Cid, dont Pedition 
originale porte un acheve d'imprimer du 23 mars 1637, Corneille se feli­
cite que la piece ait eu le bonheur de plaire a la grande dame, et il ajoute: 
"le jugement que vous en faites est une marque assuree de son prix; et 
comme vous donnez toujours liberalement aux veritables beautes l'estime 
qu'elles meritent, les fausses n'ont jamais le pouvoir de vous eblouir."4 
Comme il est naturel, la distinction entre vraie et fausse beaute ac­
quiert sa pertinence lorsque l'attention se porte, non sur les lois qui presi­
dent a la creation de l'oeuvre, mais sur le jugement qu'appelle l'oeuvre 
constitute. Elle s'adresse essentiellement au critique et, par-dela, a tout 
homme. C'est indirectement qu'elle peut toucher le createur, dans la me-
sure ou il est oblige lui-meme de se critiquer. 
Mais la meme idee n'aurait-elle pu s'exprimer sans recours aux cate­
gories du vrai et du faux? Corneille lui-meme pourrait nous inviter a 
repondre par Paffirmative. En 1632, pour la premiere de ses pieces qu'il 
ait fait imprimer, la tragi-comedie de Clitandre, il avait adresse au due de 
Longueville, destinataire de l'epitre dedicatoire, une flatterie semblable a 
celle dont il gratifia plus tard Mme de Combalet, mais en termes diffe­
rents: "Vous avez un tel degout des mauvaises choses, et les savez si nette­
ment demeler d'avec les bonnes, qu'on fait paraitre plus de manque de 
jugement a vous les presenter qu'a les concevoir."5 Ce sont done simple­
ment de bonnes et de mauvaises choses auxquelles se substitueront plus 
tard de vraies et de fausses beautes. II est evident que la seconde formule 
est incomparablement plus originale, qu'elle seule engage certains prin­
cipes esthetiques. 
Par quel cheminement Corneille est-il passe de la premiere a la se­
conde? Il serait tentant d'invoquer l'influence de Descartes et de rappeler, 
des les premieres lignes du Discours de la Methode, le prix exceptionnel 
reconnu a "la puissance de bien juger et distinguer le vrai d'avec le faux, 
qui est proprement ce qu'on nomme le bon sens ou la raison," puissance 
"naturellement egale en tous les hommes," mais plus ou moins bien exer­
cee selon les individus.6 Cette "puissance" n'a-t-elle pas a jouer son role 
en matiere de beaute comme en tout autre domaine? Corneille nous au­
torise a le conclure. Mais il ne doit rien a Descartes. Le Discours de la 
Methode, premier ouvrage publie par le philosophe, porte un acheve 
d'imprimer du 8 juin 1637: un peu plus de deux mois apres Le Cid. Est-
ce a dire que Corneille a devance Descartes sur ce point, comme il le fera 
dans la conception du "genereux," mis en scene dans les grandes trage­
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dies de 1637 a 1643, avant d'etre aussi l'objet d'une definition en 1649 
dans le Traite des Passions? II est plus naturel de considerer que Corneille 
et Descartes procedent d'un meme courant. 
Le Discours de la Methode n'est d'ailleurs pas le seul ouvrage du temps 
qui mette a haut prix la capacite de "discerner le vrai d'avec le faux." La 
formule se trouve des 1630 dans un livre promis a une large diffusion et 
a un long succes, L'Honnete homme ou I'Art de plaire a la Cour de Ni­
colas Faret.7 L'auteur s'indigne du poids que peut avoir P"opinion"—ce 
que Descartes appellera la "prevention"—sur l'esprit des hommes, et il 
fait du recours a la "raison" l'une des caracteristiques de l'"honnete 
homme." Ce n'est pas a dire que l'homme ideal, l'homme capable de 
plaire, soit un raisonneur, mais qu'il doit avoir l'esprit juste. Sa faculte 
principale est le "jugement," moins eclatant que les dons de l'imagination 
ou de la memoire, mais permettant seul une communication intime entre 
les hommes fondee sur ce qui leur est commun.8 La raison est une faculte 
souple et vivante. Elle sert de rempart contre le pedantisme et contre le 
prestige de l'autorite. II est plus profitable "d'etudier dans le grand livre 
du monde que dans Aristote."9 Descartes en dira autant, un Descartes a 
qui l'ouvrage de Faret n'etait sans doute pas inconnu. Si L'Honnete 
homme rend, a plusieurs endroits, un son precartesien, on peut dire non 
moins justement que le debut du Discours de la Methode est un plaidoyer 
en faveur de l'"honnetete": la nouvelle philosophic que Descartes entend 
fonder repose sur des principes que chacun peut trouver en soi et qui 
peuvent assurer une communication authentique. Faret et Descartes sont 
les temoins d'une meme modernite. 
Dans les milieux modernes du debut de XVIIe siecle, les categories du 
vrai et du faux semblent avoir ete appliquees d'abord aux valeurs morales 
et spirituelles. On en decouvre l'emploi chez le renovateur audacieux de 
la devotio moderna qu'a ete saint Francois de Sales. En 1608, 
VIntroduction a la Vie devote s'ouvre par un chapitre intitule Description 
de la vraie devotion.™ Dans ce titre, "vrai" n'est pas un banal synonyme 
d'"excellente." Son emploi repose sur une distinction formelle entre la 
devotion vraie, qui est unique, et les "fausses et vaines," qui sont en 
"grande quantite." Ces "statues et fantomes de devotion" ne sont evi­
demment pas a confondre avec l'hypocrisie d'un Tartuffe; ce sont de 
fausses idees d'une devotion qui, par manque de jugement, demeure "im­
pertinente et superstitieuse." Les actes exterieurs y sont preferes a 1'atti-
tude interieure. Son contraire est "la vraie et vivante devotion." 
Le meme distinction reparait dans un chapitre Des vraies amities, suivi 
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d'un autre intitule Des vraies et des vaines amities.u Le sens de toutes ces 
distinctions peut etre condense dans le precepte: "Ne recevez pas la fausse 
monnaie avec la bonne," et leur principe est bien exprime par un autre 
titre de chapitre, Qu'il faut avoir Vesprit juste et raisonnable.12 
De saint Francois de Sales et de Faret a la fois procede un autre ecri­
vain, Jacques Du Bose, dont le gros ouvrage sur L'Honnete femme— 
encore un grand succes de librairie du siecle—paru en trois parties de 
1632 a 1636, est contemporain des premiers succes de Corneille. La dis­
tinction du vrai et du faux en matiere de vertus morales y est operee 
frequemment. Aux vraies et aux fausses amities repondent vraie et fausse 
simplicite, vraie et fausse probite, vraie et fausse civilite.13 Le chapitre De 
la vraie science d'une honnete femme traite, plus de trente ans avant Mo­
liere et en termes comparables, de la question des femmes savantes.14 La 
distinction se fonde sur celle tres generale, qui oppose la verite a l'appa-
rence, la conscience a l'opinion, ou, plus precisement, la mesure, la dis­
cretion, au "faste," a la "parade."15 L'idee s'applique indirectement a la 
beaute, meme si les termes de vrai et de faux ne sont pas employes a son 
sujet. Observant que Caton estimait fort la beaute, Du Bose commente: 
"II parlait de la naturelle, et non pas de celle qui est pleine d'etude et 
d'affeterie."16 La faculte qui, dans tous les cas, permet d'operer cette dis­
tinction, c'est la raison, le jugement ou, pour retenir encore une expres­
sion precartesienne, la "lumiere naturelle."17 
Une origine plus lointaine, plus imprecise, de cette maniere de penser, 
peut etre relevee, en termes explicites ou implicites, dans un texte spirituel 
prestigieux, VImitation de Jesus-Christ. Lorsque Corneille le traduisit, il 
se plut a faire ressortir le procede plus nettement que son original. Un 
chapitre est ainsi intitule De la veritable patience, un autre En quoi 
consiste la veritable paix.u Entre les fragments de Limitation joints en 
1670 a UOffice de la Vierge, figurent les belles stances intitulees De la 
vraie liberte.19 La distinction etablie dans la dedicace du Cid ne constitue 
done pas un simple accident. 
Mais, dans ce cas particulier, quelle signification precise faut-il lui pre­
ter? Le contexte n'est pas d'un grand secours. II n'y a pas non plus beau-
coup a attendre des prefaces, examens et discours ou Corneille entend 
surtout s'expliquer aupres des doctes et se place sur le terrain de la rhe­
torique et de la poetique. Pour definir ce qu'il appelle beaute, d'autres 
textes sont a prendre en consideration. 
Dans les scenes qui, a la fin du premier acte de La Galerie du Palaisy 
publiee, comme Le Cid, en 1637, o n  t pour decor le lieu qui a donne son 
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titre a la comedie, les conversations qui se deroulent devant la boutique 
de la lingere et devant celle du libraire donnent lieu a des propos 
d'"honnetes gens" qui touchent de pres a ce sujet. 
A la lingere montrant des collets de dentelle, Hippolyte, qui represente 
assez bien le type de P"honnete femme," declare: 
Ceci n'est guere bon qu'a des gens de campagne. 
La suivante Florice critique un 
.  . . ouvrage . . . confus 
Bien que l'invention de pres soit assez belle, 
et constate qu'en un autre modele, 
. .  . la dentelle 
Est fort mal assortie avec le passement. 
Puis encore: 
Cet autre n'a de beau que le couronnement.20 
Propos moins superficiels qu'il ne pourrait sembler et dont se degage, 
en tout cas, l'idee d'une beaute fondee sur l'harmonie de divers elements 
et dont seuls les gens de gout savent juger d'une maniere correcte. 
Aux deux jeunes premiers fort "honnetes" que sont Lysandre et Dori­
mant, les livres exposes dans l'autre boutique suggerent des reflexions 
beaucoup plus interessantes, revelatrices de l'esthetique cornelienne. Do­
rimant, qui ne s'encombre guere de nuances, prononce par exemple: 
Quantite d'ignorants ne songent qu'a la rime. 
La rime est opposee implicitement, comme chez Boileau, a la raison, le 
brillant du son a la nettete du sens. Au libraire qui lui vante un recueil de 
vers: 
Considerez ce trait, on le trouve divin, 
le meme Dorimant repond sans hesiter: 
II n'est que mal traduit du Cavalier Marin.21 
Denonciation significative d'une fausse beaute. Sur la poesie en general, 
Lysandre observe: 
Beaucoup, dont l'entreprise excede le pouvoir, 
Veulent parler d'amour sans aucune pratique. 
Sur quoi Dorimant precise: 
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On n'y sait guere alors que la vieille rubrique. 
Faute de le connaitre, on Phabille en fureur, 
Et loin d'en faire envie, on nous en fait horreur. 
Lui seul de ses effets a droit de nous instruire; 
Notre plume a lui seul doit se laisser conduire. 
Pour en bien discourir, il faut l'avoir bien fait; 
Un bon poete ne vient que d'un amant parfait. 
Tous les "secrets" de l'amour, poursuit-il, 
Quoi que tous nos rimeurs en mettent par ecrit, 
Ne se savent jamais par un effort d'esprit; 
Et je n'ai jamais vu de cervelles bien faites 
Qui traitassent l'amour a la fac,on des poetes. 
C'est un tout autre jeu.. . .22 
La vraie poesie se moque de la poesie, pourrait-on dire. Ou bien: un 
vrai poete est d'abord "honnete homme." Corneille revendique en faveur 
de la vie contre un art tout d'invention, contre une beaute empruntant 
des traits forces a la "vieille rubrique," c'est-a-dire a la tradition antique, 
se guindant en des "efforts d'esprit" qui produisent des inventions artifi­
cielles, et oubliant le seul vrai modele qui est la nature. 
On ne saurait trouver meilleur commentaire a ces reflexions qu'en se 
reportant de nouveau a la premiere partie du Discours de la Methode et 
en relevant ce passage dont la portee esthetique n'a peut-etre pas ete suf­
fisamment pergue: 
J'estimais fort Peloquence et j'etais amoureux de la poesie. Mais je 
pensais que l'une et l'autre etaient des dons de l'esprit plutot que des 
fruits de l'etude. Ceux qui ont le raisonnement le plus fort et qui digerent 
le mieux leurs pensees afin de les rendre claires et intelligibles peuvent 
toujours mieux persuader ce qu'ils proposent, encore qu'ils ne parlassent 
que bas-breton, et qu'ils n'eussent jamais appris de rhetorique. Et ceux 
qui ont les inventions les plus agreables, et qui les savent exprimer avec le 
plus d'ornement et de douceur, ne laisseraient pas d'etre les meilleurs 
poetes, encore que l'art poetique leur fut inconnu.23 
Declaration typique d'"honnete homme" et qui, meme si les mots ne 
sont pas prononces, aboutit a distinguer une vraie et une fausse beaute, 
opposees comme 1'enseignement de la nature a celui de l'ecole. II va de 
soi que, chez Descartes, la continuite est parfaite entre cette conception 
d'une beaute moderne, directement ouverte sur 1'homme, et celle d'une 
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nouvelle mathematique et d'une nouvelle metaphysique reposant sur des 
principes communs a tous les hommes. 
"Vraie et vivante," disait saint Francois de Sales de la devotion. Vraie 
et vivante, telle est aussi, pour Corneille et Descartes, la beaute. L'invo-
cation du bon sens et de la raison ne signifie pas autre chose, et pas da-
vantage. La vraie beaute se situe dans une voie moyenne entre le mauvais 
gout rustique et les lourdeurs du pedantisme ou les faux brillants d'une 
imagination dechainee. 
Tels sont les enseignements qui se degagent de textes malheureusement 
fort brefs, touchant a notre sujet d'une maniere seulement incidente, mais 
que leur conjonction rend fort suggestifs. Nous nous etablirons sur un 
terrain plus solide en abordant l'ecrit qui fournit naturellement son centre 
a notre etude. 
En 1659—exactement le 20 aoiit—l'un des plus fideles imprimeurs de 
Port-Royal, Charles Savreux, faisait paraitre, sans nom d'auteur, un Epi­
grammatum delectus, choix d'epigrammes empruntees au maitre du 
genre, Martial, et a d'autres poetes latins et neo-latins. En tete, des pieces 
preliminaries aussi en latin, toujours anonymes: une Praefatio, puis une 
Dissertatio de vera pulchritudine et adumbrata, d'une quarantaine de 
pages. Consacree expressement, comme l'indique le titre, au probleme de 
la vraie et de la fausse beaute, cette dissertation, comme aussi la preface 
et le choix des epigrammes, est indubitablement de Nicole, qui fut d'a-
bord maitre aux petites ecoles de Port-Royal, et dont le talent de latiniste 
se reconnait au choix ingenieux de l'adjectif adumbrata pour exprimer 
l'idee de falsa ou de ficta, le premier de ces adjectifs etant d'ailleurs em­
ploye le plus souvent dans le corps de l'ouvrage. L'Epigrammatum delec­
tus remporta un grand succes. II fournissait des modeles d'expression 
breve et dense qui allaient s'imposer dans la prose avec les Maximes de 
La Rochefoucauld et les Pensees de Pascal. Mais c'est surtout la disserta­
tion qui fut remarquee. En 1669, un jesuite fort verse dans les belles­
lettres, le P. Vavasseur, publia un De Epigrammate liber dans lequel il crut 
devoir consacrer une centaine de pages a la critique de son devancier. 
Trait significatif, il ne reprend nulle part, fut-ce pour en contester le bien 
fonde, la distinction de la vraie et de la fausse beaute: silence comprehen­
sible, car le principe de cette distinction s'accordait mal avec l'idee, chere 
aux jesuites, d'un art tendant a rivaliser avec la nature. La dissertation fit 
aussi l'objet de deux traductions, accompagnant de nouveaux recueils 
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d'epigrammes: l'une du Toulousain Germain de La Faille, en 1689, 
l'autre de l'avocat auvergnat Brugiere de Barante, en 1698, reeditee en 
1700 et 1720. Traductions peu satisfaisantes et que nous negligerons au 
profit de l'original latin, mais qui signalent un succes durable. Aucun 
ouvrage d'esthetique du XVIIe siecle ne connut pareille diffusion.24 
Sous la plume de Nicole comme sous celle de Corneille, la distinction 
entre vraie et fausse beaute suppose qu'est adoptee sur l'oeuvre d'art une 
perspective critique. C'est meme en vue du choix des epigrammes a faire 
entrer dans le recueil que l'auteur aurait elabore ses principes.25 En fait, 
son dessein a pris une tout autre ampleur. II entend traiter de la beaute 
comme Descartes a traite de la verite. 
La demarche initiale de Nicole est calquee sur celle du Discours de la 
Methode. Prenant acte de la diversite des opinions, Descartes denonce les 
tendances humaines qui empechent l'esprit de bien juger, notamment la 
precipitation et la prevention. Contre la tentation du scepticisme, il a 
recours, non a la lec,on des Anciens, mais a l'usage du bon sens commun 
a tous les hommes et qu'il s'agit seulement de bien employer. II construit 
done une methode permettant de "bien conduire sa raison et chercher la 
verite dans les sciences." Nicole commence aussi par remarquer la diver-
site des opinions, fut-ce entre hommes cultives, touchant la beaute de ce 
qu'il nomme "scripta," de ce qu'on appellerait aujourd'hui les oeuvres 
litteraires. C'est que la prevention et la precipitation gatent le jugement 
esthetique: "Ommes temere conceptatn opinionem ac itnpressum sibi 
sine animaduersione et judicio sensum in judicando sequuntur."16 II n'en 
faut pas pour autant tomber dans le scepticisme, qui reduit le jugement 
esthetique au jeu des fantaisies individuelles. II n'est que de s'en rapporter 
a la raison, qui fournira une idee de la vraie beaute propre a servir de 
pierre de touche et a la distinguer de la fausse. N'allons pas nous me-
prendre sur le sens du mot "raison," qui demeure tres souple. II conduit 
essentiellement a la nature, une nature dans laquelle seront mis en valeur 
les traits universels. II n'exclut pas que l'oeuvre d'art soit d'abord faite 
pour plaire et que toute beaute vise le plaisir, mais ce plaisir doit etre, 
non mobile et changeant, mais ferme et stable.27 Nous demeurons dans 
l'univers de l'"honnete homme." 
Nicole elabore done a son tour une methode, aussi differente des regies 
edictees par les doctes que la methode cartesienne de la logique 
d'Aristote. Mais, par la force des choses, le parallelisme avec le Discours 
de la Methode se fait moins rigoureux. La beaute ne peut pas se compo­
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ser, comme la verite, a partir de l'evidence et en allant du simple au 
complexe. Elle ne peut etre reconnue par une deduction conduite selon le 
modele geometrique. Elle ne peut etre saisie que globalement. Meme s'il 
existe des beautes de detail, ce n'est pas leur simple somme qui constitue 
la beaute d'un ensemble. Aussi les regies de la methode de Nicole sont­
elles en meme temps des principes caracterisant la structure de la beaute, 
un peu comme chez Descartes, au-dela de la methode, est pose, comme 
fondement de la physique, le principe que tout, dans la naturel corporelle, 
se fait par figure et mouvement. 
Nicole pose done deux principes, qui sont en meme temps deux regies: 
Pour etre belle, une chose doit avoir convenance avec sa propre nature et 
avoir convenance avec la nature de l'homme, entendons de l'homme en 
general.28 La perception de la beaute est done celle d'un double rapport, 
l'un interne a Pobjet, l'autre unissant Pobjet a l'homme. La difficulte du 
systeme de Nicole reside, non pas dans ces principes, premiere expression 
coherente et profonde d'une esthetique moderne, mais dans leur applica­
tion. Le souci de rationalisation dont ils temoignent ne va pas, comme on 
peut l'observer aussi dans la physique cartesienne, sans porter atteinte a 
la complexite des choses. La conciliation necessaire de l'un et du divers 
forme le grand ecueil de toute theorie esthetique: Nicole s'y est heurte. II 
est permis de douter que sa vraie beaute soit une beaute universelle. 
La puissance de sa synthese n'en est pas moins remarquable. Les deux 
regies posees s'appliquent d'abord au beau dans la nature. Une chose 
convient a sa propre nature lorsqu'elle ne comporte ni exces ni defaut, en 
somme lorsqu'elle est "recte constituta." Elle convient a la nature de 
l'homme lorsqu'elle plait—a la fois aux sens et a l'esprit—mais d'un plai­
sir tel que peut l'eprouver une nature "emendata et bene composita."29 
La norme est assez vague. La veritable beaute se situe dans une sorte de 
juste milieu. 
Mais e'est surtout aux oeuvres d'art, et principalement aux oeuvres 
litteraires, que Nicole entend appliquer ses principes. L'art litteraire use 
comme instrument du discours, sous les deux formes traditionnelles que 
sont Peloquence et la poesie. Trois composantes s'y reconnaissent: les 
sons, qui s'adressent a l'oreille, les mots, qui signifient les choses, les 
idees, "sententiae," qui viennent de l'auteur. En ces trois domaines, la 
vraie beaute resulte de la convenance etablie avec la nature des choses et 
avec la nature de l'homme. 
A propos des choses, la situation change lorsqu'on passe de la beaute 
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naturelle a la beaute artistique et litteraire. La nature est a elle-meme son 
propre referent: la convenance a reconnaitre reside, comme on l'a vu, a 
Pinterieur de Pobjet. Dans l'oeuvre litteraire, deux categories d'objets 
sont a considerer, ceux de la nature et ceux du discours, les seconds se 
referant aux premiers. La convenance doit s'etablir entre les uns et les 
autres. 
II ne fait pas l'ombre d'un doute, pour Nicole, que Part est imitation. 
Les sons, les mots et les idees sont a prendre comme le moyen d'une 
imitation fideie. L'idee de vivacite, par exemple, sera suggeree par un son 
rapide. La convenance des mots avec les choses sera respectee lorsque les 
grands mots seront employes pour designer les grandes choses et les mots 
simples pour designer les choses simples. Les figures et les ornements ont 
leurs emplois appropries, en rapport avec les choses auxquelles ils s'ap-
pliquent. Pour les idees, qui expriment la personnalite de Pauteur, refletee 
aussi bien par ses opinions que par sa maniere, par le fond comme par la 
forme, elles ne s'accorderont avec les choses que si elles se referent au seul 
vrai. Meme la fiction ne peut etre belle que si son mensonge dit la verite. 
Les auteurs ne se refugient dans le faux que par impuissance: car la verite 
est enfermee en d'etroites limites, alors que le champ de Perreur est infini. 
Qu'est-ce done que la verite dans les idees? On admettra sans peine que 
les passions doivent etre conformes a la nature des personnages aux­
quelles elles sont pretees. Mais la severite de Nicole va parfois tres loin: 
il blame les allusions mythologiques, les pointes reposant sur des equi­
voques, les hyperboles et toutes les formes d'exageration, ce qui 
condamne l'oeuvre d'un Rabelais, le manque de clarte dans les intentions, 
les descriptions negatives, en somme tout ce qui, dans Part, est jeu sur la 
matiere meme de Part, e'est-a-dire sur le langage, tout ce qui manifeste 
indiscretement la presence de Pauteur.30 
Lorsqu'il s'agit de definir la vraie beaute par sa convenance a la nature 
de Phomme, la consideration successive du son, des mots et des pensees 
s'impose de nouveau. Mais desormais il n'est plus necessaire d'aller 
jusqu'a Pobjet; Panalyse porte entierement sur le discours. Le plaisir de 
Phomme raisonnable devient le critere de la vraie beaute. 
En quoi consiste Pagrement du son? Nicole tire de Ciceron l'idee que, 
dans Peloquence, ce qui charme Poreille est un juste equilibre entre le long 
et le bref, qu'il s'agisse des syllabes, des phrases ou du discours dans son 
ensemble. En matiere de poesie, Pexigence de produire des sons agreables 
est encore plus contraignante, d'autant que la poesie est un discours har­
monieux, oratio modulata. Mais le charme des vers suppose encore rea­
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lise un equilibre difficile entre deux extremes. L'harmonie est insuffisante 
lorsque le poete se contente de suivre les regies de la prosodie sans tenir 
compte de la valeur et du rapport des sons. Elle est excessive, ou plutot 
vaine et vide, lorsqu'elle est recherchee pour elle-meme, sans que le son 
soit soutenu par le sens. La verite de la nature humaine, comme celle de 
l'art, reside dans le juste milieu.31 
Dans l'emploi des mots, Nicole estime que ce qui plait est la confor­
mite a l'usage: en quoi il se revele disciple de Vaugelas et fidele a l'ideal 
de l'"honnete homme." Dans la ligne de ses principes, il conc.oit l'usage 
comme un juste milieu entre l'archaisme et la neologisme. Il n'est pas 
toutefois sans percevoir une contradiction entre ce respect de l'usage et la 
quete d'une beaute eternelle. Aussi, pour instaurer une liaison plus fon­
damentale entre la nature humaine et l'usage des mots, est-il conduit a 
avancer une des idees les plus originates, sinon les plus convaincantes, de 
son etude. Dans la nature humaine, selon un schema que Ton trouve aussi 
exploite, a d'autres fins, dans le Traite des Passions de Descartes,32 il voit 
un melange de force et de faiblesse. La tension constante est insuppor­
table, de meme que le relachement continuel. De la vient qu'en musique, 
la tension des consonances appelle le relachement des dissonances. Dans 
le discours, la grandeur continue fatigue, de meme qu'une trop longue 
simplicity. La variete est necessaire. Consequence principale: l'expression 
directe de la verite, par un discours sans figures, manifestation de force, 
doit parfois ceder le pas a l'expression metaphorique, qui, introduisant 
un ecart avec la pure verite, contente la nature humaine avide de change­
ment, manifestation de faiblesse. Reste qu'il faut user sobrement de cette 
necessite; la poesie, par exemple, ne doit pas devenir mascarade. Le juste 
milieu demeure la regie.33 
Dans l'expression des idees, obtenir la convenance avec la nature hu-
maine n'est encore autre chose que de rechercher ce qui plait et de fuir ce 
qui deplait. C'est, en definitive, respecter strictement les bienseances. Est 
condamne comme fausse beaute tout ce qui choque la pudeur, toute pein­
ture d'un objet repoussant: une vieille edentee, un poete crotte, toute 
bouffonnerie et toute bassesse, toute manifestation gratuite de malignite 
qui fait rire de malheurs dont les victimes ne sont pas responsables. S'il 
faut fuir certains sujets, il ne faut pas moins eviter, dans l'expression, ce 
qui detruit Pequilibre entre le langage et la pensee: surabondance des 
paroles, banalite des idees, jeux de mots artificiels. Comme il lui arrive 
souvent, Nicole insiste plus ici sur ce qui deplait que sur ce qui plait.34 
En definitive, si, dans 1'application des principes, son systeme offre 
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quelque rigidite, ce n'est pas par fidelite aux lois de la rhetorique antique, 
qu'il s'agit au contraire de depasser: ce systeme est moderne. Ce n'est pas 
non plus pour se reclamer de la raison et de la verite, notions souples qui 
renvoient a l'art de plaire. C'est pour s'appuyer sur une conception trop 
etroite du plaisir de l'art et de l'esprit de l'"honnete homme" pris pour 
reference. Le desir d'elaborer un modele d'humanite generale et constante 
aboutit a plaider pour un juste milieu, au fond aristotelicien, qui risque 
fort de deboucher sur la convention et l'academisme. 
Pour aller plus au fond de cette pensee et en faire apercevoir malgre 
tout la profondeur, il est bon de faire ressortir que Nicole se represente 
constamment l'art litteraire sur le modele, moins de la peinture, comme 
dans la tradition rhetorique, que de la musique. Les comparaisons musi­
cales sont frequentes sous sa plume et Pidee d'harmonie y revient 
constamment. La theorie meme de la vraie beaute lui emprunte ses fonde­
ments. La convenance interne de l'oeuvre se constitue comme une sorte 
d'unite musicale, comparable a celle d'un accord. Le rapport des sons, 
des mots et des idees avec les choses apparait moins comme un reflet que 
comme une harmonic Quant a la convenance externe entre l'oeuvre et la 
nature de l'homme, elle rappelle les theories fort en vogue au XVIIe siecle 
sur le rapport de la musique avec les moeurs. On ne sera done pas surpris 
de relever d'etroites affinites entre l'esthetique de Nicole et celle qui s'ex-
prime dans le Compendium musicae, ecrit de jeunesse de Descartes, 
compose en 1618, inconnu du public avant la traduction qu'en donna le 
P. Poisson en 1668, mais dont les cartesiens de Port-Royal pouvaient 
avoir quelque idee. Raisonnant en "honnete homme," Descartes affirme 
fortement que la fin de la musique est de plaire. Sans meconnaitre les 
caracteres internes de l'harmonie musicale, il insiste sur l'idee que la 
beaute, en musique, est liee a la structure de l'homme. Le plaisir eprouve 
a l'audition du son depend de la disposition de l'oreille: "Ce qui fait que 
la voix de l'homme nous agree plus que les autres, c'est seulement parce 
qu'elle est plus conforme a la nature de nos espirts."35 La musique doit 
etre perdue avec clarte mais l'exces de facilite est aussi blamable que 
l'exces de difficulte. La variete est aussi une exigence de notre nature: elle 
veut que les dissonances viennent briser la continuite des consonances. 
En somme, la musique etablit un rapport constant entre les sons et les 
passions. Chez Nicole comme chez Descartes, la reference a la musique 
denote un certain climat platonicien, qui n'exclut pas les elements aris­
toteliciens deja mentionnes.36 
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Sans nous ecarter beaucoup de Nicole, nous decouvrirons une nouvelle 
mise en oeuvre de la distinction entre vraie et fausse beaute dans les Pen-
sees de Pascal. A vrai dire, la distinction n'y est pas operee d'une maniere 
aussi formelle que dans la Dissertation. Mais, si les termes "vrai" et 
"faux" n'y sont jamais opposes symetriquement, c'est sans doute pour 
eviter toute lourdeur pedante. En fait, la distinction existe d'une maniere 
sous-jacente dans la plupart des fragments des Pensees qui touchent a 
l'esthetique. 
Des lors, une question se pose. Comment expliquer les nombreuses 
affinites decelables entre ces pensees, dont la redaction a pu s'echelonner 
entre 1656 et 1662, et la Dissertation publiee en 1659, mais peut-etre sur 
le chantier, ou deja composee, vers 1655-16$6?37 Les Pensees sont-elles 
inspirees de la Dissertation? Ou bien Pascal a-t-il ete l'initiateur et Nicole 
a-t-il tire un parti decisif de sa conversation?38 Ou bien les deux ecrits 
demeurent-ils independants? 
L'examen des textes autorise une seule certitude. Une pensee, intitulee 
Epigrammes de Martial*9 se refere incontestablement au recueil publie 
en 1659 et lui est posterieure. On observera que Pascal y emet, a propos 
d'une epigramme, des reserves sur le choix effectue dans le recueil, et qu'il 
nuance la theorie qui, dans la Dissertation, donnait la malignite pour 
toujours deplaisante. Par rapport a YEpigrammatum delectus dans son 
ensemble, Pascal se situe done comme devant un ouvrage etranger. II n'a 
pas participe a son elaboration. 
Est-ce a dire que Nicole n'ait pas rec,u certaines suggestions de Pascal? 
A la fin de la preface, l'auteur declare n'avoir pas seulement puise ses 
principes dans son propre esprit et dans les livres des Anciens, mais dans 
la conversation des "honnetes gens": "ex virorum omni eruditione praes­
tantium, et multo vitae elegantioris usu verae urbanitatis intelligentium 
sermonibus."40 Ses principales sources sont done modernes et orales. De 
tous ceux dont les reflexions ont pu l'enrichir, Pascal est sans aucun doute 
celui que, depuis 1655, il rencontrait le plus frequemment. 
Ce n'est pas a dire que Pascal n'ait aussi profite de la frequentation de 
Nicole et que chacun d'eux n'ait pu faire sur l'autre l'essai de ses idees. 
Mais il y a tout lieu de croire que les deux systemes sont independants. 
Aux idees exprimees dans la Dissertation beaucoup de pensees font 
exactement echo, un echo toujours plus dense et plus brillant: "Je hais 
egalement le bouffon et Penfle. . . . On ne consulte que l'oreille parce 
qu'on manque de coeur"; "L'eloquence continue ennuie"; "Changer de 
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figure a cause de notre faiblesse."41 Ailleurs la pensee est encore la meme, 
mais elle est exprimee avec une precision et une virulence etrangeres a la 
Dissertation: "Toutes les fausses beautes que nous blamons en Ciceron 
ont des admirateurs et en grand nombre." 42 Ou bien elle s'enrichit et se 
nuance: "II faut de l'agreable et du reel, mais il faut que cet agreable soit 
lui-meme pris du vrai." 43 Ou bien encore, a partir d'un meme principe, 
elle fournit une vue tout a fait originale: "Symetrie: en ce qu'on voit d'une 
vue . . . et fondee aussi sur la figure de l'homme: d'ou il arrive qu'on ne 
veut la symetrie qu'en largeur, non en hauteur ni profondeur." ** Enfin le 
modele musical est brillamment exploiter "On croit toucher des orgues 
ordinaires en touchant l'homme. .  . ."45 Mais Pascal est beaucoup plus 
sensible que Nicole a la difficulte de trouver la convenance entre l'homme 
et les choses qui constitue la vraie beaute. Adopte-t-il les memes principes 
qu'il est beaucoup plus prudent dans leur application. 
Si Ton aborde les deux series de pensees ou sont opposees, de la ma­
niere la plus precise, la vraie et la fausse beaute, on decouvre de grandes 
differences de perspective entre Nicole et Pascal. 
La premiere serie est formee de trois fragments, qui figurent ensemble 
sur le meme papier, celui qui est au centre portant seul un titre, Beaute 
poetique.46 Pris sous la dictee, ils sont de la main d'un des secretaires de 
Pascal et figurent dans l'unite XXIII de la seconde partie de la Copie des 
Pensees, intitulee Miscellanea. Leur date exacte est actuellement impos­
sible a determiner, mais ils ont de fortes chances d'etre anterieurs a la 
publication de YEpigrammatum delectus. 
Le premier offre le caractere le plus general. L'idee fondamentale est 
exprimee des le debut: 
II y a un certain modele d'agrement et de beaute qui consiste en un 
certain rapport entre notre nature, faible ou forte, telle qu'elle est, et la 
chose qui nous plait. 
Des rapprochements avec la Dissertation s'imposent: la consideration 
de la force et de la faiblesse de la nature humaine, l'idee d'une beaute 
definie par le rapport que l'objet reconnu beau entretient avec l'homme. 
Mais les differences sautent aux yeux. Dans la definition de la vraie 
beaute par Nicole, Pascal neglige tout l'element objectif, ou interne, tout 
ce qui tient a la structure de l'objet ou a la relation entre l'oeuvre d'art et 
le reel. Pour lui, semble-t-il, la connaissance de l'objet etant deja relative 
a l'homme, Pobjectivite veritable n'existe pas; seule compte la relation de 
l'homme a l'objet: la pensee deja citee sur la symetrie montre dans l'har-
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monie interne de l'objet le reflet de la structure de rhomme. De plus, 
Pascal complete l'idee de beaute par celle d'agrement, source d'un plaisir 
esthetique plus simple, plus familier: Pascal a, plus profondement que 
Nicole, regu l'empreinte de la societe mondaine. Mais surtout son effort 
de systematisation est plus penetrant. II introduit la notion capitale de 
modele.47 Au lieu d'enumerer, comme le fait Nicole, les exigences de la 
nature humaine dont la satisfaction determine la reconnaissance de la 
beaute, il s'attache a saisir globalement, synthetiquement, le rapport de 
l'homme a l'objet qui definit le modele de la beaute. Une beaute qui n'est 
pas situee dans l'objet meme, mais se presente comme une qualite auto-
nome, un mode de la relation que l'objet entretient avec l'homme. 
Posant un principe plus profond que Nicole, Pascal en deduit aussi des 
consequences plus generates. Le modele est independant de l'objet qui a 
servi a le definir. II peut convenir a d'autres objets: "Tout ce qui est forme 
sur ce modele nous agree, soit maison, chanson, discours, vers, prose, 
femme, oiseaux, rivieres, arbres, chambres, habits, etc." Autre trait de 
generalisation: la beaute ainsi definie n'est pas seulement celle des 
oeuvres d'art, mais aussi celle des objets de la nature. Entre toutes les 
beautes particulieres s'etablissent des correspondances, au sens baudelai­
rien du terme. 
Le modele est-il uniqeu? On pourrait assurement distinguer plusieurs 
types de beautes, et Panalyse de Pascal n'exclut pas ce prolongement de 
sa these. Mais ce n'est pas dans cette voie qu'il s'engage. II n'y a pour lui 
qu'un seule modele de ce que Nicole appelait la vraie beaute: "Tout ce 
qui n'est point fait sur ce modele deplait a ceux qui ont le gout bon." 
Ce n'est pas la raison, comme chez Nicole, mais le gout48 qui fait dis­
tinguer la vraie et la fausse beaute. La difference est moins sensible que le 
vocabulaire, entendu selon ses connotations actuelles, pourrait le laisser 
croire. Mais chez Pascal, Descartes semble bien loin et la reference a 
l'ideal de l'"honnete homme" est plus accusee. De plus, au lieu de definir, 
comme l'aurait fait Nicole, les caracteristiques du bon gout, Pascal en fait 
le privilege de certaines personnes. Le gout peut sans doute s'apprendre, 
mais il peut difficilement se raisonner. 
Unique est done le "bon modele." II y a aussi de "mauvais modeles": 
il y en a meme "une infinite." Pour chaque mauvais modele, le meme jeu 
de correspondances s'etablit qu'a propos de l'unique vrai: "Chaque mau­
vais sonnet, sur quelque faux modele qu'il soit fait, ressemble parfaite­
ment a une femme vetue sur ce modele." 
On voit que Pascal change progressivement d'adjectif, "mauvais" lais­
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sant la place a "faux." II parle ensuite d'un "faux sonnet," c'est-a-dire 
non pas d'un sonnet infidele aux lois du genre, mais charge d'une fausse 
beaute. On reconnait le mouvement de langage deja signale a propos de 
Corneille. 
Comment se construit le "faux modele"? Sans doute sur une discor­
dance entre la nature humaine et Pobjet juge beau. Toutefois, le gout se 
revele plus juste, plus universel, pour certains objets que pour d'autres: 
la beaute d'une femme—il s'agit plutot de sa parure—est plus aisee a 
juger que celle d'un sonnet. Pour apprecier un sonnet, il faut en degager 
le modele et imaginer une femme qui lui corresponde. C'est le jeu des 
ressemblances qui fonde la rationalite du systeme pascalien. 
Cette methode de correspondance est plus amplement developpee dans 
le fragment intitule Beaute poetique. Mais elle est introduite par une 
autre voie: 
Comme on dit beaute poetique on devrait aussi dire beaute geometrique 
et beaute medicinale; mais on ne le dit pas, et la raison en est qu'on sait 
bien quel est l'objet de la geometrie et qu'il consiste en preuve, et quel est 
l'objet de la medecine et qu'il consiste en la guerison. Mais on ne sait pas 
en quoi consiste Pagrement, qui est l'objet de la poesie. On ne sait ce que 
c'est que ce modele naturel qu'il faut imiter et, a faute de cette connais­
sance, on a invente de certains termes bizarres, siecle d'or, merveille de 
nos jours, fatal, etc., et on appelle ce jargon beaute poetique. 
Pourquoi cette comparaison entre poesie, geometrie et medecine? Cha­
cune de ces disciplines entretient un certain rapport avec l'homme et vise 
a son sujet un certain but: la preuve, pour la geometrie; la guerison, pour 
la medecine; l'agrement, pour la poesie. Preuve et guerison s'imposent a 
l'esprit et aux sens: on ne peut s'y meprendre. La categorie du vrai suffit 
a en rendre compte; il n'y a pas lieu de faire appel au beau. C'est 
lorsqu'une preuve est douteuse, peut-etre aussi lorsqu'un traitement me­
dical est juge independamment de son effet, qu'on peut parler, comme le 
fait Pascal ironisant sur les theories du P. Noel a propos du vide, de "belle 
pensee."49 Or l'objet de la poesie est insaisissable et sujet a discussion. 
Des lors s'applique la loi definie dans une autre pensee: "L'esprit croit 
naturellement et la volonte aime naturellement, de sorte qu'a faute de 
vrais objets il faut qu'ils s'attachent aux faux."50 Faute de connaitre la 
beaute naturelle, l'esprit invente une beaute artificielle, qu'il nomme 
"beaute poetique." Pascal, comme le montrent les variantes, avait 
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d'abord pense dire "langage poetique." La fausse beaute est en effet rap­
portee a l'emploi d'un certain "jargon." 
Un tel raisonnement devrait aboutir au scepticisme esthetique. En fait, 
la denonciation d'une fausse beaute implique l'existence d'une vraie 
beaute, si difficile qu'elle soit a percevoir. La regie du modele permet de 
saisir la beaute des vers par comparaison avec la beaute d'une femme. 
Elle invite a exclure la surcharge et l'abus des ornements, qui denotent le 
mauvais gout populaire ou pedant: 
Mais qui s'imaginera une femme sur ce modele-la, qui consiste a dire de 
petites choses avec de grands mots, verra une jolie demoiselle toute pleine 
de miroirs et de chaines, dont il rira, parce qu'il sait mieux en quoi 
consiste l'agrement d'une femme que l'agrement des vers. Mais ceux qui 
ne s'y connaitraient pas l'admireraient en cet equipage, et il y a bien des 
villages ou on la prendrait pour la reine; et c'est pourquoi nous appelons 
les sonnets faits sur ce modele-la les reines de village. 
Au fond, le domaine de la beaute est celui de l'apparence. La vraie 
beaute se distingue de la verite en ce qu'elle est verite d'une apparence, 
dont les caracteristiques tiennent a celles de la nature humaine. Elle n'a 
pas le meme statut que la preuve ou la guerison, qui appartiennent au 
reel. Le troisieme fragment montre bien sur quel terrain se situe Pascal: 
celui de l'"honnete homme," conc,u par lui comme l'homme universel, 
porteur au supreme degre de la nature humaine et s'exprimant en son 
nom: "Les gens universels ne sont appeles ni poetes, ni geometres, etc. 
Mais ils sont tout cela et juges de tous ceux-la. . . . C'est done une fausse 
louange qu'on donne a un homme quand on dit de lui lorsqu'il entre qu'il 
est fort habile en poesie; et c'est une mauvaise marque quand on n'a pas 
recours a un homme quand il s'agit de juger de quelques vers." "Poete et 
non honnete homme," dit ailleurs Pascal.51 Et, en meme temps: "La regie 
est l'honnetete." Le poete n'est pas celui qui fait metier de poesie. II n'a 
pas une specialite, il n'use pas d'un langage qui lui serait propre. La vraie 
poesie exprime l'humanite meme. On a vu que l'auteur de Discours de la 
Methode ne pensait guere autrement. 
Le seconde serie de pensees s'applique particulierement a l'autre volet 
de l'art litteraire: l'eloquence, "La vraie eloquence se moque de l'elo-
quence; la vraie morale se moque de la morale. C'est-a-dire que la morale 
du jugement se moque de la morale de l'esprit, qui est sans regies. Car le 
jugement est celui a qui appartient le sentiment, comme les sciences ap­
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partiennent a l'esprit. La finesse est la part du jugement; la geometrie est 
celle de l'esprit."52 Comme la pretendue "beaute poetique" etait une 
fausse beaute, Peloquence pure et simple est ici une fausse eloquence. 
C'est celle qui releve de la rhetorique et non de la vie: nous retrouvons 
l'idee de Descartes. 
Mais la pensee de Pascal, par rapport a celle de Descartes comme a 
celle de Nicole, comporte d'importants elements nouveaux. Elle introduit 
d'abord une comparaison tres eclairante entre Peloquence et la morale. 
L'eloquence a pour fin de persuader. La vraie eloquence entend s'adapter 
aux lois de la nature humaine, qu'il s'agit de toucher. La fausse eloquence 
se veut essentiellement fidele aux lois de la rhetorique. De meme, la vraie 
morale conduit Phomme vers le bien par Peducation de sa conscience. La 
fausse morale substitue a la consideration du vecu celle de preceptes ar­
tificiels qui, a la limite, dispensent de la conscience: c'est Pune des lemons 
des Provinciates. 
On voit comment s'etablit Popposition fondamentale entre le juge­
ment et l'esprit. Le premier s'applique a la vraie eloquence et a la vraie 
morale; le second a la fausse eloquence et a la fausse morale. Les deux 
termes se precisent par deux autres: la finesse, qui ressortit au jugement; 
la geometrie, qui ressortit a l'esprit. A quoi s'ajoute un autre terme, qui 
se rapporte au jugement, le sentiment, sorte d'intuition, proche du gout 
esthetique et de la conscience morale. 
L'esprit s'exerce normalement dans le domaine de la geometrie, ou "les 
principes sont palpables, mais eloignes de Pusage commun."53 La geo­
metrie est une construction intellectuelle, dont le rapport a la realite est 
sans importance. Le jugement est un autre nom de l'esprit de finesse, qui 
est aussi un esprit, mais pour lequel "les principes sont dans Pusage 
commun et devant les yeux de tout le monde." C'est en effet a Phomme 
et a la vie qu'il s'applique: ou les principes sont faciles a voir, mais telle­
ment nombreux qu'il est presque impossible d'en oublier, c'est-a-dire d'e-
viter l'erreur. Pour reprendre l'idee de Beaute poetique, il n'y a pas de 
beaute en geometrie parce que la verite y est atteinte d'une maniere rigou­
reuse. II y a beaute en eloquence parce qu'il est presque impossible de 
persuader en verite. Selon les analyses de Pecrit intitule De I'Art de per­
suader, Porateur doit a la fois toucher l'esprit et le coeur, convaincre et 
agreer, s'adapter aux opinions et aux desirs de son auditoire: tache d'une 
complexite extreme, surtout dans sa seconde partie. Toutefois, par cette 
distinction de la geometrie et de la finesse, Pascal se degage du scepticisme 
sans tomber dans le rationalisme tres sec de Nicole. 
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Reste la difficult^ majeure du texte. Qu'est-ce qui est sans regies, le 
jugement ou Pesprit? Grammaticalement, c'est l'esprit. Faut-il, avec plu­
sieurs editeurs, rapporter le relatif a P antecedent la plus eloigne? Rien ne 
permet de croire que pour Pascal le jugement n'obeisse a aucune regie. 
Ainsi declare-t-il qu'il y a "des regies aussi sures pour plaire que pour 
demontrer,"54 encore qu'il soit presque "impossible d'y arriver." Ces 
regies sont en effet beaucoup plus souples que celles qui regardent Pesprit. 
On peut en definir Porientation generale par la pensee deja citee: "La 
regie est Phonnetete." Nous proposerons done de preter au texte son sens 
le plus naturel, mais en interpretant "sans regies veritables" ou 
"adequates." 
Fait curieux, un autre fragment des Pensees traitant des regies 
comporte une difficulte analogue: "Ceux qui jugent d'un ouvrage sans 
regie sont a Pegard des autres comme ceux qui ont une montre a Pegard 
des autres. L'un dit: il y a deux heures; Pautre dit: il n'y a que trois quarts 
d'heure. Je regarde ma montre et je dis a l'un: vous vous ennuyez; et a 
Pautre: le temps ne vous dure guere, car il y a une heure et demie. Et je 
me moque de ceux qui disent que le temps me dure a moi et que j'en juge 
par fantaisie. Us ne savent pas que j'en juge par ma montre."55 
Incontestablement, la necessite d'une regie est ici affirmee. Faut-il cor­
riger en substituant, soit, au debut, avec Pedition de Port-Royal, "par 
regie," soit, dans la suite, avec Brunschvicg, "n'ont pas de montre"? II 
suffit de reconnaitre qu'involontairement, Pascal a pratique une inver­
sion, une sorte de chiasme, qui rend erronee la lettre du texte, mais sans 
obscurcir son sens. II va de soi que cette regie est la nature humaine essen­
tielle, ideale, a laquelle s'opposent les fantaisies des individus. La vraie 
mesure du temps est perdue par Phomme equilibre. 
Si Pascal n'utilise pas le mot de "beaute" a propos de Peloquence, la 
notion est impliquee dans ses analyses d'une maniere analogue a celle qui 
s'exprime a propos de la poesie. 
Pascal introduit une complexite, une souplesse et une profondeur 
toutes nouvelles dans des reflexions qu'il est impossible de reduire a celles 
de Nicole. Les deux auteurs se distinguent encore d'une fa^on remar­
quable par la portee qu'ils assignent a leur theorie de la beaute. Nicole se 
situe etroitement sur le terrain du jugement esthetique, negligeant tout 
prolongement philosophique et surtout religieux. Au contraire, chez Pas­
cal, la conception de la vraie et de la fausse beaute entre dans une vision 
du monde plus vaste. Les deux esthetiques sont de caractere strictement 
anthropologique. Si elles debordent le scepticisme, elles n'aboutissent ni 
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Tune ni l'autre a une conception ontologique du beau, a la maniere de 
Platon, auquel saint Augustin fait echo, notamment dans le De vera reli­
gione. Mais, si la Dissertation laisse de cote christianisme et augusti­
nisme, les Pensees s'attachent a saisir le rapport entre la partie et le tout. 
L'esthetique de Pascal se rapporte clairement au domaine de Phomme 
sans Dieu. La beaute, on Pa vu, n'est que d'apparences; elle ne touche a 
rien d'essentiel. Lorsque la verite est accessible, fut-ce la verite humaine 
de la geometrie, la beaute n'a plus sa place. De meme, les verites divines 
ne sont pas sujettes a Part de persuader.56 La preuve de Pexistence de Dieu 
par Pharmonie de la nature, "le ciel et les oiseaux,"57 est inefficace et 
ridicule. L'homme avec Dieu s'eleve au-dela de la beaute. 
Peut-etre vaudrait-il mieux dire que le beau change alors de nature et 
qu'il se confond avec le bien. En tout cas, le passage de la nature a Dieu 
s'opere selon un schema qui comporte aussi les deux termes de "vrai" et 
de "faux," appliques desormais au Bien. "L'homme sans la foi" s'attache 
a une multitude d'objets, ombres, fantomes du "vrai bien" qui est seul 
Pobjet reel de sa quete. Comme "l'homme universel" etait juge de la vraie 
beaute terrestre, le vrai bien, qui se confond avec Dieu, presente aussi ce 
caractere d'universalite.58 La theorie janseniste de la "delectation" peut 
rendre compte de ces affinites entre Part de plaire et le jeu de la grace. 
C'est encore un passage du faux au vrai, plus precisement de Pappa­
rence a la realite, que Pon saisit par Interpretation des figures de la Bible, 
capitale dans Pargumentation apologetique de Pascal. "Vrai jeune, vrai 
sacrifice, vrai temple," vraie liberte, "vrai pain du ciel":59 les figures de la 
Bible sont comme les figures de rhetorique telles que les analyse Nicole. 
Elles s'ecartent du vrai, mais leur seule justification est de signifier le vrai. 
En s'exprimant par figures et en verite, Dieu s'adapte a la nature hu-
maine, faible et forte a la fois. "L'unique objet de PEcriture est la charite." 
Mais cet "unique but" n'est pas toujours designe au sens propre, il Pest 
parfois au sens figure. "Dieu diversifie ainsi cet unique precepte de charite 
pour satisfaire notre curiosite qui recherche la diversite par cette diversite 
qui nous mene toujours a notre unique necessaire."60 Les lois qui presi­
dent a Pexpression de la beaute humaine president aussi a celle de la 
verite divine. 
Le propre de Dieu parlant aux hommes est done d'employer le langage 
de la vraie beaute. La "modestie"—la mesure—est le caractere du style 
evangelique:61 nulle outrance, nulle "affectation." Jesus-Christ "dit les 
choses grandes . . . simplement" et "nettement."62 Clarte et "naivete"— 
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naturel—qui caracterisent le sublime. Dieu n'a pas besoin du beau pour 
lui-meme, mais il se sert du beau par convenance a la nature humaine. 
Ainsi, dans le systeme de Pascal, la plus grande ampleur se concilie avec 
la plus rigoureuse coherence. 
Entre Pascal et le chevalier de Mere, comme entre Nicole et Pascal, la 
question d'une influence reciproque est a la fois inevitable et insoluble 
avec precision. De seize ans Paine, s'etant acquis quelque reputation dans 
les cercles parisiens des les alentours de 1640, le gentilhomme poitevin se 
trouvait en position d'autorite vis-a-vis de celui dont il fit la connaissance 
au plus tard en 1653, et qu'il ne cessa de revoir a Pepoque des Pensees, 
lors de ses sejours a Paris.63 Mais pas une seule ligne de lui ne fut publiee 
avant la mort de Pascal. C'est en 1668 que parut son premier et plus 
important ouvrage, ses Conversations avec le marechal de Clerambault, 
suivies du Discours de la Justesse. Des publications ulterieures, il faut 
surtout retenir les trois discours de 1677, Des Agreements, De I'Esprit, De 
la Conversation. Les Lettres, mises au jour en 1682, ne portent pas de 
dates, et, meme si leur destinataire ou leur sujet invite a les tenir pour 
anciennes—c'est le cas pour une longue lettre a Pascal—rien ne prouve 
qu'elles n'aient pas ete remaniees, peut-etre meme fabriquees, pour le 
recueil imprime qui seul les fait connaitre. A sa mort, en 1684, le cheva­
lier laissait encore quelques "discours," publies comme Oeuvres post­
humes par l'abbe Nadal en 1700.64 Entre ces divers ecrits et les Pensees, 
des rapprochements nombreux s'imposent. On ne peut les expliquer 
d'une maniere plausible que par le fait des rapports directs entre les deux 
hommes, qui ont permis une fecondation mutuelle des deux esprits, im­
possible a analyser dans le detail. Mais l'originalite de chacun d'eux est 
indubitable. Il suffit, sur le sujet qui nous occupe, de definir leurs posi­
tions respectives pour faire eclater, a cote des ressemblances, des diver­
gences considerables. 
Nul auteur au XVIIe siecle n'a use plus que Mere de la distinction entre 
le vrai et le faux, dans le domaine de la morale comme dans celui de 
l'esthetique. Avec lui, d'ailleurs, tous les sujets s'interpenetrent. Plus 
completement que les auteurs precedents, il ne separe pas la conception 
du beau de celle des rapports humains. L'"honnete homme" en quete de 
ce qui plait est comme le modele de l'artiste. II fournit en meme temps le 
modele de l'oeuvre d'art, puisque plaire, c'est eveiller chez les autres un 
plaisir de nature presque esthetique. Dans le "commerce du monde," les 
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memes lois s'exercent que dans le domaine des arts. Partout le vrai et le 
faux s'opposent semblablement. 
Dans cette perspective, le regard de Mere explore trois domaines prin­
cipaux. Le plus amplement etudie est celui de 1' "honnetete" comme art 
de vivre. Un traite entier est intitule De la vraie honnetete.6S Elle se definit 
essentiellement par le naturel. Une "douceur etudiee," affectee, se fait hair 
et denonce un "faux honnete homme."66 La recherche du brillant, Tabus 
des "bons mots" a quelque chose de contraint qui deplait. "Je ne sais 
quoi de libre et d'aise fait de bien meilleurs effets."67 La vraie honnetete 
se distingue aussi d'avec la fausse en ce qu'"elle est universelle," "juste et 
raisonnable en tous les endroits du monde."68 
L'attention de Mere se porte ensuite sur un domaine ou s'exerce encore 
T "honnetete" vecue, mais par des moyens qui, mettant en oeuvre le Ian-
gage, font songer au travail de l'artiste. Oeuvre d'art que la conversation, 
que la lettre, que la poesie amoureuse. En tous ces genres, la principale 
vertu a cultiver est la "justesse," terme directement oppose a "faussete."69 
Dans son Discours de la Justesse, Mere s'en prend aux lettres de Voiture, 
en depit de la reputation d'homme habile a plaire qu'elles avaient value a 
leur auteur. Est manque de justesse, non seulement toute impropriete de 
langage, mais toute discordance entre la pensee et l'expression, toute 
pointe et, principalement, Pequivoque:70 on rejoint tres precisement la 
lec,on de Nicole. La sincerite est la condition du beau langage. On le 
constate avec Voiture. "Lorsqu'il est question de toucher le coeur, il 
s'amuse a subtiliser et a dire des gentillesses."71 Au fond, il n'avait jamais 
bien su aimer. Jugement severe, in juste peut-etre, mais la revendication 
de la verite dans l'art exige que Ton prefere les choses aux mots. 
Aux arts majeurs, Mere s'attarde moins longuement. De la conversa­
tion il s'eleve toutefois naturellement a Peloquence. Sa critique de la 
"fausse eloquence"—l'expression est d'autant plus significative que la 
pensee de Pascal sur ce sujet etait encore inedite—apporte l'essentiel: "Je 
remarque souvent, dit-il, que ceux qui parlent trop bien, a ce qu'on dit, 
ne parlent toujours que trop mal; que leurs discours n'ont point de rap­
port au sujet; que Ton sent de Paffectation dans leur maniere et dans le 
ton de leur voix, et qu'enfin ce n'est qu'une fausse eloquence."72 "Rien ne 
reussit mieux que d'etre eloquent sans le paraitre, comme il sied aussi fort 
mal d'en avoir l'apparence et de ne Petre pas."73 Leur souci d'atteindre 
Phomme en verite a fait des Grecs les maitres de tous les arts. "On ne 
peut regarder sans larmes" le tableau du sacrifice d'Iphigenie par Ti­
mante. Par leur musiquc, "en ajustant et diversifiant de certains tons, ils 
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savaient toucher le coeur comme ils voulaient." De meme de leur sculp­
ture, de leur eloquence et de leur poesie.74 Aristote est done infidele a leur 
genie profond pour n'avoir pas "un peu plus naturalise l'art et les 
regies"75—on reconnait un mot de Montaigne. Nouvelle critique adres­
see a la rhetorique. 
Pour mieux saisir Poriginalite de Mere, il convient de s'elever au­
dessus de ces domaines particuliers et de degager sa conception generale 
de la beaute. 
A vrai dire, ce terme est moins employe chez lui que celui d'agrement, 
au singulier ou au pluriel, avec encore la distinction du vrai et du faux. 
Le terme "agrement" est d'une application plus large que celui de 
"beaute"; il convient a tout ce qui plait, de P"honnete homme" aux di­
vers objets de la nature et de l'art. L'unite des vues de Mere s'y reflete 
parfaitement. Mais il designe aussi, comme on Pa vu, une qualite plus 
familiere, plus accessible, que la beaute. Comment se distinguent done 
vrais et faux agrements? Il n'est que de generaliser les remarques deja 
presentees. Est suspect de faussete "tout ce qui brille et qui donne dans 
les yeux," tout ce qui vise "le spectacle et la decoration." Si les enfants, le 
peuple et meme les princes penchent volontiers en ce sens, parce qu'ils 
manquent de formation, en revanche, "les gens faits et qui jugent bien 
n'aiment pas les choses de montre et qui parent beaucoup, quand elles ne 
sont que de peu de valeur. Celles qui n'ont guere d'eclat et qui sont de 
grand prix leur plaisent."76 Les "vrais et profonds agrements"—les deux 
adjectifs sont plusieurs fois associes—ne peu vent resider en des "graces 
superficielles."77 
Qu'est-ce a dire? Le propre des "vrais agrements" est de ne pas 
eblouir. Ils se revelent peu a peu et, par suite, se renouvellent sans cesse. 
L'artiste doit laisser a deviner: "Rien ne temoigne tant que la maniere de 
s'expliquer est noble et parfaite que de laisser comprendre certaines 
choses sans les dire."78 "Les excellents peintres ne peignent pas tout: ils 
donnent de l'exercice a l'imagination et en laissent a penser plus qu'ils 
n'en decouvrent." C'est Pune des grandes vertus de l'art grec. Homere 
"ne s'amuse pas a decrire Helene. Il ne dit presque rien de son visage ni 
de sa taille. Cependant il a persuade a toute la terre que e'etait la plus 
belle femme qu'on ait jamais vue."79 II faut se garder de lasser: "a force 
de se faire admirer, on deviendrait insupportable."80 Les "vrais agre­
ments" resistent au temps. 
On peut encore les caracteriser d'une autre fa^on, qui fait songer a 
Nicole. Ils consistent dans la moderation, la mesure, "dans un bon tern­
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perament," dans une sorte de juste milieu. "Les vrais agrements ne 
veulent rien qui ne soit modere: tout ce qui passe de certaines bornes les 
diminue, ou meme les detruit."81II y faut aussi une exacte proportion. Ce 
n'est pas le detail qui seduit, c'est Pensemble. "Plus les parties dont une 
chose est composee sont comme il faut, plus elle est agreable." Elles valent 
"par un juste rapport qui montre qu'elles sont faites les unes pour les 
autres."82 Enfin Pagreable exclut "la maniere contrainte, ou Ton sent 
beaucoup de travail." "Les agrements aiment la justesse, mais d'une fa-
c,on si naive qu'elle donne a penser que c'est un present de la nature."83 
Cette exaltation des agrements ne va-t-elle pas sans un certain discredit 
de la beaute? II est certain que, comme La Fontaine, Mere est tente de 
trouver la grace "plus belle encore que la beaute."84 Il lui arrive meme 
d'associer la beaute au faux et le vrai a l'agrement. Ainsi distingue-t-il 
deux sortes de "bon air," maniere generale de designer ce qui plait: "Le 
premier et le plus commun est celui qui cherche la pompe et l'eclat; l'autre 
est plus modeste et plus cache. Le premier a beaucoup de rapport avec la 
beaute, et je trouve qu'il lasse aisement, mais cet autre qui se montre 
moins a decouvert, plus on le considere et plus on l'aime. II y a toujours 
dans le premier je ne sais quoi de faux et quelque espece d'illusion; le 
dernier est plus reel quoique plus imperceptible, et je vois qu'il approche 
de l'agrement. L'un donne plus dans la vue aux jeunes gens qui d'ordi-
naire sont bien aises d'etre eblouis, et l'autre plait davantage a ceux qui 
ont le gout fait."85 
Cette critique de la beaute n'est pas sans appel. Pour en sauvegarder le 
prix, il faut fuir ce qui n'en a que l'apparence.86 Le monde est plein de 
choses qui passent pour belles et qui "ne sont point belles."87 C'est ce qui 
se produit lorsqu'on y cherche seulement l'eclat. Mais "les bonnes choses 
sont ou jolies ou belles. Les jolies donnent plus de joie et les belles plus 
d'admiration, mais il faut qu'elles soient belles d'une veritable beaute." 
Le faux existe aussi bien dans les jolies choses que dans les belles; mais 
dans les premieres il se denonce aisement; dans les secondes, il y a souvent 
du "fard" qui "eblouit." Toutefois, "quand elles sont belles d'une veri­
table beaute, elles tiennent le premier rang."88 La beaute possede une 
grandeur qui en fait le prix, mais qui rend plus difficile a satisfaire Texi­
gence de naturel, le refus d'une tension qui sent la contrainte et l'etude, 
la necessite toujours imperieuse "d'avoir encore plus de soin de la naivete 
que de la perfection des choses."89 
Nul mieux que Mere ne permet de comprendre comment la distinction 
du vrai et du faux en matiere de beaute risquait d'atteindre la beaute elle­
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meme. C'est en definitive une esthetique de la grace qu'il propose. 
D'autres s'engageront dans la voie du sublime, qui sauve la beaute par la 
simplicite. Si le terme est inconnu de Mere, l'idee ne lui est pas etrangere. 
Entre ce vrai et ce faux qui envahissent tous les domaines, comment 
l'homme peut-il s'orienter? A quelles facultes doit-il recourir pour les dis­
tinguer? II arrive a Mere de distinguer deux sortes d'esprits, les "inven­
teurs" et "ceux qui n'inventent pas";90 en d'autres termes, les genies 
originaux et les intelligences comprehensives. Nous sommes fort loin de 
Pascal et notre sujet n'en est pas eclaire. 
Precieuse, en revanche, une autre distinction. "II y a deux sortes 
d'etude; l'une qui ne cherche que l'art et les regies; l'autre qui n'y songe 
point du tout, et qui n'a d'autre but que de rencontrer par instinct et par 
reflexions ce qui doit plaire en tous les sujets particuliers."91 Sans exclure 
tout a fait la premiere, qui forme les doctes et porte sur la rhetorique et 
la poetique, Mere affirme sa preference pour la seconde, qui consiste au 
fond dans une mise en oeuvre des ressources de la nature. C'est la voie 
moderne, opposee a celle des Anciens. 
Les termes "instinct" et "reflexions" suggerent la possibility d'une di­
vision a l'interieur de cette seconde categorie. C'est a quoi procede Mere 
lorsque, a plusieurs reprises, il releve deux formes de "justesse," celle de 
P"esprit" et celle du "sentiment,"92 qui contribuent toutes les deux a la 
distinction du vrai et du faux. La justesse de l'esprit "s'exerce sur la verite 
simple et nue"; elle etablit "le vrai rapport que doit avoir une chose avec 
une autre";93 elle se garde de "prendre une circonstance pour le noeud de 
l'affaire," en somme d'"extravaguer," par exemple en critiquant la beaute 
d'une dame a cause de la legerete de sa conduite.94 La justesse du senti­
ment consiste a trouver "le bon temperament . . . entre l'exces et le de­
faut"; elle "ne souffre pas que Ton fasse trop grand ou trop petit ce qui 
veut etre grand ou petit."9S Du sentiment on peut rapprocher le gout, qui 
s'en distingue peu: il est "le sentiment de ce qui sied bien"; il s'acquiert 
par une sorte d'habitude.96 Esprit et sentiment peuvent tous les deux pro-
ceder soit par raisonnement—"reflexion," dit plus souplement Mere— 
soit par intuition, ou "tout d'un coup," encore que la reflexion convienne 
mieux a l'esprit. Pour Mere, la raison ne se confond pas avec l'esprit: elle 
est "une puissance de l'ame commune a l'esprit et au sentiment."97 Le 
gout, d'ailleurs, "se fonde toujours sur des raisons tres solides, mais sans 
raisonner."98 II reste que la justesse du sentiment est beaucoup plus sub­
tile que celle de l'esprit. 
Les affinites de cette distinction avec celle que propose Pascal entre 
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Pesprit de geometrie et Pesprit de finesse, ou entre Pesprit et le jugement, 
sont assez lointaines. Si soucieux de raison que soit Mere—il critique 
meme la "prevention" en termes quasi-cartesiens"—il n'en fait pas 
moins large place a des intuitions qui, pour etre soigneusement distin­
guees de la fantaisie individuelle, n'en traduisent pas moins la spontaneite 
d'une bonne nature, cultivee par un bon maitre, plutot qu'une forme su­
perieure de la raison, comme Pesprit de finesse pascalien. 
Que Pexigence de rationalite soit moindre chez Mere que chez Pascal, 
a plus forte raison que chez Nicole, on peut en donner deux preuves. 
Mere refuse de distinguer Pesprit et le jugement, qui sont pour lui "une 
meme chose." 10° C'est-a-dire que les deux "esprits" pascaliens se regrou­
pent dans la premiere de ses deux "justesses," la plus rationnelle. La se­
conde n'est cependant pas sans offrir quelques points communs avec 
Pesprit de finesse, mais on est loin de la nettete pascalienne. De plus, si 
Mere s'en prend a Aristote, dont la rhetorique et la poetique lui parais­
sent introduire Partifice dans Part, il ne s'en prend pas moins aux geo­
metres modernes, dont la methode est pourtant directement opposee a la 
logique aristotelicienne. Nous avons etabli une continuite entre la re-
flexion de Descartes sur la rhetorique et la poetique et la methode qu'il 
elabore pour "chercher la verite dans les sciences." Avec Mere, le geo­
metre, dont il trouve le modele en Pascal, avec ses "longs raisonnements 
tires de ligne en ligne,"101 est presque aussi eloigne qu'Aristote de la vraie 
connaissance de Phomme. Pascal n'ignore pas que la geometrie s'ecarte 
de la vie par son objet. Mais il voit dans le raisonnement qu'elle met en 
oeuvre le modele de tout bon raisonnement, indispensable meme a 
P"honnete homme" pour faire "Pessai," sinon "Pemploi" de ses forces.102 
Autre difference considerable: Pascal attache la fausse eloquence—ou, 
du moins Peloquence artificielle, apparente—a Pesprit et la vraie elo­
quence au jugement. Pour Mere, les deux justesses collaborent dans Peli­
mination du faux et la reconnaissance du vrai. 
Pour rendre compte de ces differences et achever de caracteriser la pen-
see de Mere sur notre sujet, on remarquera qu'il est moins un theoricien 
qu'un pedagogue. La relation de maitre a eleve est frequemment evoquee 
par lui. S'il parle souvent de modeles, ce n'est pas de modeles abstraits 
comme ceux qu'elabore Pascal, mais de modeles humains dont il invite a 
recueillir Pexemple et les lemons pour acquerir un parfait "discerne­
ment." 103 C'est Phabitude du monde qui fait acquerir un gout si raffine 
qu'il semble tout naturel. Pour lui plus que pour ses predecesseurs, la 
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distinction de la vraie et de la fausse beaute depend des qualites person­
nelles de 1'homme plutot que de l'application d'un methode. 
C'est, jusqu'a plus ample informe, en un milieu tres restreint qu'on a pris 
au XVIIe siecle l'habitude de distinguer vraie et fausse beaute. Pascal est 
tout proche de Mere, tout proche de Nicole, et il a bien connu Corneille. 
Les relations personnelles ont pu jouer, mais surtout l'existence d'un cou­
rant ou s'expriment a la fois une certaine culture et une certaine pensee. 
Fait de culture que l'influence grandissante de la societe mondaine au 
detriment des cercles erudits ou se regroupent les doctes; influence qui se 
manifeste meme a Port-Royal. L'ideal de l'"honnete homme" a contribue 
a fonder sur de nouvelles bases une reflexion sur le beau distincte de la 
consideration des regies de l'art, a susciter l'elaboration d'une esthetique, 
a cote de la rhetorique et de la poetique. L'esprit moderne s'est detourne 
d'Aristote pour reconstruire totalement la philosophic; il a trouve son 
expression la plus forte chez Descartes, maitre plus ou moins direct, et, 
dans une large mesure, involontaire, de nos theoriciens du beau. 
C'est a une pensee de type cartesien qu'ils participent. Au depart, le 
refus du scepticisme, qui se plait a denoncer la diversite des gouts, la 
conviction que la nature humaine comporte des elements universels, rai­
son, bon sens, qui permettent la distinction fondamentale du vrai et du 
faux, attitude a la fois critique et constructive. Au centre de cette pensee, 
Phomme, juge du vrai et du faux en tous domaines, et par rapport auquel 
s'ordonne toute connaissance, celle de Dieu et de l'Etre etant, sinon ne­
gligee, du moins rapportee a des lumieres surnaturelles. Le Beau consi­
dere est le Beau pour l'homme, non le Beau absolu de Platon. 
Si nos auteurs se ressemblent par ces traits communs, ils n'en offrent 
pas moins des individuality differentes. Chacun d'eux se caracterise par 
le dosage qu'il etablit, dans le jugement esthetique, entre le jeu de la rai­
son proprement dite et celui de diverses formes d'intuition. L'evolution 
s'accomplit dans le sens d'une moindre affirmation du role de la raison, 
ce qui risquait de faire prevaloir de nouveau le gout individuel. L'equi-
libre qui conditionnait leur pensee risquait alors de disparaitre. Peut-etre 
est-ce la raison pour laquelle le courant qu'ils representent ne se prolonge 
pas au-dela de la fin du XVIIf siecle. 
Meme quand la distinction de la vraie et de la fausse beaute n'est pas 
prononcee, des idees analogues a celles qu'ils ont developpees ne s'en 
expriment pas moins de divers cotes. Un La Rochefoucauld, un Moliere, 
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un Saint-Evremond et meme certains aspects de Boileau seraient interes­
sants a considerer dans cette perspective. A plus forte raison pourrait-on 
s'attarder sur un traite De la vraie et de la fausse eloquence de Jean Le 
Clerc, publie a Amsterdam en 1699.104 Derniere expression, a notre 
connaissance, de la distinction. En 1715, le Traite du Beau de Crousaz 
l'ignore. Mais l'esthetique naissante n'oubliera pas totalement la lec,on de 
ses precurseurs du XVIIe siecle. 
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Sur le sens du mot "raison" au 
dix-septieme siecle 
Robert Garapon 
II est des mots, dans notre vocabulaire critique, dont tout le monde sait 
qu'ils ne signifient plus la meme chose qu'au XVIIe siecle: ainsi le mot de 
nature, qui renvoyait alors a la nature humaine, et non a la nature exte­
rieure. Mais il est d'autres termes, tout aussi importants, dont nous me­
surons mal combien ils ont change de sens en trois cents ans: en 
particulier le mot de raison, a propos duquel nous ne cessons de 
commettre quantite d'erreurs implicites, tant et si bien que nous finissons 
par fausser et deformer des pans entiers de l'esthetique classique. Lorsque 
nous rencontrons raison chez Boileau ou chez La Bruyere, et plus gene­
ralement dans une page de critique ou de morale du XVIIe siecle, nous 
pensons a la capacite discursive de l'esprit qui a permis la science mo­
derne, alors que l'auteur de VArt poetique ou celui des Caracteres pen­
saient a ce pouvoir quasi intuitif que nous appelons aujourd'hui 
discernement, gout ou tact. 
Pour fixer la signification essentielle qu'a prise de nos jours le terme de 
raison, je me permets de donner ci-dessous la definition qu'en fournit le 
dictionnaire de Paul Robert, en son tome V: 
I. Pouvoir par lequel Phomme est capable d'organiser, de systematiser 
sa connaissance et sa conduite, d'etablir des rapports vrais avec le monde. 
Dans certaines theories, systeme de principes qui dirigent l'activite de l'es-
prit et forment une regie, un modele ideal de connaissance et d'action. .  . . 
i° La faculte pensante et son fonctionnement chez l'homme: ce qui 
permet a l'homme de connaitre, juger et agir conformement a ses prin­
cipes (considered comme plus ou moins stables) . . . Specialement La pen-
see discursive. 
On le voit, la raison, pour nous, en cette fin du XXe siecle, c'est avant 
tout le pouvoir qu'a l'esprit de raisonner, c'est-a-dire de joindre en une 
chaine significative des propositions dependant les unes des autres et 
aboutissant a une conclusion. Des lors, la difficulte est grande, pour le 
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Francois de 1987, de comprendre les endroits ou Boileau, dans YArtpoe­
tique et ailleurs, fait reference a la raison. Lorsqu'il ecrit, par exemple: 
Aimez done la raison: que toujours vos ecrits 
Empruntent d'elle seule et leur lustre et leur prix1 
nous comprenons qu'il est adversaire de tout epanchement de la sensibi-
lite—et nous nous meprenons gravement sur l'attitude des classiques a 
l'egard de la sensibilite, car ce n'est pas d'elle, mais de l'imagination qu'ils 
se mefient, comme l'a tres bien montre Jean Mesnard.2 
Mais il y a pis: dans certains cas, en effet, le faux-sens tourne au bur­
lesque et risque d'entrainer une incomprehension complete. Ainsi, 
lorsque nous lisons, toujours dans YArt poetique: 
Mais la scene demande une exacte raison, 
L'etroite bienseance y veut etre gardee3 
ou encore: 
J'aime sur le theatre un agreable auteur 
Qui, sans se diffamer aux yeux du spectateur, 
Plait par la raison seule et jamais ne la choque4 
nous risquons de nous meprendre du tout au tout: car comment imaginer 
un dramaturge qui aime raisonner et qui ne soit pas mortellement en­
nuyeux? Pour un peu, nous irions croire que Boileau appelle ici de ses 
voeux Le Fils naturel ou Le Pere de famille de Diderot et l'indiscrete 
predication dont ces ouvrages sont pleins. 
Mais, me dira-t-on, cette acception du mot raison qui se presente d'abord 
a notre esprit aujourd'hui ne vient-elle pas de Pascal lui-meme? N'est-ce 
pas dans les Pensees que Ton trouve—et des la premiere edition de 
1670—la fameuse distinction entre le coeur et la raison? On se souvient 
du passage: 
Nous connaissons la verite non seulement par la raison mais encore par 
le coeur. C'est de cette derniere sorte que nous connaissons les premiers 
principes et c'est en vain que le raisonnement, qui n'y a point de part, 
essaie de les combattre.. . . Les connaissances des premiers principes: es-
pace, temps, mouvement, nombres, sont aussi fermes qu'aucune de celles 
que nos raisonnements nous donnent et c'est sur ces connaissances du 
coeur et de l'instinct qu'il faut que la raison s'appuie et qu'elle y fonde 
tout son discours. Le coeur sent qu'il y a trois dimensions dans l'espace et 
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que les nombres sont infinis et la raison demontre ensuite qu'il n'y a point 
deux nombres carres dont 1'un soit double de l'autre. Les principes se 
sentent, les propositions se concluent, et le tout avec certitude quoique 
par differentes voies . . .5 
On ne saurait mieux opposer le caractere successif et logique des opera­
tions de la raison et Pimmediatete contraignante de l'evidence que definit 
le coeur au sens pascalien! 
Oui, certainement, le XVIIe siecle connaissait le sens du terme raison 
qui nous parait actuellement essentiel. Seulement, cette acception etait­
elle la premiere qui vint a l'esprit des Francois d'alors? La encore, la re­
ponse s'impose, et elle est negative. Le sens dominant du mot est tres 
different vers 1680 de ce qu'il est devenu trois siecles plus tard; raison, a 
l'epoque, equivaut tres souvent a "discernement," et l'on peut deja s'en 
convaincre en se reportant a la definition que Furetiere donne du mot 
dans son Dictionnaire: 
RAISON. Entendement; faculte, puissance de Tame qui discerne le bien 
du mal, le vrai d'avec le faux.. . . 
RAISON dans la meme idee signifie le jugement, le bon sens, la faculte de 
concevoir, de reflechir; la comprehension; l'etendue et la penetration de 
l'entendement. . . 
Si l'on compare ce debut d'article avec l'endroit correspondant de Paul 
Robert cite plus haut, la difference est saisissante. Et Furetiere, notions-le 
bien, se borne ici a enregistrer l'usage de toute son epoque, et de tout le 
XVIIe siecle. 
"Faculte, puissance de l'ame qui discerne le bien du mal, le vrai d'avec 
le faux . . ." C'est exactement ainsi que Descartes, dans les premieres 
lignes du Discours de la methode, en 1637, entendait le terme quand il 
ecrivait que "la puissance de bien juger et distinguer le vrai d'avec le faux, 
qui est proprement ce qu'on nomme le bon sens ou la raison, est naturel­
lement egale en tous les hommes." Je n'ai pas besoin de souligner que 
l'equivalence etablie par le philosophe ("le bon sens ou la raison") serait 
proprement inacceptable de nos jours: elle n'en est, a mes yeux, que plus 
revelatrice! 
Treize ans plus tard, Nicole, dans son Traite de la vraie et de la fausse 
beaute dans les ouvrages de l'esprit (1650), ecrira: 
II faut avoir recours a la lumiere de la raison. Elle est simple et certaine, 
et c'est par son moyen qu'on peut trouver la vraie beaute naturelle . . . 
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"La lumiere de la raison . . . simple et certaine": cette expression indique 
a merveille le caractere instantane et incontestable de l'information four­
nie par la raison: son action est immediate et sure, comme celle d'un 
rayon de soleil passant par la fenetre qu'on ouvre! 
Une quinzaine d'annees plus tard, la comedie de Tartuffe nous offre 
deux passages particulierement interessants. D'une fac,on generale, il fau­
drait souligner l'utilite precieuse de l'oeuvre de Moliere pour ce qui est 
des recherches lexicographiques: d'une part, le poete vise evidemment a 
se faire comprendre sans aucune peine de tous ses spectateurs, et il est 
done conduit a employer les mots dans une acception tres largement re-
c,ue; d'un autre cote, il pratique volontiers, comme on sait, la redondance 
et la repetition de la meme idee a l'aide de mots differents, et il offre ainsi 
des synonymes qui eclairent puissamment sur le sens de tel ou tel terme 
en question. Voici d'abord la declaration bien connue de Cleante a la 
scene 5 de l'acte Ier: 
Les hommes la plupart sont etrangement faits! 
Dans la juste nature on ne les voit jamais; 
La raison a pour eux des bornes trop petites; 
En chaque caractere ils passent ses limites; 
Et la plus noble chose, ils la gatent souvent 
Pour la vouloir outrer et pousser trop avant. 
Dans ces vers, la juste nature et la raison sont manifestement liees entre 
elles: la juste nature, e'est-a-dire la nature conforme a une certaine me-
sure, appelle la raison, qui a des bornes qu'il ne faut pas depasser, au 
risque de tomber dans l'"etrangete" (entendez l'extravagance) ou dans 
l'"outrance." La raison n'est nullement ici synonyme de raisonnement, 
mais & appreciation—ou de discernement. Comme W. D. Howarth l'in-
dique tres finement, les "raisonneurs" de la comedie molieresque (et 
Cleante est un des principaux!) ne raisonnent pas: ils ne font jamais usage 
de leur raison raisonnante, mais seulement de leur bon sens.6 
J'en viens maintenant a l'autre extremite de Tartuffe, a la tirade de 
l'Exempt qui fait le denouement de la piece; elle commence par ces vers 
tres eclairants pour notre propos: 
Nous vivons sous un Prince ennemi de la fraude, 
Un prince dont les yeux se font jour dans les coeurs, 
Et que ne peut tromper tout 1'art des imposteurs. 
D'un fin discernement sa grande ame pourvue 
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Sur les choses toujours jette une droite vue; 
Chez elle jamais rien ne surprend trop d'acces, 
Et sa ferme raison ne tombe en nul exces. 
II donne aux gens de bien une gloire immortelle; 
Mais sans aveuglement il fait briller ce zele, 
Et l'amour pour les vrais ne ferme point son coeur 
A tout ce que les faux doivent donner d'horreur. 
On remarquera sans peine les quatre couples de mots qui servent egale­
ment ici a la louange de Louis XIV: un fin discernement permet au Roi 
de jeter sur tout une droite vue, c'est-a-dire un regard qu'on ne trompe 
pas; mais, d'un autre cote, sa ferme raison est sans aveuglement, elle pu­
nit l'hypocrisie comme elle recompense la veritable vertu. En verite, il 
serait difficile d'imaginer un parallelisme plus exact ou plus satisfaisant 
pour l'investigation qui nous occupe. Le seul endroit qui nous paraisse 
comparable, pour la pensee comme pour le vocabulaire, est ce distique 
de Corneille (que Moliere a du reciter bien des fois), dans lequel Cinna 
vante le bonheur qu'un prince eclaire procure a ses Etats: 
Avec ordre et raison les honneurs il dispense, 
Avec discernement punit et recompense.7 
La conversation entre Alceste et Philinte qui ouvre Le Misanthrope 
nous offre d'autres emplois tres revelateurs du mot raison. En premier 
lieu, quand il s'agit du proces qu'Alceste risque de perdre, le terme de­
signe la force contraignante de l'evidence a laquelle doit se rendre spon­
tanement tout homme de bonne foi: 
Ma foi! vous ferez bien de garder le silence. 
Contre votre partie eclatez un peu moins, 
Et donnez au proces une part de vos soins. 
—Je n'en donnerai point, c'est une chose dite. 
—Mais qui voulez-vous done qui pour vous sollicite? 
—Qui je veux? La raison, mon bon droit, l'equite. 
—Aucun juge par vous ne sera visite? 
—Non. Est-ce que ma cause est injuste ou douteuse? 
En second lieu, apres avoir note que l'amour de son ami pour la co­
quette Celimene est en contradiction avec la haine qu'il manifeste pour 
"les moeurs d'a present," Philinte ajoute avec une amicale sollicitude: 
—Pour moi, si je n'avais qu'a former des desirs, 
La cousine Eliante aurait tous mes soupirs; 
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Son coeur, qui vous estime, est solide et sincere, 
Et ce choix plus conforme etait mieux votre affaire. 
A quoi Alceste replique, avec un sourire gene: 
—II est vrai: ma raison me le dit chaque jour; 
Mais la raison n'est pas ce qui regie l'amour. 
De toute evidence, le mot designe, non pas la raison raisonnante, dont on 
voit mal ce qu'elle viendrait faire ici, mais ce sens des convenances qui est 
l'apanage de l'homme de la bonne societe. 
Je voudrais enfin, avant de quitter Moliere, rappeler un mot de Chry­
sale dans Les Femmes savantes; c'est le fameux vers par lequel le bon­
homme resume l'etat deplorable de sa maison abandonnee aux exces 
d'une science indiscrete: 
Mes gens a la science aspirent pour vous plaire, 
Et tous ne font rien moins que ce qu'ils ont a faire; 
Raisonner est l'emploi de toute ma maison, 
Et le raisonnement en bannit la raison .  . .8 
L'antithese est tres significative, entre le raisonnement, qui n'est ici que le 
signe d'une activite intellectuelle devoyee et hors de propos, et la raison, 
cette capacite quasi instinctive de discerner ce qui convient. 
C'est toujours ce sens de discernement (j'allais dire de gout) que Boi­
leau donne au mot raison quand il s'erige en legislateur du Parnasse. II 
serait aise de le montrer d'apres les vers que je citais tout a l'heure. Mais 
je prefere m'arreter sur un autre passage de YArt poetique: 
La plupart, emportes d'une fougue insensee, 
Toujours loin du bon sens vont chercher leur pensee: 
Us croiraient s'abaisser, dans leurs vers monstrueux, 
S'ils pensaient ce qu'un autre a pu penser comme eux. 
Evitons ces exces: laissons a l'ltalie 
De tous ces faux brillants Peclatante folie. 
Tout doit tendre au bon sens; mais pour y parvenir, 
Le chemin est glissant et penible a tenir: 
Pour peu qu'on s'en ecarte, aussitot on se noie. 
La raison pour marcher n'a souvent qu'une voie.9 
Remarquons-le bien, les poetes que ces vers condamnent ne sont pas des 
esprits faux, qui raisonneraient mal, mais des extravagants qui recher­
chent une originalite de mauvais aloi, qui affectent une eclatante folie. 
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Boileau ne leur reproche pas d'etre de mauvais geometres, pour parler 
comme Pascal, mais de chercher a se singulariser par un raffinement 
contraire au naturel. Cela dit, il vaut la peine de noter aussi que, pour 
recommander la voie de la raison, notre auteur use d'une image—celle 
d'une chaussee au milieu d'un marecage—qui annonce curieusement une 
reflexion de La Bruyere. On lit en effet au debut du chapitre Des ouvrages 
de I'esprit: 
II y a dans l'art un point de perfection, comme de bonte ou de maturite 
dans la nature. Celui qui le sent et qui l'aime a le gout parfait; celui qui 
ne le sent pas, et qui aime en dec,a ou au dela, a le gout defectueux. II y a 
done un bon et un mauvais gout, et Ton dispute des gouts avec 
fondement.10 
Meme si ce n'est plus une digue qui est suggeree, mais une ligne qu'il faut 
atteindre sans la depasser, les domaines metaphoriques sont voisins, et le 
mot gout relaie de fac,on tres significative le mot raison. 
Mais on trouve mieux encore dans les Caracteres. Voici nettement in­
diquee Petroite parente que la raison-discernement possede avec le gout 
(on voudra bien se souvenir que le bon sens et la raison ne sont qu'une 
seule et meme faculte de l'esprit): 
Talent, gout, esprit, bon sens, choses differentes, non incompatibles. 
Entre le bon sens et le bon gout, il y a la difference de la cause a son effet.11 
Et voici la raison identifiee a ce que nous appellerions le tact: 
Les belles choses le sont moins hors de leur place; les bienseances mettent 
la perfection, et la raison met les bienseances . . ,12 
Par un curieux retournement, la raison, dans tous ces exemples, n'est 
nullement une capacite discursive, mais au contraire une sorte d'intuition 
qui fait voir la verite, le naturel, ce qui est de bon gout, ce qui convient. 
En somme, la raison, pour Nicole, Moliere, Boileau ou La Bruyere, est 
tres proche de ce que Pascal appelait le coeur, et il n'est pas sans interet 
de relever que La Bruyere, quand il evoque l'operation du gout, emploie 
le meme verbe sentir qui designe chez Pascal l'acte du coeur: "II y dans 
l'art un point de perfection . . . Celui qui le sent. . . a le gout parfait." De 
meme, quand Boileau tentera, dans sa celebre Preface de 1701, de definir 
le beau en litterature, il recourra au meme verbe sentir, qui denote une 
saisie intuitive et rebelle a Panalyse: ". . . un je ne sais quoi qu'on peut 
beaucoup mieux sentir que dire . . ." 
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Pascal lui-meme, observons-le en passant, ne s'est pas fait scrupule, le 
cas echeant, de prendre le mot raison au sens de discernement du vrai et 
du faux. Relisez, par exemple, le celebre fragment sur l'imagination: vous 
verrez que l'opposition institute par moraliste n'est pas entre l'imagina-
tion et la raison raisonnante, mais tout bonnement entre l'imagination et 
le bon sens, le sens des realites. Autrement, on ne saurait comprendre des 
phrases comme: "Elle [l'imagination] fait croire, douter, nier la raison," 
ou comme: "Rien ne nous depite davantage que de voir qu'elle remplit 
ses notes d'une satisfaction bien autrement pleine et entiere que la raison. 
Les habiles par imagination se plaisent tout autrement a eux-memes que 
les prudents ne se peuvent raisonnablement plaire . . ."13 
A la lumiere des quelques indications qui precedent, nous pensons etre en 
mesure de mieux comprendre maints passages a la fois celebres et diffi­
ciles de nos grands auteurs classiques, ces endroits que Ton se plait a citer 
souvent—en se gardant bien d'en preciser le sens! 
Nous nous bornerons, naturellement, a quelques exemples, et nous 
emprunterons le premier, non pas au XVIIe siecle, mais a Joachim du 
Bellay. Tout le monde sait par coeur le fameux 3ie sonnet des Regrets: 
Heureux qui, comme Ulysse, a fait un beau voyage, 
Ou comme cestui-la qui conquit la toison, 
Et puis est retourne, plein d'usage et raison, 
Vivre entre ses parents le reste de son age . .  . 
"Plein d'usage et raison": on peut traduire sans crainte d'erreur "plein 
d'experience et de discernement," mais on mesure combien les deux vieux 
mots sont denses, dans leur brievete et leur saveur etymologique. 
Ouvrons maintenant YAstree au debut de la deuxieme partie, et reli­
sons le discours que tient devant Leonide la chaste Celidee, qui est aimee 
en meme temps par le sage Thamire et son neveu Pimpetueux Calidon: 
J'ai oui dire, grande Nymphe, qu'on peut aimer en deux sortes: l'une 
est selon la raison, l'autre est selon le desir. Celle qui a pour sa regie la 
raison, on me l'a nommee amitie honnete et vertueuse, et celle qui se laisse 
emporter a ses desirs, amour. Par la premiere, nous aimons nos parents, 
notre patrie et en general et en particulier tous ceux en qui quelque vertu 
reluit; par l'autre, ceux qui en sont atteints sont transported comme d'une 
fievre ardente, et commettent tant de fautes, que le nom en est aussi dif­
fame parmi les personnes d'honneur, que l'autre est estimable et honoree. 
Or j'avouerai done sans rougir que Thamire a ete aime de moi; mais in­
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continent j'ajouterai: pour sa vertu, et que de tneme j'ai ete aimee de Tha­
mire, mais selon la vertu.14 
La pudique bergere distingue ici les deux formes de l'amour: l'amour-
desir et l'amour "selon la raison." Cette derniere forme d'amour ne sau­
rait etre regie par la raison raisonnante, car, comme l'ecrira bientot Pas­
cal, "On ne prouve pas qu'on doit etre aime en exposant d'ordre les 
causes de l'amour; cela serait ridicule."15 La encore, il faut donner a rai­
son son sens de "discernement," car c'est bien de cela qu'il s'agit: pour 
aimer quelqu'un, il faut pouvoir decouvrir, distinguer en lui quelque 
vertu qui reluit; et cet amour-discernement (nous preferons ce terme a 
celui d'amour-sentiment, qui reste ambigu) est bien l'amour genereux qui 
animera les heros de Corneille et qui, loin de les asservir, leur apprendra 
a bien user de leur liberte pour rester dignes de la personne aimee. 
Mais venons a un exemple beaucoup plus difficile: je veux parler de la 
fin de la terrible scene 5 de l'acte IV dans Horace et des deux vers que 
prononce le heros victorieux au moment meme ou il tue sa soeur Camille: 
C'est trop, ma patience a la raison fait place: 
Va dedans les enfers plaindre ton Curiace. 
Que veut dire Horace quand il allegue la raison? Sa raison ne devrait-elle 
pas lui representer que Camille est une jeune fille cruellement meurtrie, 
qui vient d'apprendre la mort tragique de son fiance, que cette jeune fille 
est sa soeur, et done qu'il a precisement mille raisons d'exercer sa pa­
tience? C'est la reflexion que nous nous faisons plus ou moins explicite­
ment en entendant ce vers, et nous sommes revokes et en meme temps 
deroutes. Mais c'est que nous commettons un grave faux-sens: quand il 
prononce le mot de raison, Horace ne veut pas parler de sa capacite de 
raisonner, qui devrait en effet Pincliner a la mansuetude; il designe sim­
plement une evidence qui s'impose a lui (la raison, ne l'oublions pas, est 
aussi le sens des realites): Camille est desormais une Albaine, et doit etre 
traitee comme telle. 
Si, du substantif raison on peut passer a l'adjectif raisonnable, je men­
tionnerais volontiers les premieres lignes de la Preface de Phedre: 
Voici encore une tragedie dont le sujet est pris d'Euripide.[.. .] Quand 
je ne lui devrais que la seule idee du caractere de Phedre, je pourrais dire 
que je lui dois ce que j'ai peut-etre mis de plus raisonnable sur le 
theatre . . . 
 43 Sur le sens du mot "raison" au XVIIe siecle
A premiere vue, l'assertion a de quoi surprendre, car on ne s'attendait 
pas a voir qualifier de raisonnable le caractere de Phedre! Aussi bien les 
commentateurs se sont-ils sentis obliges d'expliquer cet adjectif insolite. 
"Raisonnable: conforme a la nature et a la verite," indique Henri Chabot 
dans son edition scolaire de la tragedie.16 De son cote, le tres regrette 
Raymond Picard ecrit: "A n'en pas douter, ce que Racine appelle raison­
nable, c'est un caractere qui se developpe avec rigueur et clarte: or preci­
sement, la progression de Phedre est marquee avec une nettete subtile qui 
fait en grande partie la valeur de la piece."17 Sans meconnaitre ce que ces 
indications ont de suggestif, je voudrais seulement dire ici que raison­
nable est a entendre exactement dans le sens ou nous avons pris rai­
son precedemment; raisonnable signifie: conforme au discernement des 
mouvements de Pame. 
Pour finir, je voudrais proposer une regie toute pratique pour une meil­
leure intelligence des textes du XVIIe siecle. Chaque fois que nous rencon­
trerons le mot de raison chez un auteur de cette epoque, commen^ons par 
essayer d'y substituer mentalement "discernement" au lieu de lui donner 
son sens actuel de "fondement de la demarche scientifique." Notre 
comprehension exacte de ce que nous lisons y gagnera beaucoup, et 
meme notre comprehension de certaines expressions qui sont demeurees 
dans notre langue contemporaine. Ainsi, nous saisirons mieux que 
"perdre la raison" et "perdre le sens" soient synonymes; nous aperce­
vrons aussi que la vieille expression I'dge de raison signifie tout bonne­
ment "Page du discernement" (comme le suggere Pequivalent anglais— 
age of discretion). Je suis sur que Peminent collegue a qui ce livre est offert 
n'est pas indifferent, loin de la, a ces nuances essentielles. 
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Desmarets's "L'Art de la poesie": 
Poetics or Politics? 
H. Gaston Hall 
The text* of Desmarets's "L'Art de la poesie, a Monseigneur le Cardinal-
Due de Richelieu"—established by James Dryhurst from a MS copy in 
the Bibliotheque de 1'Arsenal in Paris—speaks for itself.1 But after some 
350 years it does not by itself fully explain the cultural context in which 
it was formulated. This ambitious text, though not strictly speaking an 
inedit, since it was incorporated in the text of "L'Excellence et les plaintes 
de la poesie heroique" which Desmarets prefaced to the first edition of 
Esther in 1670, is less well known even than his "Discours de la poesie," 
also dedicated to Richelieu. We do not know exactly when "L'Art de la 
poesie" was written; but it can de deduced from the dedication that it 
was written after 1631, when Richelieu was made a duke, and before 
Richelieu's death in December 1642. Perhaps it preceded the "Discours 
de la poesie," which was first published in 1633 (along with poems by 
Maynard, Racan, L'Estoile, Malleville, Baro, Habert, Godeau, and Cha­
pelain) in Boisrobert's anthology Les Nouvelles Muses and then repub­
lished in Desmarets's Oeuvres poetiques, a partial collection of his plays 
and poems acbeve d'imprimer by Le Gras on 20 November 1640. That 
"Discours" stands witness to Desmarets's ambitions in heroic poetry at 
the time when—already a member of the group of literati incorporated 
in 1634 as the Academie-Franc.aise—he entered Richelieu's personal ser­
vice, also in 1634.2 This was evidently the time at which Desmarets began 
writing Clovis, the first and most ambitious of the heroic poems on which 
he was to work (though not consistently) for over twenty years before it 
was finally published in 1657.3 
"L'Art de la poesie" reflects literary theory and literary ambitions 
somewhat similar to those expressed by Desmarets in his "Discours," 
which may have superseded it. But I suspect that it was not included in 
his Oeuvres poetiques along with the "Discours" because it was not yet 
*The text of the poem follows on page 58. 
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written by the end of 1640. Late 1642 seems the likely date of composi­
tion. The phrase "au retour des allarmes" in line 5 would appear to have 
been prompted by the conspiracy of Cinq-Mars and de Thou and espe­
cially by fears for the Cardinal's life as he was brought back to Paris 
grievously ill in the fall of that year. The other alarming incidents in Ri-
chelieu's career—including the famous Journee des dupes of 1630—gen-
erally occurred before he was made a duke or else have no obvious 
association with a return. Richelieu's death on 4 December shortly after 
his return to Paris would account for the fact that "L'Art de la poesie " 
was not printed at that time.4 
Desmarets's involvement with the poetics of heroic poetry is by no 
means limited to the period of Richelieu's patronage. Yet what he empha­
sizes in "L'Art de la poesie" is very much in line with his other literary 
preoccupations in the last years of Richelieu's life. The hints of political 
allegory from line 101 are compatible with the atmosphere of Europe, 
first performed in November 1642. The exemplary idealism expounded 
from line 81 recalls the no less didactic theory of the novel in Desmarets's 
dedication to Richelieu's niece of his unfinished novel Rosane (1639). 
Here, Desmarets requests that the young princes for whom he was writ­
ing Rosane (the future Louis XIV and his anticipated brother) 
admirent les exemples parfaits qu'on propose, & se portent avec ardeur a 
les imiter: & pource que la nature produit rarement des personnes par­
faites, l'art de l'invention supplee a ce defaut. . .  . 
The art of fiction consists of mixing fable with fact, the entertaining with 
the edifying, the marvelous with the educational. The result is not cul­
pable deceit (feinte, mensonge in a pejorative sense), but the greatest 
imaginative effort of the mind: 
La fiction ne doit pas estre considered comme un mensonge, mais comme 
une belle imagination, & comme le plus grand effort de l'esprit: & bien 
que la Verite semble luy estre opposee toutefois elles s'accordent merveil­
leusement bien ensemble. Ce sont deux lumieres qui au lieu de s'effacer 
l'une l'autre & de se nuire, brillent par l'esclat l'une de l'autre. 
Fiction interacts with fact {verite) on the basis of a perception—doubtless 
Aristotelian in origin—that literature is more philosophical than history. 
For Desmarets the more fully imaginative works 
sont pleins de feintes parmy la verite, plus ils sont beaux & profitables; 
pource que la feinte vraysemblable est fondee sur la bien-seance 6c sur la 
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raison; & la verite toute simple n'embrasse qu'un recit d'accidens hu-
mains, qui le plus souvent ne sont pleins que d'extravagances. 
Clearly a community of inspiration links this theory of the didactic heroic 
novel with the poetics of the epic expressed in the "Discours" and in 
"L'Art de la poesie" and afterwards illustrated in Clovis and in Desmar-
ets's other heroic poems. Though no further volume of Rosane appeared, 
this novel must have been in Desmarets's thoughts when he adapted from 
it his last tragicomedy, Erigone—the "comedie en prose" seen at the 
Palais-Cardinal by guests of Mme de Rambouillet on 19 January 1642.5 
In any case Desmarets's poetics of idealism—the theory by which fact in 
imaginative works should be ingeniously embellished by fiction—oper-
ates on much the same assumptions as those expressed at much the same 
time by Corneille, who opens his "Abrege du martyre de Saint Polyeucte" 
prefaced to Polyeucte—a play read or perhaps privately performed for 
Richelieu shortly before his death: "L'ingenieuse tissure des fictions avec 
la verite, ou consiste le plus beau secret de la Poesie . . ." Consider also 
Livie's last lines in Cinna: 
Et la Posterite dans toutes les Provinces 
Donnera votre exemple aux plus genereux Princes 
[V:3] 
Throughout Desmarets's practice of the novel, of theater and of heroic 
poetry runs his conception of literature as an "art merveilleux" (see lines 
6, 122, 131, and 142). This conception may have roots in the merveilleux 
of court ballet, in which Desmarets would appear (as Marays) to have 
distinguished himself as a performer before composing two of the grand­
est ballets of the age. In "L'Art de la poesie" it is already linked with the 
"merveilleux chretien" destined to be so important in Clovis and in the 
Biblical epics which later divided Boileau from Desmarets: note "ce 
grand Dieu merveilleux" (1. 45). In line 11 the evocation of the beauteous 
splendors of the heavens and of earth are—however different the impli-
cations—clearly reminiscent of Psalms which Desmarets had para­
phrased and dedicated to Louis XIII in 1640 before including "Psaumes 
pour le Roy" in his Oeuvres poetiques, beginning with Coeli enarrant 
gloriam Dei. . . (XVIII). 
However, if it is correct to date "L'Art de la poesie" to the period 
immediately following publication of Desmarets's Psaumes de Davide 
paraphrases, it is all the more curious to note his insistence here on the 
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thesis that 'Tart nous ravit plus que ne fait la Nature" (1. 38). Not that 
this attitude is inconsistent with Richelieu's patronage of the arts or with 
Mazarin's activity at the time as one of Richelieu's principal collectors of 
art works, but because Desmarets later changes his mind more than once. 
Just before the mystic experience which may be styled the conversion of 
this already deeply religious man, he subordinates art to nature in the 
"premiere promenade" of Les Promenades de Richelieu (1653). He dis­
tances himself from the magnificence of the great chateau (of which he 
was then intendant) because he prefers "les simples beautez de la riche 
Nature"—the works of God—to any works of art "Ou les mortelles 
mains pretendent trop de part." Not until five years later does he appear 
to conciliate his feeling for nature, surely exceptional in seventeenth-cen-
tury France, with esthetic pleasure derived from works of art, writing in 
Les Delices de Vesprit (1658) that "les Arts sont agreables a Dieu & a 
l'homme; parce que l'Art est l'ouvrage de l'homme sur l'ouvrage de 
Dieu"—a formula reconciling feeling for nature and esthetic pleasure in 
the arts both with each other and with religious fervor. 
Two strands of imitation theory thus reconciled in Les Delices de Ves­
prit are much more distinct in "L'Art de la poesie," reflecting the ambi­
guity of the concept imitation or mimesis associated with the 
interpretation of Aristotle's Poetics. As Henri Gouhier suggests: 
Le mot [imitation] est equivoque. Est-ce l'oeuvre qui imite quelque chose 
ou est-ce l'auteur qui imite quelqu'un? Dans le premier cas, ce qui est 
imite, ce sont les actions des hommes agissant dans le monde; dans le 
second, celui qui est imite, c'est l'auteur presume du monde dans lequel il 
y a des hommes agissant.6 
Probably Aristotle meant the former. Desmarets's emphasis on the latter 
reflects a Judeo-Christian tradition whereby the Greek verb poiein—the 
root of such words as poet, poetry, and poetics—came to be regarded, 
through a mutation of concepts, as representing an act of creation, 
thereby indicating, as Gouhier puts it, "que l'imitation est celle qui fait 
du 'poete' un createur a l'image du Createur" {Ibid.). In "L'Art de la 
poesie" Desmarets (who would publish in 1654 his verse translation of 
L'imitation de Jesus-Christ) blends the duality of imitation theory with 
the idealism of didactic exemplarity. By means of imitative (representa­
tional or mimetic) art the writer imitates not only God's creatures (here 
relatively disvalued), but His Creation, His creativity (11. 45-52). Argua­
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bly the exemplary "role models" by which the writer then goes on to 
embellish his fiction are destined to exert a redemptive influence upon the 
reader analogous to the role of the Savior in the real, historic world cor­
rupted by the Fall of Man. It is ironic, not to say perverse, that in the 
"Querelle des Imaginaires" Pierre Nicole—who took a more radical view 
of the Fall—would condemn Desmarets's fiction as corrupting although 
it had been conceived as redemptive. 
The serious work of fiction is thus a multiple imitation of God's Cre­
ation, combining imitation of the act of Creation with representation of 
creatures in the fallen state and models for their redemption. In maintain­
ing that "PArt imitateur est l'ouvrage des hommes, / C'est une creature," 
Desmarets asserts the concept of creative writing. "L'Art de la poesie" 
must be one of the earliest texts to do so. But from line 53 "Plus un art a 
nos sens represente de choses," we are back to the first strand of imitation 
theory: "Poeuvre qui imite quelque chose." This strand is developed 
along the familiar lines of Horace's precept "Ut pictura poesis . . .  " with 
one curious reservation: 
La Peinture, embrassant les objets de nos yeux, 
Imite tous les corps que l'on voit sous les Cieux. 
Mais la Muse divine, a qui tout est possible. 
Embrasse tout sujet invisible, & visible 
[11. 55-58] 
Literature is argued to have an imaginative dimension somewhat arbi­
trarily denied to the plastic arts. In the wake of such theorists as the early 
cubist Albert Gleizes (1881-1953), it is scarcely necessary to repostulate 
theories by which painting or sculpture may be regarded as creating ob­
jects rather than as representing subjects or to underline the limitations 
of Desmarets's antithesis on this point. But it is worth noting that the 
antithesis is not supported by one of his principal illustrators, Abraham 
Bosse, who derived from the Lyonese mathematician G. Desargues 
(1593-1662) a theory of perspective serving to represent 
sur une surface platte de quelque matiere & inclination qu'elle puisse 
estre, tous les objets visibles de la nature, & ceux que l'on peut former 
dans Pimagination.7 
It is also worth pausing to consider the notion of a "sujet invisible." 
An invisible subject may be imaginary, as Bosse suggests; but it may 
also be doctrinal or allegorical, as in the theological concept that the sun, 
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visible light, manifests God, lux invisibilis. It is not Bosse's illustrations 
of Desmarets's Ariane (1639) or his frontispieces for Desmarets's plays 
published around 1640 that depict invisible subjects so much as the illus­
trations later engraved by Frangois Chauveau and others for Clovis and 
Les Delices de I'esprit. In these texts one may contemplate numerous 
representations of the imaginary, the allegorical, and the theologically 
symbolic. Pertinent to the present discussion is the extent to which these 
beautiful books strive as a whole—text and illustration—to render a sen­
sibility Christian and then modern through forms not only ancient but 
originally pagan. It is not merely a matter of heroic poetry or the epic 
privileged by "L'Art de la poesie," but such other forms as the dialogue, 
the romance, drama, the ode, even the Ars poetica. Even if one excepts 
such devotional works as his recently identified Lettres spirituelles and 
the paraphrased Psalms, the examples set by Saint Paul and by David 
confirm that Desmarets's literary practice supposes an essential third 
strand of imitation theory: the imitation of select literary models, mainly 
from classical antiquity, but also from the Old and the New Testaments. 
In "L'Art de la poesie" it is possible to show not only general indebted­
ness to Aristotle and to Horace, but specific inspiration from Virgil. The 
verse "Des astres nous decrit le regie mouvement" (1. 59) is unlikely not 
to have been prompted by Anchises's famous prophesy in Aeneid VI: 
"caelique meatus / Describent radio et surgentia sidera dicent" (11. 849— 
50). Here, the thought is imitated; elsewhere, aspects of Virgilian form. 
For much of what follows in "L'Art poetique" however, Desmarets 
appears to imitate a more modern imaginative model: Ludovico Ariosto. 
To a large extent the imitation is a matter of atmosphere, but at times it 
seems quite specific. Line 60 "Monte d'un vol hardy dessus le firmament" 
seems reminiscent of the flights of the hippogriff in Orlando furioso and 
of "Ruggiero, / che scorre il ciel su l'animal leggiero" (VI: 16, but com­
pare also X: 91-92). The view looking down upon wide stretches of the 
earth from an airborne hippogriff (symbolic among other things of poetic 
imagination) is not much different from the viewpoint supposed for Vir-
gil's gods, angels or the traditional Christian God. Indeed in Orlando 
furioso "la Bonta ineffabile" gazes down upon threatened France and 
introduces the allegorical episode with Silence, Fraud, and Discord which 
Desmarets may have recalled in his lines 102-4. Although Conrart's 
copyist seems to have neglected the capital letters required for fully alle­
gorical Erreur and Flaterie, Desmarets does appear to have recalled 
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Ariosto's Discordia when beginning Les Promenades de Richelieu: "Pen­
dant que la Discorde espouvante les loix . . ." Desmarets also from time 
to time reasserts Ariosto's promise in Canto I, 2, to relate "cosa non detta 
in prosa mai ne in rima." 
It is difficult to imagine a more pointed contrast with Malherbe's 
"aversion contre les fictions poetiques" as reported by Racan. When Mal­
herbe read in Regnier's first Epitre au Roi "que la France s'enlevait en 
l'air pour parler a Jupiter et se plaindre du miserable etat ou elle etait 
pendant la Ligue," says Racan, Malherbe "demanda a l'auteur en quel 
temps cela etait arrive" because he had not noticed its having occurred 
during the past fifty years.8 I wish I could report that Racan replied "in 
poetry" or "in poetic time." Antoine Adam uses this anecdote (without 
reply) to illustrate a trivializing influence of Malherbe's famous reform of 
French poetic diction. Malherbe is said to have reduced the role of the 
poet, in a land governed by a king and guided by the Church, to that of a 
mere arranger of syllables, "pas plus utile a la societe qu'un bon joueur 
de quilles" (I: 32). 
Not, I think, the whole truth of the matter. But Adam goes on to link 
Malherbe's reaction against imaginative hyperbole to the cultural impov­
erishment induced by the Counter-Reformation in France: 
La chute que signifie, dans l'histoire de la pensee, la victoire de la Contre-
Reforme, s'exprime de fagon saisissante dans cet abandon des hautes doc­
trines de la Pleiade. Elles supposaient un climat de liberte intellectuelle, 
un affranchissement des traditions, le droit pour l'individu de courir tous 
les risques et d'oser toutes les audaces. La monarchic, PEglise, Paristocra­
tie ont repris la situation en main, etouffe les efforts de l'esprit pour se 
liberer. La poesie paie le prix de sa liberte perdue. [I: 32-33] 
Desmarets was an important Counter-Reformation personality. He wrote 
verse exhibited in the Lady Chapel of Notre-Dame Cathedral and later 
dedicated his verse translation of the Office de la Vierge (1645) t  o the 
Queen Regent. But the atmosphere of "L'Art de la poesie" is not at all 
what Adam describes. "Enfin Malherbe vint. . ." belongs to a retrospec­
tive part of Boileau's Art poetique (1674). Boileau's hostility toward Des­
marets, along with that of the Jansenist Nicole and the Protestant Bayle, 
so influential in the historiography of the seventeenth century, has gravely 
distorted perception of Desmarets's role and of the cultural patronage of 
Richelieu. Even Perrault and the Moderns whom Desmarets later did so 
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much to encourage, lost few opportunities to minimize the achievements 
of the period of Louis XIII and of Richelieu in order to maximize a late-
starting "century of Louis-le-Grand"—Louis XIV 
Let me contrast Adam's "chute" with a few passages of Desmarets's 
"Discours de la poesie" of 1633, the first of his poems known to have 
been noticed by Richelieu, who is straightforwardly advised: 
Si tu veux que ton nom brille aux siecles suivans, 
Chery les vertueux, sois l'appuy des sc,avans. .  . .9 
Indeed Desmarets goes on to warn the Cardinal specifically against: 
l'erreur de ces nouveaux critiques 
Qui retranchent le champ de nos Muses antiques, 
Qui veulent qu'on les suive, & qu'adorant leurs pas 
On evite les lieux qu'ils ne cognoissent pas. 
Leur Muse cependant de foiblesse & de crainte 
Pensant se soutenir affecte la contrainte, 
N'ose aller a l'escart de peur de s'esgarer; 
Et parlant simplement croit se faire admirer: 
Elle a peur d'eschaufer le fard qui la rend vaine, 
Et la moindre fureur la mettroit hors d'haleine. 
Then Desmarets disparages such "esprits rampans" in favor of a "Muse 
sublime"—a term surely worth noticing at this date and a concept con­
textual for "L'Art de la poesie." For Desmarets proposes a "Muse sub­
lime" with 
un coeur ambitieux, 
Qui d'un superbe vol s'emporte vers les Cieux, 
Et void avec orgueil, marchant dessus la nue, 
La terre dont le globe a ses yeux diminue: 
Le Ciel qu'elle apperc,oit & plus vaste & plus pur, 
Qui de Tor du Soleil enrichit son azur, 
Luy paroit un seiour digne de son courage: 
Iamais dans un destroit sa grandeur ne s'engage. . .  . 
De celeste fureur quelquefois s'animant, 
Elle se sent ravir iusques au firmament. .  . 
[80. 5] 
Here, as also in "L'Art de la poesie," is an exalted overview reminis­
cent of Ariosto and of the Pleiade. The neo-Platonist cast of "fureur ce-
leste"—for like the madman, the lover and the mystic, the poet can 
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through "fureur" attain ecstasy—is intelligible in terms of, for example, 
Pontus de Tyard's Dialogues philosophiques. These last lines may further 
serve to gloss the "noble furie" of the Muse "des Cieux originaire" in­
voked in lines 101-9 of "L'Art de la poesie." 
The neo-Platonist inspiration of the "Discours" and of "L'Art de la 
poesie" finds expression also in the activities of the early Academie-Fran-
qaise and of other playwrights associated with Richelieu's patronage. 
Desmarets in particular was familiar with Pleiade neo-Platonism. In Les 
Visionnaires the "fureur" of the extravagant poet Amidor in Act I, scenes 
2 and 3, parodies that aspect of Pleiade poetics, notably Ronsard's ode I, 
3 beginning "Je suis trouble de fureur." Poetic "fureur" is complemented 
by a parody of the lover's "furie" in the role of Filidan, "amoureux en 
idee" whose inspiration is even more clearly neo-Platonist: 
J'adore en mon esprit ceste beaute divine, 
Qui sans doute du ciel tire son origine. 
[1:4] 
That the parody is firmly grounded in familiarity with neo-Platonist 
thought is evident in Desmarets's works from the "Discours de la poesie" 
to Les Delices de Vesprit, including his first comedy written for Richelieu 
Aspasie (1636). It must also have been evident in his lost address to the 
Academie-Franc,aise of August 1635 m which he is reported to have ar­
gued that Platonic love "a quelque chose de divin."10 
But Desmarets rejects Plato's notion that literature, being an imitation 
of ideal reality imperfectly manifested in the world of phenomena, threat­
ens to corrupt its audience. For as we have seen, he envisages a role for 
the poet not merely as an imitator of things, but as an imitator of divine 
Creation capable also of introducing redemptive imaginative ameliora­
tion into his work. In this way God becomes the guarantor of both the 
merveilleux and the inventive Muse: 
Mais alors qu'elle invente une belle aventure 
Glorieuse elle suit l'autheur de la Nature; 
Et produisant au jour ce qui ne fut jamais, 
Imite du grand Dieu les admirables faits 
[11. 113-16] 
Ornaments of the merveilleux are metaphor and hyperbole—compare 
with Andre Gide's observation that "Poeuvre d'art est exageration." H Yet 
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the marvelous remains verisimilar through its relation to fact or to doc-
trine—"le fondement, pris sur la verite." By "verite" Desmarets, who 
gives scant attention to the technical analysis of rhetoric, seems to mean 
(in terms of the categories suggested by Aristotle's Poetics XXV) not only 
"things as they were or are," but "things as they are said or thought to 
be" and "things as they ought to be." This last category strongly favors 
the redemptive exemplary idealism with which Desmarets is concerned 
in "L'Art de la poesie" and which he clearly conceives as being compat­
ible with verisimilitude. Some thirty years later, in the Discours pour 
prouver que les suiets Chrestiens sont les seuls propres a la poesie He-
ro'ique prefaced to the revised edition of Clovis (1673), Desmarets argues 
against the ornamental use of pagan mythology in poetry and associated 
hyperboles, claiming that "les Chrestiens, qui seuls ont la verite, ont seuls 
le vrai-semblable." 
Because it is so deeply ironic, I hope it is worth repeating that Desmar­
ets is sometimes remembered, if at all, only through Nicole's hostile 
phrase: "Un faiseur de romans et un poete de theatre est un empoison­
neur public, non des corps, mais des ames des fideles . . ."12 For it is 
forgotten not only how extensive and influential Desmarets's writings 
were, but that he had been closely associated with the cultural and devo­
tional activities of the royal Court itself. Desmarets supplied poems not 
only for Notre-Dame, but for the statue of Louis XIII in the Place Royale 
(now Place des Vosges). Doubtless because he had so often danced in 
Court ballets with the King, it was Desmarets's great Ballet de la felicite 
which was selected to celebrate the birth of the Dauphin, the future Louis 
XIV; and it was his Mirame which was selected to open in 1641 the great 
new theater in the Palais-Cardinal destined to become Moliere's theater 
and then the Paris Opera. Though early in his career Desmarets seems to 
have come close to compromise in the trial of Theophile de Viau, his 
purpose (as far as I can see) was never to corrupt, but to edify through 
entertainment. Good intentions do not of course assure success, but ar­
guably Desmarets's success was greater than is now appreciated. One can 
cite the numerous editions and translations into several languages of 
Ariane and Les Visionnaires. After his conversion, he was not proud of 
his early reputation as a star performer in Court ballet, or for the inno­
vative staging of Aspasie with successive decors and of Mirame with 
transformation scenes which also respected the newly fashionable unities. 
The innovative illustration of Clovis and of Les Deliccs de Vesprit also 
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deserves mention, although the texts (often without illustrations) had nu­
merous reprints, especially the latter. Desmarets was the first to use Eu­
rope in the title of a separate publication and one of the earliest to use 
the title and form of the literary promenade.13 He was an early proponent 
of the critical appreciation of French literature and of what we now call 
comparative literature in La Comparaison de la langue et de la poesie 
franqoise avec la grecque et la latine, et des poetes grecs, latins et franqois 
(Paris, 1670). Neither "L'Art de la poesie," La Comparaison, nor any of 
his other critical writing is strong in detailed analysis of rhetorical theory. 
But this relative weakness is compensated by a lofty conception of the 
cultural value of literature and of other arts, including technologies. 
Above all, he was an early protagonist of the Modern position in the 
Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns. As early as 1636 he wrote in his 
burlesque poem "Les Amours du compas et de la regie" dedicated to 
Richelieu: 
Et la Muse en riant me conduit par la main 
Ou ne marcha iamais le Grec ni le Romain.14 
Even in this burlesque poem, Desmarets's high purpose stands in sharp 
contrast both with Malherbe's abdication of high cultural ambitions for 
literature and with Nicole's hostility toward the liberating innovation of 
imaginative writing. It involves a sense of post-Renaissance adventure in 
which, though deeply imbedded in classical forms and Counter-
Reformation patterns of thought, he glimpses a new superiority in mod­
ern European civilisation and the prospect of establishing within it the 
cultural hegemony of France. As for Richelieu, this was partly a matter 
of arms: Desmarets was Controleur general de I'extraordinaire des 
guerres and secretary to the French Mediterranean fleet. But it was also 
very much a matter of diplomacy, of cultural and literary confidence and 
ascendancy. 
One achievement not evident in "L'Art de la poesie" is more or less to 
have devised the schema through which we divide the study of French 
literature into separate centuries, through the concept of the century of 
Louis XIV, which I have discussed elsewhere in relation to Desmarets's 
Le Triomphe de Louis et de son siecle (1674) a n ^ t  o Perrault's Le Siecle 
de Louis-le-Grand (1687).15 Discussion of his sense of translatio studii 
and of translatio imperii would exceed the limits of this presentation. Yet 
among a growing body of French intellectuals who early in the seven­
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teenth century came to see Bourbon and Catholic France not simply as 
cyclical successors to such select past periods of greatness as the Empire 
of Alexander and the Roman Empire under Julius and then Augustus 
Caesar, but (by an upturn in the cycle) as positively superior in religion, 
arms, politics, invention, technology, the arts, and literature, Desmarets 
was clearly one of the more influential. To express a new confidence he 
often adapted classical forms, as suggested above, but with a different 
message. Witness the contrast between Anchises's prophesy in Aeneid VI, 
p.847 ff., where Virgil concedes that other nations may excel in the arts 
and in rhetoric, but Rome will have a dominant political role, and Des-
marets's increasing insistence on the superiority of all things French, 
Catholic and modern. The limitations of such a view hardly need spelling 
out, and the Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns did spell them out. 
But much of this position survives in underlying attitudes long associated 
with French "classicism," for instance (Catholic dominance excepted) in 
Voltaire's Siecle de Louis XIV, from the explicit translatio studii with 
which it begins, through insistence on cultural as well as military achieve­
ments, to Voltaire's general assumption that French literary values are a 
superior norm even in an increasingly relativist world. Doubtless this 
oversimplifies, but it scarcely distorts or exaggerates. In any case, it re­
stores some of the credit for the achievements of the later seventeenth 
century to the foundations laid by Richelieu and by the poet who, in the 
"Discours de la poesie," addressed Richelieu near the beginning of his 
ambitious program of cultural patronage in the following terms: 
Rends nostre siecle illustre en lettres comme en armes: 
Fay qu'un esprit divin descouvre par ses vers 
Qu'un LOUIS doit un iour regir tout l'univers.. .  . 
This is the doubtless still contentious sense in which Desmarets should be 
considered as "un visionnaire du XVIIe siecle." 
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L'Art de la Poesie 
a 
Monseigneur le Cardinal-Due de Richelieu 
Grand DVC, qui terracant les monstres de la France, 
As couronne ta gloire, en dontant l'lgnorance; 
Richelieu, dont le nom courant par l'Univers, 
Souffre d'estre porte sur l'aile de nos vers; 
Entens un peu parler, au retour des allarmes, 5 
De cet art merveilleux dont tu cheris les charmes, 
Et de tes hauts pensers tiens le vol en suspens, 
Pour gouter ses secrets, qu'au monde je repans. 
De l'esprit des Mortels la douce nourriture, 
N'est pas a contempler les faits de la Nature. 10 
D'un oeil indifferent nous voyons leurs beautez, 
Des moindres feux du Ciel les brillantes clartez, 
Du grand Astre des jours la lumiere eclatante, 
Et le teint argente de sa soeur inconstante. 
L'Homme, de ces beaux corps regarde la splendeur 15 
Sans un ravissement digne de leur grandeur. 
II voit des elemens la concorde & la guerre, 
Le bel azur des Cieux, & le vert de la Terre, 
Des spacieuses mers les ecumantes eaux, 
Le crystal ondoyant des murmurans ruisseaux, 20 
Les flots impetueux des rivieres superbes, 
Le vif email des fleurs, & l'oeil riant des herbes, 
Les arbres chevelus des rivages voisins, 
Les fertiles cotaux ou naissent les raisins, 
Les epics jaunissants, richesses des campagnes, 25 
Et l'abry des valons, & l'orgueil des montagnes. 
II voit de toutes parts mouvoir par l'univers, 
Des habitans de l'air le plumage divers, 
II voit des animaux les troupes vagabondes, 
Et les peuples muets qui nagent sous les ondes, 30 
L'Homme se voit luy meme en ce monde loge, 
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Le Chef-d'oeuvre de Dieu, son portrait abbrege. 
Nous voyons tous les jours tant d'oeuvres nonpareilles, 
Sans nous sentir epris de toutes leurs merveilles. 
Mais si quelque Mortel d'un habile pinceau, 3 5 
De l'un de ces objets a finy le tableau, 
Nous aymons ardemment cette rare peinture, 
Et l'art nous ravit plus que ne fait la Nature. 
Si quelqu'autre accordant par d'inconnus ressors 
La souplesse d'esprit avec celle du corps, 40 
Imite une action ou plaisante ou serieuse, 
Cette veue a nos yeux semble delicieuse, 
Sans aymer l'Imite nous aymons PImitant. 
Ce que l'esprit produit, nous rend l'esprit content. 
Ce grand Dieu merveilleux dont nous sommes l'lmage, 45 
Ayme la creature ainsi que son ouvrage; 
II se plut a l'Instant en ce qu'il avoit fait, 
De ses puissantes mains il admira l'effet; 
La Nature est de luy, c'est par luy que nous sommes; 
Mais l'Art imitateur est l'ouvrage des hommes, 50 
C'est une creature, il nous charme les sens, 
Et remplit nos esprits de plaisirs innocens. 
Plus un art a nos sens represente de choses, 
Plus de perfections la se treuvent encloses; 
La Peinture, embrassant les objets de nos yeux, 5 5 
Imite tous les corps que l'on voit sous les Cieux. 
Mais la Muse divine, a qui tout est possible, 
Embrasse tout sujet invisible, & visible; 
Des astres nous decrit le regie mouvement, 
Monte d'un vol hardy dessus le firmament; 60 
Elle fuit au dela des lieux imaginaires, 
Puis descend aux secrets des effets sublunaires, 
D'ou naissent les eclairs, l'orage & les frimats, 
L'esperance & l'horreur des terrestres climats. 
C'est elle qui decrit & Dieu meme & ses Anges, 65 
Adore son pouvoir, luy donne des louanges, 
Dicte les mots sacrez dont on le doit benir, 
Se mele de savoir le passe, l'avenir; 
Penetre des humains le coeur & la pensee, 
Dit ce qu'une ame sent de douleur oppressee, 70 
Ou quels sont ses transports nageant dans le plaisir, 
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Ou s'animant de haine, ou mourant de desir; 
Les vices, les vertus, &C les humeurs diverses, 
Du sort capricieux les biens & les traverses, 
Des esprits moderez les jours delicieux, 75 
Et les nuits sans sommeil des coeurs ambitieux; 
Les douceurs de la paix, les travaux de la guerre, 
Et la honte & l'honneur des Princes de la terre. 
En fin, d'un vers pompeux, sa verve nous decrit 
Tout ce qui reconnoit l'empire de l'esprit. 80 
Mais son art qui comprend toute chose imitable, 
Sait meler sagement l'utile au delectable 
Par ses charmes flateurs rend le vice abattu, 
Inspire adroitement l'amour de la Vertu, 
Elle amuse nos sens par les fables plaisantes, 85 
Arrachant de nos coeurs les epines nuisantes; 
Puis y plante en leur lieu les bons enseignemens; 
Comme une Mere entend par des amusemens 
A charmer de plaisirs une humeur enfantine, 
Cependant que sa main verse la medecine. 90 
Dans le vers heroique, elle forme un guerrier, 
Pieux, sage, courtois, vaillant, aventurier, 
Patient aux travaux, amateur de justice, 
Honnorant les beaux-faits, & punissant le vice; 
Tel que doit estre un Roy, de qui les qualitez 95 
Font d'un Peuple les maux, ou les felicitez. 
Pour depeindre les Grans, & pour leur estre utile, 
Entrant dans leurs palais, elle prend un haut style, 
Elle s'arme pour eux de pompe, & de grandeur, 
Et fait luire en son front une auguste pudeur. 100 
Elle sait s'animer d'une noble furie, 
Pour chasser d'aupres d'eux l'erreur, la flaterie, 
L'Impiete, PEnvie, & les sales amours, 
L'Injustice, & Porgueil, pestes des grandes cours. 
Pour se rendre plus grave, elle enfle sa parole, 105 
La docte Metaphore, & la haute Hyperbole, 
Sont de ses grans discours les riches ornemens. 
Elle se laisse aller aux transports vehemens; 
Et pour se faire voir des Cieux originaire, 
Dedaigne de parler un langage ordinaire. 110 
Car la Muse imitant tout ce que voit l'esprit, 
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Suit cet art des humains qu'en la terre elle apprit; 
Mais alors qu'elle invente une belle aventure 
Glorieuse elle suit l'autheur de la Nature; 
Et produisant au jour ce qui ne fut jamais, 115 
Imite du grand Dieu les admirables faits. 
D'abord, en meprisant d'entrer par la barriere, 
Elle saute au milieu de sa longue carriere; 
Et jette les esprits en ce meme moment 
Dans l'agreable espoir d'un grand evenement. 120 
Ayant par le desir attache les oreilles, 
Elle sait les charmer de ses doctes merveilles, 
Conduit les grands desseins d'un fil ingenieux, 
Ensorcele nos sens d'un son harmonieux, 
Et mele adroitement d'une veine fertile, 125 
Et le faux, & le vray, le plaisant & Putile. 
Puis, pour rendre l'esprit de tout point contente, 
Et ne l'engager pas dedans l'obscurite; 
Elle prend aux cheveux les rencontres naissantes, 
Pour faire un beau recit des choses precedentes. 130 
Ce discours est succinct, clair, doux & merveilleux, 
Plein d'accidens divers, de combats perilleux, 
De contes inoui's, & de fameux voyages; 
Tantot marquant des mers les dangereux passages; 
Tantot les regions, les ports, & les Citez; 135 
Toujours divertissant par ses diversitez. 
Enfin, dans ce doux point l'ame se voit conduite, 
Qu'elle entend le passe dont elle sait la suite. 
Sortant de ce detroit avec tant de plaisir, 
Pour savoir le surplus nait un plus grand desir. 140 
La Muse avance alors le grand corps de sa fable, 
Qui, bien que merveilleuse est toujours vray-semblable, 
Et dont le fondement, pris sur la verite, 
Fait qu'on rec,oit pour vray tout le faux invente. 
Aux grandes actions, superbe elle s'attache; 145 
Des moindres s'en defait, les neglige & les cache; 
Elle fait un beau choix, & decrit seulement 
Ce qu'elle reconnoit capable d'ornement. 
Les querelles des Roys a leurs Etats funestes, 
Et du Peuple Innocent les dangereuses pestes 150 
Les horribles combats, les sieges, les assauts, 
De deux camps ennemis la force & les defauts, 
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Des plus nobles guerriers la diverse vaillance, 
L'un vaillant par vertu, l'autre par arrogance, 
Un autre par espoir, ou par necessite,
Par ruse, par exemple, ou par brutalite. 





Poetry and the Comic—A Subtle Partnership 
Odette de Mourgues 
"The English have humor, the French perceive it." This bon mot spring­
ing from the well-known gallic arrogance illustrates in a jocular way the 
possible disjunction between the producer of a discourse and its recipient. 
It offers a crude similarity, and gives a dismissive thrust, to a delicate 
question which is at the center of literary criticism and has been much 
discussed in the past few years: that of the problematic connection be­
tween the production of a text (whether conscious, semiconscious, or, as 
in the French statement mentioned above, supposedly unconscious) and 
the response of the reader. 
I have chosen this lateral opening to the present essay because the 
alliance of the poetic and the comic in a work of literature not only may 
require from the author the elaboration of intricate patterns but also may 
confront the reader with a teasing range of responses. The perception of 
the comic is by itself a complex operation and the kind of satisfaction 
suggested by poetry is equally complex and of a different nature. If al­
ready a number of people do not expect the comic to have serious impli­
cations, many more would find it difficult to conceive that poetic and 
comic elements could happily blend, each making its full impact on the 
reader. They might bring as an argument the case in which one of the two 
elements is entirely subservient to the other, the formal pattern of poetry 
with its various devices (meter, rhymes, etc.) being used only to produce 
a comic effect, as in a limerick for instance. This in fact is properly called 
comic verse, not poetry. It remains that much depends on both authors' 
and readers' own ideas of what is "poetic." These views are not only 
influenced by personal idiosyncrasies, literary genres, and, in as far as the 
reader is concerned, by degrees of competence or application but also 
historically conditioned by the particular concept of poetry at a given 
period.1 
The intricacies of the question are, I think, very noticeable in French 
classicism and also, up to a point, in English neoclassicism. 
The first text I propose to examine is taken from the opening scene of 
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Moliere's Les Femmes Savantes, in which the two sisters express their 
divergent views on marriage: 
Mon Dieu, que votre esprit est d'un etage bas! 
Que vous jouez au monde un petit personnage, 
De vous claquemurer aux choses du menage, 
Et de n'entrevoir point de plaisirs plus touchants 
Qu'un idole d'epoux et des marmots d'enfants! 
Laissez au gens grossiers, aux personnes vulgaires, 
Les bas amusements de ces sortes d'affaires; 
A de plus hauts objets elevez vos desirs, 
Songez a prendre un gout des plus nobles plaisirs, 
Et traitant de mepris les sens et la matiere, 
A l'esprit comme nous, donnez-vous toute entiere. 
Vous avez notre mere en exemple a vos yeux, 
Que du nom de savante on honore en tous lieux: 
Tachez ainsi que moi de vous montrer sa fille, 
Aspirez aux clartes qui sont dans la famille, 
Et vous rendez sensible au charmantes douceurs 
Que l'amour de l'etude epanche dans les coeurs; 
Loin d'etre aux lois d'un homme en esclave asservie 
Mariez-vous, ma soeur, a la philosophic 
Qui nous monte au-dessus de tout le genre humain, 
Et donne a la raison l'empire souverain, 
Soumettant a ses lois la partie animale, 
Dont Pappetit grossier aux betes nous ravale. 
Ce sont la les beaux feux, les doux attachements, 
Qui doivent de la vie occuper les moments; 
Et les soins ou je vois tant de femmes sensibles 
Me paroissent aux yeux des pauvretes horribles.2 
The comic of Armande's speech is, at least at first sight, perfectly 
straightforward. It lies in the discrepancy between the accepted opinion 
of a woman's role as a wife and mother and the precieuse's abnormal 
tenets: refusal of marriage, obsessive yearning for intellectual pursuits. 
However this feminist attitude—which was partly justified by the condi­
tion of women at the time—needed some elaboration to be presented as 
comic. 
The most obvious comic flaw in Armande's rhetoric is its oversimpli­
fication. The passage is built on antitheses which constantly oppose mind 
and matter, spiritual delights and humdrum chores. Keywords underline 
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the opposition: "bas," "grossiers," "vulgaires," "animale" on the one 
hand, "hauts," "nobles," "charmants" on the other. The dynamic pat-
tern—a succession of rises and falls—translates in its uncompromising 
verticality the antithetical nature of Armande's overstatements. But the 
pattern is far from being rigid or mechanical, and is marked by an elegant 
flexibility. The ascending movement, punctured by objurgations such as 
"elevez vos desirs," "aspirez aux clartes," comes to a magnificent climax: 
Loin d'etre aux lois d'un homme en esclave asservie 
Mariez-vous, ma soeur, a la philosophic, 
Qui nous monte au-dessus de tout le genre humain .. . 
Here the absurd analogy, made to stand out through the pauses in the 
lines, sound like a triumphant clarion call introducing the impressive long 
period that follows. 
The rhymes also play their part, emphasizing the joys of life devoted 
to study ("desirs"—"plaisirs," "douceurs"—"coeurs"), giving a neat fin­
ish to the reminder of an exemplary mother ("fille"—"famille"), magni­
fying the power of knowledge ("genre humain"—"souverain") in 
opposition to the downward pull of lower instincts ("animale"— 
"ravale"). 
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of this speech is the diction 
which, with very few exceptions, belongs to the grand style characteristic 
of the literary language of the French classicists. One of the features of 
this language is the strong tendency to use abstract words with an exten­
sive field of connotations, the blurring of their outlines even increased by 
the added imprecision of the plural, such as "clartes," "douceurs," 
"attachements." 
Three words, however, do not belong to poetic diction: "claquemu­
rer," "marmots," "idole" (taken here in its seventeenth-century meaning 
of a dull inert creature, a dolt). But the words are used by Armande more 
or less in inverted commas as if she were compelled by the violence of her 
ironical scorn to stoop to such familiar expressions. In any case, the un­
seemly picturesqueness of "claquemurer" is nicely balanced by the vague 
grayness of "choses du menage," "idole" and "marmots" and by the or­
thodoxy of "epoux" and "enfants." The despicable chores of a married 
woman are thereafter viewed from a great distance and "bas amuse­
ments," "sortes d'affaires," and finally summed up in the last line of the 
passage as "pauvretes horribles." 
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In comedy, poetic language may take some liberties which would not 
be possible in tragedy, on the condition of course that it should be done 
sparingly and with tact. Compare for instance Athalie's periphrasis when 
referring to Jezabel: 
cet eclat emprunte 
Dont elle eut soin de peindre et d'orner son visage 
Pour reparer des ans l'irreparable outrage. 
[II: 5] 
and the precise realistic term used by Celimene when talking about Arsi­
noe to her face in a speech rightly admired for its stylistic elegance: 
Mais elle met du rouge et veut paraitre belle. 
[Ill: 4] 
In Armande's lines, quite apart from the intrinsic aesthetic value of the 
overall effect of the grand style, the very vagueness of this kind of diction 
is very much in keeping with what we suspect to be the comic vagueness 
of the precieuse's acquaintance with knowledge. There is also another 
way in which the lofty terms reveal in Armande a comic discrepancy 
which will appear more clearly later in the play. The words chosen to 
convince the anti-precieuse Henriette of the delights which a life devoted 
to higher thinking will offer—the satisfaction of "desirs," the fulfillment 
of the "coeur," the "charmantes douceurs," "beaux feux," "doux at-
tachements"—are undoubtedly rhetorical overstatements. But, if we re­
member the lexical range of poetic diction, these terms are part and 
parcel of the language of love and their sexual implications are subcon­
sciously present in a woman who boasts of despising "les sens et la 
matiere." 
Thus the possibilities afforded by a poetic text—rhythm, rhymes, dic-
tion—result in a comic discourse which is both forceful in its direct im­
pact and rich in subtle nuances. At the same time the poetic medium is in 
no way debased and retains its elegant urbanity. 
This last point is important when we consider Les Femmes Savantes 
as one of Moliere's comedies which has had the misfortune of having 
been liked or disliked for the wrong reasons. Here, Moliere's comic vision 
of preciosite is very skillfully balanced. The refinement of language which 
we have just seen in Armande's speech—and which historically owed so 
much to the influence of the precieux circles—is not in itself made ridic­
ulous. In fact the raisonneur, Clitandre, who stands for good taste, uses 
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the same language as Armande most of the time. But in keeping with the 
complex pattern of the play, we find variety of tone and diction. And no 
one better than Moliere can show how, in the case of a bad poet, a comic 
discordance can ruin all the potential poetic value of a piece of verse. 
Thus Trissotin, in his epigram on the carrosse offered to a lady, destroys 
all the delicate poetic suggestions of the lovely word "amarante" by his 
deplorable pun: 
Ne dis plus qu'il est amarante: 
Dis plutot qu'il est de ma rente. 
[Ill: 2] 
Such is the flexibility in Moliere's use of stylistic devices that if in this 
last illustration from Les Femmes Savantes he can remove the poetic sub­
stance from formal verse, conversely he can elsewhere give prose passages 
a lyrical quality: for instance, Dorante's sophisticated description of an 
exquisite meal in Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme or in the fireworks of Sea-
pin's fanciful inventiveness. 
These would deserve close scrutiny but I am concerned here with what 
in Moliere's works conforms to the poetics of French classicism: the mold 
of the regular alexandrine and the limitations on vocabulary. The restric­
tions are not a hindrance but an asset when the writer takes advantage of 
the various connotations of the terms belonging to poetic diction. The 
choice of the possible implications of a word becomes a question of focus. 
We saw for instance that in Armande's speech the comic vision of pre­
ciosite gave a particular significance to the vocabulary of love. A similar 
vocabulary is also to be found in Tartuffe's declaration to Elmire, but this 
time the focus is different. 
One remembers the two superbly engineered speeches in which Tar­
tuffe displays his rhetoric of seduction, both ending with a neat symmet­
rical pattern of opposites: the first on the tone of the respectful lover 
whose diffidence is underlined by the pauses: 
Heureux, si vous voulez, malheureux, s'il vous plait. 
[Ill: 3] 
the second with a closely knit pattern which firmly sums up the cynical 
advantages of his offer: 
De l'amour sans scandale et du plaisir sans peur. 
[Ill: 3] 
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The opening lines of the declaration set the key to the phraseology Tar­
tuffe is going to exploit: 
L'amour qui nous attache aux beautes eternelles 
N'etouffe pas en nous l'amour des temporelles; 
Nos sens facilement peuvent etre charmes 
Des ouvrages parfaits que le Ciel a formes. 
Ses attraits reflechis brillent dans vos pareilles; 
Mais il etale en vous ses plus rares merveilles: 
II a sur votre face epanche des beautes 
Dont les yeux sont surpris, et les coeurs transported, 
Et je n'ai pu vous voir, parfaite creature, 
Sans admirer en vous l'auteur de la nature, 
Et d'une ardente amour sentir mon coeur atteint, 
Au plus beau des portraits ou lui-meme il s'est peint. 
[Ill: 3] 
This is a variation on the traditional syllogism used by Petrarchan poets 
with reference to neoplatonic fiction (we must adore Beauty, my mistress 
is beautiful, therefore I must adore her). The theme here is endowed with 
an exalted quality rarely to be found in love sonnets. The amplitude of 
the rhythm strikes a chord of solemnity, particularly when a couple of 
lines end with polysyllables ("eternelles"—"temporelles") or sonorous 
rhymes ("pareilles"—"merveilles"). The beautes eternelles may conjure 
up the world of Ideas but the "Ciel" clearly refers to the Christian God, 
"auteur de la nature" and as such, the maker of a "parfaite creature." 
The ultimate effect of loftiness comes from the reminder that God created 
man in his own image, after his likeness: 
Au plus des portraits ou lui-meme il s'est peint. 
Having reached these heights, Tartuffe is able to play with the ambiguities 
of a rich semantic field in order to assimilate human love and religious 
fervor. 
It has often been remarked that Tartuffe uses terms that belong to the 
vocabulary of religious mysticism such as "infirmite," "tribulations," 
"beatitude," "quietude," adjectives such as "benigne," "suave." These 
words with their marked degree of abstractedness, their impressive qual­
ity of containing a vast network of evasive connotations fit perfectly into 
the poetic diction of the speech. They also give a powerful and deeply 
comic enlargement to the attitude of the traditional Petrarchan lover, al­
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most beyond the customary hyperboles, as well as a different coloring to 
the poetic substance. The unworthiness of the lover reaches the depths of 
humility with the Christian implication that only grace can save him as 
he expects nothing "des vains efforts de mon infirmite." The joys he longs 
for are on a level with the peaceful contemplation of a soul blissfully 
attuned to its creator. The religious atmosphere which thus subtly per­
meates the text affects such conventions of love poetry as the deification 
of the lady and the invincible power of her eyes so that the line 
De vos regards divins l'ineffable douceur 
while conforming to the topos suggests the mysterious and ambiguously 
sensual ecstasy of a saint, as portrayed by a baroque artist. 
Boileau also takes up the subject of hypocritical devotion with a portrait 
of the fashionable directeur de femme insisting on the kind of advice he 
gives to one of his flock, the central point of his comforting doctrine being 
that 
Tout est sanctifie par une ame pieuse 
[Satire X]3 
All the moral shortcomings of the lady are justified including her fierce 
greed and ambition to see all her family grabbing the financial and hon­
orific advantages of high offices at court: 
Vostre bon naturel en cela pour Eux brille. 
Dieu ne nous defend point d'aimer nostre famille. 
D'ailleurs tous vos parens sont sages, vertueux. 
II est bon d'empescher ces emplois fastueux, 
D'estre donnez peut-estre a des Ames mondaines, 
Eprises du neant des vanitez humaines. 
[X] 
The comic of this complete reversal of moral values is particularly fine in 
the last two lines where the grand style adds a solemn emphasis to the 
preposterous casuistry. 
A few lines further on the tone becomes somewhat different when we 
are given the result of this spiritual guidance: 
Sa Devote s'incline .  . . 
Sa tranquille vertu conserve tous ses crimes: 
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Dans un coeur tous les jours nourri du Sacrement 
Maintient la vanite, l'orgueil, Pentestement, 
Et croit que devant Dieu ses frequens sacrileges 
Sont pour entrer au Ciel d'assurez privileges. 
Voila le digne fruit des soins de son Docteur. 
Encore est-ce beaucoup, si ce Guide imposteur, 
Par les chemins fleuris d'un charmant Quietisme 
Tout a coup l'amenant au vray Molinozisme, 
II ne luy fait bien-tost, aide de Lucifer, 
Gouster en Paradis les plaisirs de l'Enfer. 
[X] 
We are left in no doubt as to the label to affix onto this comic vision of 
false devotion. The explicit moral condemnation ("crimes," "sacrileges," 
etc.), the precise mention of contemporary religious movements, the stark 
violence of the irony culminating in the brutality of the final paradox: 
this is barefaced satire. In Moliere's Tartuffe the satire was incidental as 
is almost always the case with him. Vices or foibles, even those seemingly 
of his own times—the excesses of preciosite, the rich parvenu, or the faux 
devot—are a point of departure for a more general criticism of life in the 
form of a comic presentation of the insoluble problems to be found in 
human nature. The comic of Tartuffe does not lie in being a take-off on a 
contemporary devot (they were more subtly clever than he is) but in the 
contradiction between his assumed saintly appearance and the only too 
visible reality of his gluttony and lechery. Moreover Tartuffe is part of 
a more intricate comic picture in which his maneuvers and utterances 
light up and conversely are colored by the reactions of the other 
characters. 
Boileau is a satirist. And with satire the alliance of the poetic and the 
comic faces a particular difficulty. Satire is a hybrid form of the comic. 
Pure comic to be perceived requires an attitude of detachment which ba­
sically seems impossible in the case of satire. The satiric mode tends to 
bring out in the reader immediate reactions of his sensibility such as dis­
gust, indignation, even painful bitterness and loathing.4 
Yet with Boileau the perception of the comic is safe. The main subject 
of his attacks is not one likely to upset the reader's sensibility. Occasion­
ally, as in the satire against women from which I have just quoted a pas­
sage, he may treat a conventional topic; however, what he is primarily 
concerned with is not an aspect of human conduct but a more intellectual 
problem: the aesthetics of poetry. What he attacks is not men but books, 
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words: not Chapelain the man but Chapelain the poet as in Satire IX. 
The violence in him takes the form of "la haine d'un sot livre" (IX) and 
what he has so wittily and rightly called in his preface to Satire XII "une 
espece de colere poetique." This focus undoubtedly implies limitations. 
The sphere of his satire has nothing in common with that cruel tussle 
with evil which is the hallmark of great satire. But his singleness of pur­
pose gives him a very special place in the pantheon of formal satire. His 
achievement can be considered, for the greater part, as an original and 
remarkable contribution to a very close partnership of the poetic and the 
comic—poetry being at the same time the tool and the material in pro­
ducing the comic effect. 
The revaluation of Boileau in the second half of the present century 
has brought to the fore his qualities as a poet and I shall have the pleasure 
of referring to some aspects of this most stimulating approach.5 A num­
ber of Jules Brody's remarks are especially relevant to the present essay, 
as when he very finely delineates the kind of response—an active partici-
pation—Boileau's text must elicit.6 This invitation on the poet's part to 
"collaborate" (to borrow Brody's word) implies both curiosity and sym­
pathy from us. This should be the most rewarding, given the attractive 
complexity of Boileau's own attitude toward poetry, because for him po­
etry is fun and is also the most serious thing in the world. 
The strict requirements of verse form may appear to him at times the 
curse of his life: 
Maudit soit le premier dont la verve insensee 
Dans les bornes d'un vers renferma sa pensee. 
[Satire II] 
And yet when praising the King's victories in Holland what enjoyment 
he derives from next to impossible rhymes and from his feigned inability 
to deal with names in essence unpoetic! 
Et qui peut, sans fremir, aborder Woerden, 
Quel Vers ne tomberoit au seul nom de Heusden? 
Quelle Muse a rimer en tous lieux dispozee 
Oseroit approcher des bords du Zuiderzee? 
Et par tout sur le Whal, ainsi que sur le Leek, 
Le vers est en deroute et le poete a sec. 
[Epistre IV] 
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These last two rhyming monosyllables sound like a sharp tap on the 
Muse's fingers. 
More subtle than this juggling with difficult rhymes is the sustained 
jeu poetique which presides over the fundamentally serious content of 
Satire IX, and gives it its pattern. The poem is par excellence Boileau's 
apologia for satire. As Maynard Mack has shown in a brilliant essay7 it 
is necessary for the satirist to make his ethical position clear and convinc­
ing by presenting himself in a favorable light, worthy of being trusted. 
Hence the importance of the persona he assumes. In Satire IX we witness 
the acrobatics of the fictitious persona who, endowed with a split person­
ality, embarks on a mock duel from antithetical positions: for or against 
the right to satirize. The successive twists in the exchange or arguments— 
some of these cleverly self-defeating—result in a great variety of tones— 
reproachful, sarcastic, falsely naive, irritated, humble—and multiply 
through the skillful maneuvers of the duelists the number of thrusts, at 
times pleasantly unexpected, which directly or indirectly are aimed at the 
satirist's victims. 
The victims are of course the bad poets of the period but the virtuosity 
of this attack transcends its contemporary character and thus escapes the 
fate of short-lived topical satire. 
Et qui sc,auroit sans moi que Cotin a preche? 
A joke but also a prophetic statement. Cotin and the other writers whom 
Boileau has ridiculed exist for the modern reader as protagonists in a 
poetic comedy we can appreciate for itself. But if the original features of 
these personages have faded into a kind of timeless transparency, it re­
mains that, as is the case with Moliere, the reader's active response to 
Boileau's text must take into account the conventions of seventeenth-cen-
tury literary language. They affect in a rather interesting way the classi-
cist's handling of metaphors. 
Here are a few lines from L'Art Poetique where Boileau, referring to 
Scudery, makes fun of the descriptive technique of an author who never 
knows when to stop: 
S'il rencontre un Palais, il m'en depeint la face: 
II me promene apres de terrasse en terrasse. 
Icy s'offre un perron, la regne un corridor, 
La ce balcon s'enferme en un balustre d'or: 
II compte des plafonds les ronds et les ovales, 
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Ce ne sont que Festons, ce ne sont qu 'Astragales. 
Je saute vingt feuillets pour en trouver la fin, 
Et je me sauve a peine au travers du jardin. 
[Chant I] 
The passage undoubtedly relies on figurative language for its comic and 
poetic effect. Paradoxically, the slow, boring reading of a tedious descrip­
tion undergoes a lively transformation. Verbs of motion sketch the hap­
hazard and dull method of the author: chance encounters, leisurely 
meandering, exhaustive survey of niggling details, and the swift desperate 
escape of the reader. Inanimate objects acquire a life of their own through 
the interplay of denotations in verbs like "s'offre" and "regne," the finest 
semi-personification being that of the "balcon" with the "s'enferme" 
which suggests a gesture and a mental attitude of proud disdain. All these 
suggestions are light touches and their rapid succession while stimulating 
our imagination does not leave us with lasting pictures. We have here that 
impression of evanescent metaphors to be found as well in other classical 
writers.8 The two elements of the narrative, the actual and the imaginary, 
are nicely fused at the end of the passage in the juxtaposition of the im­
patient flipping through the pages of a book and the panic-stricken flight 
through the grounds of the mansion. 
The imagery of motion, conspicuous in these lines, plays a very impor­
tant part in Boileau's poetry.9 It was perhaps a subtle way for a classicist 
to re-introduce unobtrusively a concrete element in a literary language 
which was so cut off from a realistic representation of the world. We find 
it equally in La Bruyere with a similar comic and poetic value. 
We may also notice another paradox in the passage. Although the sur­
charge of ornaments in the description is ridiculed, the line which ex­
presses such unnecessary sophistication has a sophisticated beauty of its 
own ("La ce balcon s'enferme en un balustre d'or") so that even the quo­
tation from Scudery, inserted almost immediately after, strikes a note of 
pleasurable luxury, mostly with the sonorous and lovely word Astragales 
which sounds (quite wrongly as far as its etymology and meaning are 
concerned) like a display of starbursts. 
It is not the only time that we find in Boileau the device of incorporat­
ing a quotation from another poet into his own text, thus illuminating 
both with a lateral shaft of light. It may be a quotation from a poet he 
admires as when the lines he borrows are, at several degrees removed, 
from Malherbe: 
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Irai-je dans une Ode, en phrases de Malherbe, 
Troubler dans ses roseaux le Danube superbe: 
Delivrer de Sion le peuple gemissant; 
Faire trembler Memphis, ou paslir le Croissant: 
Et passant du Jourdain les ondes alarmees, 
Cueillir, mal a propos, les palmes Idumees? 
[Satire IX] 
This is obviously a little dig at Malherbe's slavish imitators, but the verse 
retains a Malherbian nobility and the amusing twist at the end sets off 
the exotic allusiveness of the Idumaean palms while inviting the reader to 
share in the joke of the anticlimax. 
Literary borrowings from the classics are another matter. Here too one 
has to remember that imitation was still a principle of art in the seven­
teenth century. The Horatian flavor of a great deal of Boileau's poetry is 
well known. Imitation of the classics gave an ennobling patine to a poem. 
This could not fail to be an important consideration for him: 
Quoyque vous ecriviez, evitez la bassesse. 
Le stile le moins noble a pourtant sa noblesse. 
[Art Poetique I] 
He would never allow the comic to debase the poetic language. When we 
think of the two traditional genres that established ready-made patterns 
for the alliance of the poetic and the comic, it is significant that he did 
not choose the burlesque, which he abominated, but its very antithesis, 
the mock-heroic, (which raised a subject taken from low life onto a 
higher and nobler plane) and composed Le Lutrin.10 
One of the most precious legacies of Greece and Rome was the myth­
ological atmosphere which had been the privileged domain of French 
poetry since the Renaissance. Among other advantages, it provided a dec­
orative imagery for the poet's creative process. Boileau finds it useful to 
render his own harassing experience of the search for perfect rhythm, 
perfect rhymes and rich expressiveness: 
Sans cesse poursuivant ces fugitives Fees, 
On voit sous Les Lauriers, haleter les Orphees. 
[EpistreXI]11 
(These two lines with their seemingly effortless harmony and their sug­
gestive power giving the lie to the implied statement.) 
Some of the most obvious mythological figures linked with poetic in­
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spiration were equally convenient for self-mockery; and even more so for 
satirizing incompetent poets: 
Phebus a-t-il pour vous applani le Parnasse? 
[Satire IX] 
Mythology had lost a great deal of its evocative quality by the time of 
French classicism. Boileau manages more than once to infuse a breath of 
life into a world frozen by convention. This he achieves by using once 
more images of motion but tactfully, with a great lightness of touch, so 
as not to upset the accepted connotation of the mythological element. 
This careful process can be seen very clearly in the way he expresses the 
clumsy attempts of the poete sans art: 
Sa Muse dereglee, en ses vers vagabonds 
Ne s'eleve jamais que par sauts et par bonds 
[Art Poetique, III] 
The incongruous movements of the Muse in her abortive flight upwards 
are comic but within the harmony of the verse the jerkiness is poetically 
controlled. Note also that the concrete element is kept in check. The word 
"dereglee" which qualifies the muse can only apply to an abstraction (for 
"Muse" read "inspiration"). We move smoothly from abstract to con­
crete through the "vers vagabonds." As a result of this delicate balance 
there is no danger of a burlesque picture of the muse. 
Elsewhere in the Art Poetique a pompous and insensitive poet is ridi­
culed for metaphorically sounding a clarion in the middle of a gentle 
eclogue. The effect of this loud discordant noise is rendered by the grace­
ful flight of rustic deities: 
De peur de l'ecouter, Pan fuit dans les roseaux, 
Et les Nymphes d'effroi se cachent sous le eaux. 
[II] 
Mythology had not lost its charm entirely and could at times give a deli­
cate coloring to Boileau's comic sketches. 
When we see the pastoral landscape thus lending its scenery to the comic 
vision without being debased in any way, we may well think of another 
poet, English this time, Pope, who also took advantage of the same tra­
dition, mostly in his milder satiric vein. 
Here are a few lines devoted to the pretentious garden of a wealthy 
man: 
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His Gardens next your admiration call, 
On ev'ry side you look, behold the Wall! 
No pleasing Intricacies intervene, 
No artful wildness to perplex the scene; 
Grove nods at grove, each Alley has a brother, 
And half the platform just reflects the other. 
The suff'ring eye inverted Nature sees, 
Trees cut to Statues, Statues thick as trees, 
With here a Fountain, never to be play'd, 
And there a Summer-house, that knows no shade. 
Here Amphitrite sails thro' myrtle bow'rs; 
There Gladiatorsfight, or die, in flow'rs; 
Un-water'd see the drooping sea-horse mourn, 
And swallows roost in Nilus' dusty Urn. 
[Epistle IV: 11. 114-26]12 
The comic here might appear as a caricatural description of a garden 
where everything is wrong, the amusing effect increasing with the enu­
meration and variety of the examples which testify to false art, including 
the absurdity of a fountain without water and a useless summerhouse. 
The unrelenting symmetry of the landscaping emphasized in several 
lines by the caesura gives the features of the garden preposterous human 
attributes (a nod or a brother) and makes its strongest impact with the 
pattern of line 120 where the mutilation of nature and coarsening of art 
are translated with superb compactness through the comic inversion of 
the normal order of things: 
Trees cut to Statues, Statues thick as trees, 
The placing of the statues—these destined to add the refinement of 
classical culture to the grounds—is in complete contradiction with the 
attributes of the figures they represent and may well seem the most gro­
tesque aberration in the design of the park. 
And yet I think I was not right in using the word caricatural. This 
would not take into account the poetic character of the passage which is 
particularly marked in the last four lines. Strangely, the classical figures 
by being seen in unexpected surroundings recapture a lost evocative 
power. Amphitrites appear more lovely, if less conventionally regal, sail­
ing through bowers of myrtle which one thinks should have been destined 
to Aphrodite. The gladiators, no longer petrified as Gladiator Pugnans 
and Gladiator Mortens, assume, even in their dying fall, a lissom grace 
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against a flowery background. The line that depicts the fate of the sea-
horse starts with an elegant syntactical inversion and is made to sound as 
a long, drawn out pathetic plaint and the last line, with its pleasant allit­
eration and its swallows, brings renewed life to the dusty emptiness of 
the urn held by the river god. 
Here perhaps the response of the modern reader would be to connect 
in his imagination the charm of the pastoral suggestions with the haunt­
ing and subtle beauty of those old, long-neglected formal gardens where 
fountains are for ever silent and nature has with random artistry invaded 
what is left of former statuary. 
This last remark might suggest that the postromantic reader would 
more easily find Pope's lines poetic than he would the illustrations from 
Moliere or Boileau I have given. This may be the case. Pope is obviously 
a very great poet. But we must remember that if English neoclassicism 
had a great deal in common with French classicism, there were also im­
portant differences; for neoclassicism incorporated a much wider tradi­
tion. Most important of all, whatever the presence of a poetic diction 
which Wordsworth was to attack later on, the literary language was not 
restricted by the limitations inherent in the poetics of seventeenth-century 
France. A poet could couple the nobility of the grand style with the crisp 
raciness of a rich vocabulary, as Pope did, for example when satirizing, 
like Boileau, the boring long-winded writers: 
Still humming on, their drouzy course they keep, 
And lash'd so long, like tops, are lash'd asleep. 
[An Essay on Criticism, 11. 600, 601] 
It remains that with Moliere and Boileau as with Pope the comic im­
pact with all its nuances is inseparable from the poetic achievement. In 
the case of these French seventeenth-century writers, the author-reader 
(or listener) relationship may happen to be a very close one, with a self-
effacing attitude on the part of both, given the respect of the first for the 
poetics of his time and for his audience and, as far as the second is con­
cerned, the willingness to enjoy the plaisir du texte according to a certain 
code. 
It does not necessarily follow that all the readers will oblige. I have 
mentioned some specific reactions of the twentieth-century reader. And 
my pleasurable response to the word Astragales may be an unjustified 
personal one. But, in spite of some inevitable variations in the way our 
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imagination reacts, the kind of text I have illustrated in this essay keeps 
the quality of uniqueness in the handling of literary language, character­
istic of classicism, which gives it its highly rewarding, if somewhat exact­
ing, appeal. 
There was, incidentally, at the same time another French poet whom I 
have not yet mentioned whose works show in the most exquisite form 
how subtle the partnership between the comic and poetry could be: La 
Fontaine. 
But that, Best Beloved (if I may so address the Muse of Comedy) is 
another story. 
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deals with The Rape of the Lock as well as Le Lutrin and shows through subtle 
and convincing analyses how the transformation of the real into poetry operates 
in both poems. 
11. The word was used to mean any fantastic being, including the muses. 
There is no question of Boileau introducing here an allusion to the national 
folklore. 
12. The quotations from Pope are taken from his Poetical Works, ed. Herbert 
Davis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966). 
Corneille, Oedipus, Racine 
Terence Cave 
Anyone who inserts the name of Oedipus between Corneille and Racine 
can nowadays hardly help inserting a note of anxiety into what is other­
wise a classic and indeed banal parallel. Opposition, even conflict, was 
of course always there, but in the form of a reassuring antithesis: Cor­
neille Jesuit, Racine Jansenist; Corneille optimistic, Racine pessimistic; 
Corneille political, Racine psychological; Corneille heroic, Racine pas­
sionate; even Corneille boring, Racine interesting. The interference of 
Oedipus puts the twins, or the father and the son, in an uneasy relation 
with one another, a relation in which difference and identity are not easily 
disentangled. Both, in the texts I shall be considering, seem to grapple 
obscurely and anxiously with a complex topos of poetics, the topos 
jointly constructed by Aristotle and Sophocles. It is thus in the first in­
stance on their authority—Sophocles' and Aristotle's—rather than 
Freud's that Oedipus appears in this paper; but by the very nature of the 
subject, the question of authority will remain an open one. 
My point of departure is a simple chronological observation: Cor-
neille's Oedipe, published in 1659, was immediately followed (in 1660) 
by his Examens and Discours, whereas Racine's first tragedy, La The­
baide, was written only some three years later.1 The grouping may be 
accidental, but accidents of that kind invite interpretation. For example, 
Corneille in his reflections on tragedy writes against the Sophoclean Oe­
dipus as a paradigm, dissociating himself sharply from Aristotle, yet at 
precisely the same time he writes his own version; Racine, who as a 
young playwright must have been acutely aware of the threat posed by 
Corneille's monumental reputation, chose as his first subject the sequel to 
the story of Oedipus. At the center of the configuration is the question of 
tragic recognition (Aristotle's anagnorisis) as a theme of poetics with 
which the story of Oedipus is deeply bound up, and the principal object 
of this paper is to approach from that angle the rather delicate issue of 
the relationship between neoclassical theory and practice.2 
One precautionary remark is needed about the definition of "recogni­
tion." In the course of the history of poetics, the term becomes extremely 
82

 83 Corneille, Oedipus, Racine
elastic: in fact, the period in question is a crucial test of its elasticity. But 
it is important to emphasize that the authority of Oedipus as Aristotle's 
chief example as well as in its own right leads virtually all commentators 
of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries to restrict the use 
of the term primarily to instances where persons are recognized: other 
possibilities, such as the recognition of a state of affairs or of a hidden 
psychological truth, are only marginally admitted to the canon.3 It is nec­
essary to make this point, as some of the more influential modern com­
mentaries on the Poetics have adopted a far more catholic view,4 and one 
therefore risks begging an important historical question, the question of 
the apparent decline of recognition. 
It is not difficult, in fact, to show that neoclassical poetics, in France 
at least, is uneasy about tragic anagnorisis. D'Aubignac, whose La Pra­
tique du theatre is after all the most substantial and complete treatise of 
the period, has little to say about the topic except in relation to the ques­
tion of suspense;5 Boileau makes no specific reference to recognition in 
the Art poetique; and Dacier, writing in 1692, claims that "Nos Poetes 
Tragiques ont peu fait de denoiiemens par la reconnaissance."6 
Yet the fact remains that spectacular recognitions could draw in the 
crowds until late in the seventeenth century, as is shown by the notorious 
success of Thomas Corneille's Timocrate, first performed not long before 
Oedipe was written; as another example, one might cite Claude Boyer's 
Le Fils suppose, published in 1672, when Racine was in mid-career. Da­
cier himself claims that Rotrou's Venceslas of 1647 continued to be pop­
ular because its recognition scene was technically an improvement on the 
Sophoclean model.7 
Such discrepancies and oscillations already suggest a pervasive tension 
between theory and practice, or indeed within theory and practice. The 
tension is certainly perceptible in Corneille; the case of Racine is slightly 
different, since his theoretical writings are marginal in comparison with 
Corneille's, but the underlying question remains the same: the question 
on the one hand of a recurrent anxiety about Oedipus as a model and, 
on the other, of the recognitions in which such anxiety seems most criti­
cally to be invested. 
Corneille's attitude to anagnorisis ("agnition") in his theoretical writings 
appears to be consistently negative. The one instance in which he allows 
it as a possibility (a denouement in which a character may discover that 
he is of noble birth) is mentioned in the context of comedy. As far as 
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tragedy is concerned, the key passage occurs in the second Discours. 
Having enumerated Aristotle's classes of tragic denouement (from Poetics 
14), he notoriously reverses the Aristotelian order of priority, placing the 
cases in which the character is fully conscious of his deeds and acts openly 
("a visage decouvert") above those in which he is in ignorance.8 The re­
sult is that recognition plots are relegated to an inferior status, and Cor­
neille goes on to say: "Je sais Que l'agnition est un grand ornement dans 
les tragedies: Aristote le dit; mais il est certain qu'elle a ses incommo­
dites." For Corneille, sustained emotional dilemmas and conflict are pref­
erable to the single outburst afforded by recognition scenes. Le Cid and 
Rodogune are far more moving than Oedipus.9 
The phrase "a visage decouvert" is an interesting one in that it recalls 
the romance tradition of knights in disguise rather than the tradition of 
poetics. It certainly illustrates the extent to which Corneille's critical lan­
guage attempts to excise what is covert or hidden, what is not the object 
of conscious knowledge. One could illustrate the same point in relation 
to his treatment of hamartia: he knows the word can mean "error," but 
he excludes this reading in favor of a moral one, which has the further 
effect of separating hamartia from anagnorisis.10 The question of tragic 
ignorance or knowledge seems to be marginal for Corneille, in his theo­
retical writings at least. 
The consequence, when it comes to Oedipus, is that a good deal in the 
paradigm is rejected, treated abrasively, or suppressed. What is rejected 
first of all is contrivance: Sophocles' play is mentioned as an example of 
how the ancients, in their recognition scenes, made use of an extraneous 
character appearing fortuitously, an error which Corneille says he has 
corrected in his version; he also speaks of the way he has tidied up the 
story of Oedipus' killing of La'ius and other implausibilities. These are of 
course problems arising from the need to sustain and motivate Oedipus' 
ignorance. In more general terms, Corneille treats very gingerly the ques­
tion of the horror of the play, its monstrous transgressions. In his discus­
sion of catharsis, he points out that no spectator of Oedipus would 
"craindre de tuer son pere ou d'epouser sa mere"; the play would be 
more likely to purge the desire to have recourse to predictions, since these 
may make us fall into the very misfortune we seek to avoid.11 This is the 
first time that Oedipus' patricide and incest are explicitly referred to in 
the Discours, and Corneille wraps them up in a kind of pre-Voltairean 
joke. In the Examen, he remarks that he has suppressed the horror of the 
subject: 
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Je tremblai quand je l'envisageai de pres. Je reconnus que ce qui avait 
passe pour merveilleux en leurs siecles [sc. ceux de Sophocle et de Se­
neque] pourrait sembler horrible au notre; que cette eloquente et serieuse 
description de la maniere dont ce malheureux prince se creve les yeux, qui 
occupe tout leur cinquieme acte, ferait soulever la delicatesse de nos 
dames, dont le degout attire aisement celui du reste de l'auditoire; et 
qu'enfin, l'amour n'ayant point de part en cette tragedie, elle etait denuee 
des principaux agrements qui sont en possession de gagner la voix 
publique.12 
What Corneille perceived when he looked at it closely, then, was that the 
horror of Oedipus' recognition exceeded the bounds of contemporary 
taste. It is no doubt worth noting that, while claiming that the play is 
defective in love interest, Corneille succeeds in omitting any reference to 
Oedipus' incest. The blinding, which Corneille treats as if it were (again) 
a kind of embarrassing joke, serves perhaps as a metaphorical substitute 
for sexual wounding. The other topic that is visibly missing is recognition 
itself:13 the plotting of monstrous ignorance and the threat of unspeak­
able transgressions are both relegated to the margins, hidden from the 
delicate view of the audience. In his theoretical writing, Corneille at­
tempts to tackle Oedipus and his problems a visage decouvert, but only 
at the cost of averting his gaze. 
One might well ask why Corneille wrote Oedipe at all, given his stric­
tures on both the form and the subject of the classical model. It seems 
likely that his preoccupation with poetics at this stage in his career led 
him to undertake an exercise which, like much of his theoretical writing, 
pays homage to Aristotelian authority while marking a critical difference 
from it: Nadal is I think right to point out that Oedipe is a critique of 
Oedipus.14 On the other hand, there was also a demand for the subject: 
Fouquet commissioned the play, giving Corneille a choice of three pos­
sible subjects, and the King subsequently rewarded him for his work. 
Given the status and stature of Corneille, the very existence of the play 
implies a desire on the part of contemporary audiences to see the monster 
paraded again on the stage, decked out in agrements which hide his 
bleeding eyes and his sexual misdemeanours. 
This desire was both acknowledged and (predictably) deplored by 
d'Aubignac in his 1663 Dissertation on Oedipe.xs D'Aubignac returns 
almost obsessively to the impropriety of imposing on the audience an 
action reeking of incest and parricide, accompanying this with an equally 
predictable attack on the wholesale lack of plausibility in the plot (the 
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implausibility is of course once again located in the continued ignorance 
of Oedipus and other characters). He recognizes that Corneille has tried 
to "rectify" the errors of Sophocles in this respect, but takes the view (as 
Voltaire will also) that he has only tinkered with the surface, leaving all 
the main problems intact. What d'Aubignac in fact does in this polemical 
document is to magnify Corneille's own strictures and thus display more 
prominently a difficulty which is already inherent in the project of rewrit­
ing Oedipus in mid-seventeenth-century France. D'Aubignac's censorship 
is the sign of an anxiety which he shares with Corneille; their difference, 
in the sense of differend, is produced by a concealed identity. 
Oedipe is in various ways an oddity in Corneille's dramatic output, al­
most a hapax. Written after a period of seven years in which Corneille 
had produced no writings for the theatre, Oedipe emerges from the si­
lence, a circumstance which lends it a no doubt spurious air of mystery. 
Yet it is possible to discern a group of earlier experiments having some­
thing like a "recognition plot" and belonging to the phase of Corneille's 
career immediately preceding the silence. I am thinking here in particular 
of Heraclius and Don Sanche, in which both the recognition structure 
and the Oedipal themes of parricide and incest are used uneasily, criti­
cally, with embarrassment as it were: censorship and seduction alternate 
in their themes and presentation. They are also examples of generic un­
certainty, mingling questions of classical poetics with materials from 
tragicomedy and romance. 
A more detailed treatment of these plays is not possible within the 
compass of the present study.16 For reasons that will become apparent 
later, it is, however, necessary to make a brief excursion still further back 
in Corneille's career, to Rodogune. Corneille classed Rodogune as a play 
in which the tragic deed is undertaken consciously, no doubt because 
Cleopatre knows perfectly well what she is doing. The classification, 
however, fails to account for certain central aspects of the play. Although 
its subject is nonclassical, it is distinctly reminiscent of the classical family 
plot: there are echoes, for example, of Medea and the Oresteia, and par­
ricide is an ever-present possibility realized in the murder of Seleucus.1^ 
More particularly, these elements are conjugated with a plotting depen­
dent on uncertainties, on the withholding of knowledge: Rodogune re­
fuses to say which twin she prefers; the death of Seleucus places 
Antiochus between two women either of whom may be guilty; and the 
issue of primogeniture—which of the twins has the marginally superior 
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right to the throne?—hovers unresolved over the whole plot. From the 
beginning of the play, these elements are explicitly placed in relation to a 
textual memory: Seleucus reminds his twin that, being rivals in both love 
and political ambition, they risk repeating the disasters of Thebes and 
Troy, tragedy and epic. More specifically, the allusion to Thebes recalls 
the story of the twin sons of Oedipus, Eteocles and Polynices; it thus 
provides the exact counterpart of the resolute friendship of the twins, 
which withstands their double rivalry and the attempts of Cleopatre to 
make trouble between them.18 The memory of Thebes is a memory of 
Oedipus, and of Oedipus Rex, a memory which Rodogune is already 
trying to rectify. 
D'Aubignac, in his Dissertation, was the first to make in public the per­
haps all-too-obvious point on which most of the following discussion of 
Oedipe is based, namely, the splitting of the plot between the love-episode 
and the Oedipal episode. D'Aubignac goes so far as to say that what one 
would nowadays call the "romance" element—the ultimately happy 
love-affair between Thesee and Dirce—supplies the main plot, with the 
story of Oedipus and his recognition serving only as a secondary epi-
sode.19 This duality or split epitomizes the problem of the play as an 
attempt to rectify or evade the monstrosities of the Sophoclean version. 
By regarding it as a simple error, which could have been overcome either 
by greater dramatic skill or—better—by complete censorship, 
d'Aubignac remains trapped in what one might call the politics of eva­
sion. In repeating the analysis (and it is, in part at least, a repetition), I 
would hope to show that the error is a complex one, in the sense that 
Corneille's play itself draws on and thematizes a difficulty which Cor­
neille explicitly recognized in his theoretical writings. The "confusion" 
which is produced by the generic and structural ambivalence of Oedipe 
is not an accidental but an intrinsic effect, and in this sense the play al­
ready goes beyond d'Aubignac's strictures. 
The play opens, flamboyantly enough, with romance: Dirce, daughter 
of Laius and Jocaste, exhorts her lover Thesee to leave Thebes before he 
is struck down by the plague. The Oedipal question itself is not fully 
raised until 1.5, where the oracle is reported to have refused to speak, 
thus giving rise to uncertainty and anxiety among the characters. From 
this point on, the plot is sustained by a series of false inferences and thus 
false recognitions. In II.3, the ambiguous reply of Laius' ghost is at once 
taken by everyone to mean that Dirce will have to be sacrificed to lay the 
88 TERENCE CAVE 
ghost (i.e., the name of Dirce is recognized as the solution to the riddle 
posed by the metonym "mon sang" in the oracular speech of the ghost). 
In III.4, Oedipe reports a rumor that Jocaste's exposed infant survived; 
Thesee now pronounces himself the son of Laius and hence the brother 
of Dirce, much to Jocaste's surprise (line 1183: "Quoi! vous seriez mon 
fils?"). In IV.4, Jocaste, then Oedipe, discover that Oedipe is the murderer 
of Laius, the story of the robbers having been shown to be a fiction. The 
guilt is now divided, it seems, between Oedipe and Thesee (1546: "Je suis 
le parricide, et cefils est Pinceste"), although Thesee has already admitted 
to Dirce, and thus to the audience, that he himself started the rumor as a 
ruse to prevent her from becoming the victim. Finally, in V.2—3, with the 
arrival of the messenger from Corinth, the various pieces of the story 
come together and full recognition is achieved. 
The first thing to note here is that recognitions proliferate, initially at 
least, in order to imprint their mark on the love-intrigue. The balance 
only gradually swings from the note of heroic offers of self-sacrifice (from 
Dirce and Thesee) towards the blinding of Oedipe. Meanwhile, the rela­
tionship between these generically different elements remains an awk­
ward one, and is marked as such when, in III.4, Oedipe first shows signs 
of serious anxiety: he remarks that, having previously wanted to prevent 
the lovers' marriage, by force if necessary, he now—"sans savoir pour-
quoi"—would like them to go away and consummate their passion "loin 
de [s]a vue," out of sight and out of mind. "J'admire," he says, "un 
changement si confus que le mien" (1048), as well he might. 
Such moments, where textual tensions are exhibited in the anxiety of 
characters, recur later in the play: the imperfect accommodation of dark 
desires and monstrous acts with fragments of a romance discourse is in 
an important sense what Oedipe is "about." Around this central uncer­
tainty may be grouped other signs of displacement and would-be rectifi­
cation, beginning with the passages which remove or supplement 
Sophoclean "defects" such as the story of the several robbers who are 
said to have killed Laius (see IV. 2). These passages are the direct echo 
within the play of Corneille's theoretical strictures, functioning as a rec­
tification of the logic of Sophocles' version. 
The term "rectification" in cases like this is however equivocal, since 
the trace of commentary designed to erase the play's implausibilities cre­
ates new tensions, skewing the text in sometimes surprising ways. One of 
these is the move by which Oedipe's title to the throne—his ability to 
solve the riddle of the Sphinx—is demoted by Dirce to the level of mere 
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wit: "J'ai vu ce peuple ingrat que l'enigme surprit / Vous payer assez bien 
d'avoir eu de Pesprit" (451-52). Voltaire would have appreciated the 
joke; so, no doubt, would Freud. It might appear to be only a local in­
stance, but the same satirical note is evident elsewhere, particularly in 
certain passages where the implied motivation of Oedipus Rex is called 
into question. Every time the possibility of a recognition—however spu-
rious—comes into view, the character concerned hastens to motivate her 
or his "crime." Dirce accuses herself of being the occasion for Laius' 
death (643—55). Thesee accepts the mild imputation of unwitting and 
unconsummated incest with his "sister" but cannot swallow the mon­
strous allegation that he has killed his "father" (1198-12.00); he also 
argues that anyone ought to be able to recognize a king, even one dis­
guised as a peasant, so that ignorance is no excuse (1348-50). 
In these ways, the problem of Oedipus' error and punishment is scath­
ingly explored by the characters in the play, much as if they were person­
ifications of an issue in poetics. The most flamboyant instance is 
undoubtedly Thesee's tirade at the end of Act HI in favour of free will and 
moral responsibility as against arbitrary predestination: the kind of fa­
tality normally associated with the case of Oedipus is repudiated, again 
with scorn (1167: "D'un tel aveuglement daignez me dispenser"). As a 
representative of romance and its habit of poetic justice, Thesee inevi­
tably comes into conflict with the topoi of tragedy. Thesee, however, has 
a right to complain, since he is a character from another kind of fiction 
who suddenly finds himself without a passport in the troubled lands of 
tragedy. Oedipe is a displaced person in a rather different sense: however 
the play is rewritten, he cannot rid himself of his transgressions or of the 
expiation they require, so that the tension and the anxiety in his case are 
self-evidently greater. 
One might first note that his culpability is established in advance by 
other characters in various ways—once again, the mania for motivation. 
Thesee's argument about the obligation to recognize kings at all times 
whatever their guise clearly covers Oedipus' case; Dirce, disapproving of 
his consultation of the dead, associates this "insolence" with his tyran­
nical behavior toward the whole family of Laius, accuses him of usurping 
the throne, and predicts that the dead will punish him for his violence 
and the gods for his impieties (553-60). 
Despite this evidence, Dacier was to claim that Corneille's Oedipe 
failed to answer to the Aristotelian juste milieu because he is a virtuous 
man who falls into misfortune. This view is no doubt a consequence of 
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Oedipe's reaction to the recognition of his guilt, which closely corre­
sponds to Thesee's speech on free will (1820-40,1988-94)  . When Oed­
ipe finds out who he is and what he has done, he disowns his crime and 
thus turns recognition into a scandal, a meaningless error, to be faced out 
with stoic constancy and contempt: to put it in another way, hamartia 
reverts here to the sense of "error" (see for example 1919), and thus, 
according to Corneille's own theory, loses all claim to meaning. There is 
in fact a major shift in the ethos of Oedipe in the course of the play: he 
begins by behaving like a standard Cornelian tyrant and usurper and 
ends by behaving like a standard Cornelian hero. In Heraclius, the tyrant 
Phocas can be done away with, leaving the characters to sort out the 
~ problem of identity to their own satisfaction. But Oedipe is another mat­
ter: he can't simply be ejected from the plot. So Dirce in the end has to 
take back everything she had earlier said about his tyrannical behaviour 
and claim that she had said it a contre-coeur anyway (1799-1812). In­
deed, it rather neatly proves to be the case that if Oedipe is the son of 
Laius, he is the rightful king of Thebes, not a tyrant and usurper: he goes 
out complaining of the tyranny of the gods (1991—94), so the irony can 
hardly be overlooked. 
Oedipe, then, loses a voluntary guilt and acquires an involuntary one 
for which he can therefore disclaim responsibility. What is recognized, in 
this sense, is that Oedipe is a hero like Thesee: 
Mon souvenir n'est plein que d'exploits genereux, 
Cependant je me trouve inceste et parricide, 
Sans avoir fait un pas que sur les pas d'Alcide, 
Ni recherche partout que lois a maintenir 
Que monstres a detruire et mechants a punir. 
(1820-24) 
By a curious twist in this notoriously twisting plot, Oedipe shows himself 
to be entitled to cross the boundary into tragicomedy and romance, the 
land of heroic monster-killers. The moment at which he begins to cross it 
can be exactly pinpointed: it is the moment referred to earlier when he 
mysteriously changes his mind about Thesee and Dirce and wishes them 
safe and sound from the contamination of Thebes. He begins at that mo­
ment to feel a nostalgia for romance. 
All this could be stated in terms not only of Corneille's hesitations and 
defensiveness but also of the way the audience might be expected to react 
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to textual memories. To speak of the characters as if they personally had 
feelings on the matter is of course simply a convenient fiction (although 
it's true that the best fictions are usually the convenient ones). The play 
engineers an accommodation between the romance plot and the Oedipal 
plot: the unacceptable face of the Oedipal recognition has to be disguised 
or repudiated, compensation being provided by the eclat of heroic dis­
course, the appeal of admiration. 
Despite the showy Cornelian "miracle" of the last scene, the mixture 
remains an uneasy one, the sign of a profound difficulty in the rewriting 
of the master-text. Knowledge may be re-established through recogni­
tion and a schema for its interpretation may be imposed; yet the ques­
tion of knowledge remains problematic as the curtain falls. After 
Thesee's confident pronouncement that there can no longer be any doubt 
about the choice of a victim by the gods, Dirce gloomily adds: "Un autre 
ordre demain peut nous etre donne" (2007). Consequently, an element 
of doubt hovers over the ending, a doubt which seems to point prolept­
ically toward the story of Oedipus' progeny, toward the yet unwritten 
La Thebai'de. It is also not difficult to show that the criteria which char­
acters use to determine the truth in the course of the action are all un­
certain or fallible. Nature speaks through "le sang," and may 
retrospectively be seen to be right, but it doesn't speak clearly enough 
to prevent Oedipe from killing Laius or marrying Jocaste, or to enable 
Jocaste to be quite certain Thesee isn't her son. Raison allows some 
distinctions to be made and some positions secured, but it is constantly 
undermined by states of confusion, passion and desire, and all too easily 
ramifies into spurious logic and false inference. Corneille makes virtually 
no use of the themes of blindness and insight characteristic of Oedipus 
Rex, but "obscurite," "confusion" and other vocabulary of this kind 
circulates throughout the play. Dirce herself, despite her commitment to 
uncontaminated romance values, is seduced by the sexual ambiguities of 
the Oedipal plot: 
L'amour pour les sens est un si doux poison, 
Qu'on ne peut pas toujours ecouter la raison. 
Moi-meme, en qui l'honneur n'accepte aucune grace, 
J'aime en ce douteux sort tout ce qui m'embarrasse, 
Je ne sais quoi m'y plait qui n'ose s'exprimer, 
Et ce confus melange a de quoi me charmer. 
(1255-60) 
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The 'confus melange' is in fact a temptation that all the characters—and 
surely the audience—find hard to resist, shocking as that no doubt 
seemed to d'Aubignac. 
In these ways, the play seeks constantly but unsuccessfully to disguise 
its own transgressions. Generic transgressions: the mingling of romance 
and tragedy; transgressions of ethos: the figure of the usurper first be­
comes confused and then turns into a hero; transgressions of bienseance: 
Corneille's decision to unveil the monster before a polite but distinctly 
interested audience. In the end, the naturalization of the acceptable yet 
seductive master-plot actually draws attention to the means by which it 
is naturalized, creating an unease which can't be erased (as the so-called 
errors of Sophocles might be erased) from the tragic recognition. Oedipe 
betrays the anxiety of a text confused about its title and origins, a text 
groping for an identity and finding only difference. 
In several senses, Racine's first tragedy was composed in the shadow of 
Oedipus. Its subject is the fatal enmity of the twin sons of Oedipus and 
Jocasta; its action, like that of Andromaque, is the reverberation of a 
disaster which has already become notorious. The play is preceded, extra 
fabulam, by the paradigm of all recognitions: its action is saturated, the­
matically and diegetically, with knowledge of Oedipus' transgressions. 
The presence of Jocasta alone, resurrected from the noose of Oedipus 
Rex, would be enough to ensure this effect, since Jocasta is herself knowl­
edge incarnate. All the transgressions have passed through her body, and 
in Racine's version she is not inclined to let the other characters (or the 
audience) forget it. References to her womb and breast are insistent to a 
degree matched by neither Euripides nor Rotrou—Racine's principal 
models.20 So, for example, the mutual hatred of Eteocles and Polynices is 
in Racine's version exclusively congenital: in Euripides' version, it was at 
least in part brought on by Oedipus' curse, to which there is no reference 
in La Thebaide. More strikingly still, for the first time in Racine's play 
the brothers are twins, already fighting before they left their mother's 
womb. Or at least they become twins in a late variant (four lines added 
in 1697):21 Racine brings out in retrospect a symmetry or identity which 
can be regarded as latent in the first version. Despite what Jules Brody 
says about the moral superiority of Polynice,22 it seems to me in fact that 
Racine has made the brothers much less different than they are in either 
Euripides or Rotrou. They appear, especially with the endorsement of the 
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variant, as identical twins, and like other identical twins, they perfectly 
and absolutely know one another, except that their likeness is manifest 
in hatred, in their differend: they reach agreement only on the decision to 
fight to the death in single combat.23 
In the face of this flood-tide of knowledge, there seems little room for 
the uncertainties and enigmas that compose the recognition plot. Cer­
tainly no contemporary critic or theorist would have dreamt of using the 
term anagnorisis in connection with this play. Corneille himself could not 
have complained that Racine's characters act any less a visage decouvert 
than the characters of his own plays. Yet knowledge is still a question in 
La Thebaide, and the question is raised already by the decision in I. 3 to 
consult the gods, which leads to the quotation of an ambiguous oracle in 
II. 2. Predictable as this oracle and its ambiguity may be, the device is 
exploited structurally by Racine in a way that is much closer to Oedipus 
Rex (or Oedipe) than to The Phoenician Women or Rotrou's Antigone, 
in both of which the function of the oracle is local and episodic. The 
characters—in particular Jocaste and Antigone—are led at a crucial 
point (Act III) to believe erroneously that the oracle has been fulfilled by 
the voluntary, heroic death of Menecee, who seems to have paid the price 
of all sins and all crimes; it also gives Creon the chance to pretend that 
he has been converted by the death of his son, and thus to foster Jocaste's 
illusion that the meeting of her sons will heal the rift. 
In this way, the play is plotted towards a climactic and decisive scene 
(IV. 3) which Russell Pfohl has confidently (rather over-confidently for 
my taste) called a "magnificent recognition scene."24 It begins with Jo-
caste triumphantly proposing a reconciliation and ends with her renounc­
ing natural maternal affection. The twins meet not in order to recognize 
one another, to discover that they are twins (as in the Comedy of Errors), 
but to disclose irrevocably their enmity. Jocaste nevertheless, in her open­
ing speech, invites them to recognize one another as brothers, as if they 
had forgotten or were ignorant of the fact. This gesture shows that the 
lapse in her knowledge is due not only to oracular indirection but also to 
a nostalgia—even in this context—for the natural and the plausible.25 
The Oedipal plot, then, is not present in La Thebaide as an inquisition 
or a guessing-game or a perpetual riddle-solving narrative. It appears as 
the last delusive glimmer of the possibility that the monstrous might be 
staved off; or, more accurately perhaps, of the constant desire to avert 
one's gaze from an intolerable breakdown of the conventions that make 
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the world comprehensible. Oedipus, master and victim of the inquisito­
rial plot, had similarly averted his gaze from the evidence presented to 
him by Tiresias and others, as Racine in his notes on Sophocles' play had 
himself observed.26 
La Thebaide is in this sense the inversion of a recognition play; the 
meeting of Eteocles and Polynices is the identical yet opposite twin of 
anagnorisis. The difference between the brothers is, as Rotrou if not Ra­
cine keeps reminding one, a differend, a conflict which cannot be resolved 
by appeal to a higher authority. There are no higher authorities in the 
post-Oedipal world, only predators like Creon who wait for their adver­
saries to destroy one another. Indeed, one might well be tempted to ac­
cept Poulet's view that Creon is the central figure in La Thebaide, the 
figure who attempts to efface the past (the story of Oedipus, the death of 
his own sons) in order to become an absolute and arbitrary authority in 
the present:27 in this sense, he repeats the ethos of Oedipe as tyrant and 
usurper, but sustains it throughout the play. His ambition, too, will col­
lapse (it is after all the kind of ambition for which collapse is an ever-
present possibility), so that anomy prevails both politically and episte­
mologically; the question of knowledge is fractured and scattered 
throughout the action. The Oedipal plot, which in Aristotle and Sopho­
cles is phrased as an ignorance ultimately supplanted by knowledge, op­
erates in reverse. The monstrous is already known, and its presence can 
now only be called into question again in the form of a fitful nostalgia for 
ignorance. 
One may at this point revert to the Corneille—Racine parallel by citing 
Benichou's rather curious contention that La Thebaide is written pre­
dominantly in the Cornelian mode.28 It is certainly true that Racine 
tackles Corneille on his own ground, but it looks rather as if the similar­
ity is chosen expressly in order to bring about a difference. Indeed, the 
intertextual lice provided by Oedipus and its aftermath could hardly be 
more precisely circumscribed. So, for example, in her attempts to per­
suade Polynice to hold off, Jocaste—desperately averting her gaze— 
urges him to go and prove his status as a hero elsewhere: 
Soyez, mon Fils, soyez l'ouvrage de vos mains. 
Par d'illustres exploicts couronnez vous vous-mesme, 
Qu'un superbe laurier soit vostre Diademe; 
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Regnez & triomphez, & joignez a la fois 
La gloire des Heros a la Pourpre des Roys. 
(1266—70; 1697 ed. 1138—42) 
Don Sanche might have taken the point, but not Polynice, who dismisses 
Jocaste's suggestion as "chimeres." The irrelevance of heroism is in fact 
one of the principal things the play seems to be about: it is instructive 
and even diverting to watch Racine demolishing heroes so efficiently in 
1663. Menecee goes first, a paragon of innocence and virtue, sacrificing 
himself uselessly to a misreading of the oracle (in Euripides, his suicide 
did in fact guarantee the peace of Thebes; in Racine, the gods meant 
something else, although of course they were after Menecee, too). He is 
followed in due course by his brother Hemon, who on the instructions of 
Antigone tries to separate the twins in their final combat: if one were to 
pursue the game of personifications, he could be said to represent gaze 
aversion, the unwillingness to accept that hereditary kinks can never be 
straightened out by a normal clean-living youth. The good brothers de­
stroy themselves like the bad brothers, only a bit sooner. 
So much for heroes. In a preface written some twelve years after the 
play, Racine expressed regret at having allowed love-interest to intervene 
in such a bloody story.29 The remark sounds like a delayed riposte to 
Corneille's claim that Oedipus was a subject sadly deficient in love-
interest; likewise, if the Antigone-Hemon episode "imitates" the Dirce-
Thesee episode, it does so a contre-coeur, reversing its sense. In La The­
baide, love and heroism go under hand in hand, whereas in Oedipe they 
survive the contamination of knowledge. 
A further feature of the parallel is the presence in both plays of pas­
sages embodying critical reflection on the themes and motivation of Oed­
ipus Rex. Alongside the examples I have already given from Corneille, 
one might place Jocaste's speech in III. 2 on the scandal of divine injustice, 
which works in much the same way as a defensive preface. Racine, like 
Corneille, is aware of the difficulties of the paradigm, and the embarrass­
ment shows. But whereas in Oedipe the defensive move alters the whole 
course of the denouement, in La Thebaide the questions raised by such 
passages remain suspended as the action progressively and ruthlessly 
eliminates all the characters. The scandal, in Racine, is allowed to run its 
course. 
Finally, in drafting the "twin" motif into La Thebaide, Racine neatly 
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inverts the terms of Rodogune: the textual memory of Thebes which Cor-
neille's play evokes and then attempts to rectify is resurrected in its most 
anxiety-ridden form, and will be rehearsed by Racine in Britannicus, Ba­
jazet and Mithridate, all plays concerning murderous rivalry between 
brothers.30 
In such ways, the textual engagement of La Thebaide with Oedipe 
already displays a mythical symmetry which will recur in later phases of 
the combat between Corneille and Racine: Britannicus exactly inverts the 
imperial theme of Cinna, while the story of the twin versions of Berenice 
is too well known to need repeating here (except to note that there too 
the question of primogeniture is unresolved). The elaboration of "paral­
lels" between Corneille and Racine, from La Bruyere to Barnwell, has 
enshrined the symmetry—or at least the antithesis—as a critical com­
monplace, so that it becomes easy to rephrase it. One could say, for ex­
ample, without too great a risk of hyperbole, that the rivalry and enmity 
of the two dramatists are already figured in the story of Eteocles and 
Polynices as Racine rewrites it; or that, in removing representatives of 
effective authority, Racine's play attempts to erase Corneille's monumen­
tal reputation; or again, conversely, that Racine himself renewed for Cor­
neille the threat of Oedipus. However one puts it, Oedipus always seems 
to intrude between Corneille and Racine, turning the parallel into an 
episode and its indeterminate sequels. These critical myths represent no 
immediate historical reality, although one could no doubt construct a 
historical context for them.31 Nor can the somewhat asymmetrical par­
allel I have been drawing be said to lay bare the psyches of the play-
wrights—Corneille and Racine are here always used as labels for groups 
of plays and other writings. The mythical parallel in this case has what is 
primarily a heuristic value in sketching out the figure of a complex inter­
textual relation: the relation between Oedipe and La Thebaide; between 
Racinian tragedy and Cornelian tragedy; between instances of poetics 
and instances of dramatic practice; and between the modern corpus and 
the ancient corpus. 
At the center of this construction, what is at issue is the articulation in 
tragedy of something called knowledge. Something called knowledge be­
cause it attracts the rhetoric and the vocabulary of inquiry, uncertainty 
and recognition, but leaves the object of knowledge always in some mea­
sure in abeyance. Tragedy doesn't and can't answer questions; but in 
Sophocles' Oedipus it presents the mirage of an answer to a question so 
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persistent that it can't be avoided. Ever since Aristotle framed Oedipus 
as the paradigm of tragedy, and thus made recognition itself a central 
question in poetics, the mirage has continued to be reflected and refracted 
in the rival discourses of tragedy and poetics. One of the consequences is 
that Oedipus has become impossible to rewrite. Later versions already 
know too much, whether directly or through poetics (those two routes 
being barely distinguishable). Racine and Corneille, like Eteocles and 
Polynices, know all too well, in one sense, what they are doing; they agree 
in advance on the impossibility of recognition tragedy, so that their fight 
to the death with each other and with the master-text takes place a visage 
decouvert. 
On the other hand, the intervention of Oedipus or of Oedipus Rex 
always casts a shadow, the shadow of what cannot, despite all repetitions 
and reformulations, quite be said. In this sense, the aftermath of Oedi-
pus—Euripides, Rotrou, Corneille, Racine, et bien d'autres encore—may 
be imagined as a series of ricochets, or as the ever-increasing debris of a 
chain reaction. Or again, it could be described as the interminable retell­
ing of a story which will always retain a margin of secrecy, despite the 
apparent answering of the Oedipal question in the authorized version of 
Sophocles. 
What I mean in this context by saying that the story always retains a 
margin of secrecy, or by speaking of the shadow of something that can't 
quite be said, is that it is impossible to assign a definitive content to the 
knowledge such plays seek unsuccessfully to conceal and to reveal. The 
truth brought to light by Oedipus and his progeny is not an ethical or a 
metaphysical scandal, though themes of that kind may surface in the 
plays; it is not an authentic self, stripped at last of its masks and self-
deceptions; it is not a transcendent Hegelian synthesis; nor is it a re­
pressed desire to kill the father and have sex with the mother. These pred­
icates are all pretexts invented plausibly by and for each cultural milieu 
in which the question is posed. I am tempted to suggest that, in the cur­
rent cultural milieu, the predicate might best be described as a hoax: 
Oedipus discovering that he's been taken for a ride, though a very long 
and absorbingly interesting one. 
There seems in any event to be little point in trying retrospectively to 
lay down the law for the "true" paradigm of recognition. 1 have been 
using the word "paradigm" all along in connection with Oedipus Rex, 
for reasons that are self-evident, but it is now time—high time, at the last 
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moment—to question that assumption. The trick worked by Sophocles 
could perhaps only work once, despite Aristotle's inveterate habit of 
moving to the universal from the particular; Oedipus Rex would then 
not be a paradigm but a hapax. If that view is accepted, all of its progeny 
are doomed to endless particularity and to endlessly unresolved conflict. 
Oedipal tragedy and Oedipal poetics become the joint search for a rec­
ognition which always comes too soon (Oedipus got there first) or too 
late (we've added it ourselves). 
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A Theatrical Reading of Cinna 
Judd D. Hubert 
In interpreting Cinna, not only do I favor a metadramatic approach, but 
I go so far as to postulate that a given character's so-called tragic flaw 
coincides with performative failure, or sometimes self-defeating success, 
as dramatist, director, actor, spectator. 
Auguste, in substituting Cinna and Maxime for Maecenas and 
Agrippa, has hardly shown skill in casting. He has picked as advisers the 
leaders of a conspiracy against his life; he has substituted for his way­
ward daughter a firebrand eager to destroy him. Grown weary of the 
imperial role he himself had imposed, he wishes to abdicate and thus 
cease altogether to function as dramatist. 
Emilie fares no better, for her part as lover constantly interferes with 
her star role as avenger. Inevitably, she lapses into a state of confusion, 
akin to the bewilderment of her beloved Cinna, that reluctant assassin 
who would gladly accept his casting as chief counselor in the imperial 
establishment. In Maxime, we find a character repeatedly upstaged and 
outperformed by every one, including his own confidant Euphorbe whose 
trite plotting generically belongs to comedy. Paradoxically, Corneille's re­
markable success as playwright depends on these performative shortcom­
ings of his dramatis personae—but naturally not on inadequacies on the 
part of his actors and actresses. 
Metaphorically, exchange, as Jacques Ehrmann has shown,1 domi­
nates the play; while dramatically the big switch, as Susan Tiefenbrun 
has proved, operates throughout, even to the point of turning the political 
world upside down.2 Finally, the often repeated motif of sacrifice relates 
equally to exchanging and switching; by reason of ambiguity, it contains 
within itself all the dynamics of reversal. 
Cinna plans to kill the emperor during the religious ceremony, thereby 
conveniently substituting one sacrificial victim for another. The emperor's 
punishment would thus fit his numerous and well-documented crimes 
against the citizens of Rome. Cinna, Emilie, and even Auguste frequently 
describe the proscriptions and massacres of the civil war in terms of sac-
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rificial immolations, a metaphorical switch conducive to dramatic rever­
sal. The entire play lends itself to a Girardian interpretation; indeed, 
Corneille has dramatized a sacrificial crisis similar to those described in 
La Violence et le sacre? One might even claim that the denouement of 
Cinna shows how Auguste puts an end to this crisis, not by a sacrifice but 
by the imposition of a new order based on law, relegating violence and 
religion to an inoperative past. But from a theatrical standpoint, Auguste 
has assumed a new role and assigned specific parts to his subordinates 
who must henceforth perform according to his script. Instead of rewrit­
ing chronicles, they face with equanimity a rigorously programmed fu­
ture. Corneille, a thoroughly modern dramatist, not to say legal mind, 
dispenses altogether with scapegoats—not only here but even in his Oed­
ipe. The emperor's achievement at the denouement may provide a mise-
en-abyme of Cornelian drama, for he succeeds in imposing a workable 
order on the world, an order reflecting the efficacy expected of a well-
made and professionally staged play. Auguste's historical triumph, which 
ends the tragedy, appears to arise from and reflect on Corneille's theatri­
cal mastery. 
The play opens with Emilie's dramatically complex soliloquy. She gen­
erates a plurality of voices pertaining to two conflicting personifications 
or, if you prefer, actants, each one striving for domination: revenge and 
love. Reversal operates from the beginning, for revenge, clearly defined 
as duty, arrogates the vocabulary of Eros: desire, seduite, ardents trans­
ports as well as such metonymies as enfants and naissance. Conversely, 
love, deprived in part of its usual terminology and forced to fall back on 
the vocabulary of duty, uses terms indicative of subordination or morality 
such as sers, ceder, honte, gloire, genereux. Emilie reaches paradoxical 
heights in stating: 
Au milieu toutefois d'une fureur si juste, 
J'aime encore plus Cinna que je ne hais Auguste, 
Et je sens refroidir ce bouillant mouvement 
Quand il faut, pour le suivre, exposer mon amant. 
[17-20] 
Coldness pertains to love; boiling and fury to the self-imposed duty of 
avenging her father. As she no longer knows what role to perform or 
what play to write, she exhorts the warring factions within her to ex­
change their parts. In other words, she requires an impossible perform­
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ance that would reflect not only her own predicament but also the 
proneness to reversal so characteristic of the play as well as the sacrificial 
crisis that undermines all action. 
Stylistically, Emilie keeps at a distance the competing and alienating 
personifications she has herself set in motion. By thus combining dis­
placement with presence, elusion with illusion, she automatically con­
demns herself to failure in everything she undertakes. Her own 
statements, in so far as we can distinguish them from the voices she puts 
into play, involve the related themes of evaluation and exchange, which 
we can also consider as metaphorical equivalents of her initial displace­
ment and elusion. Exchange and evaluation, however, have very little in 
common with love or with the kind of generosity which, at the end, will 
impose an acceptable order. Indeed, they can only lead to blackmail and 
a perpetuation of the sacrificial crisis: " . .  . des memes presents qu'il verse 
dans mes mains / J'achete contre lui les esprits des Romains" (79—80). 
Auguste's material generosity will, by reversal, lead to his own undoing. 
But Emilie here and elsewhere advocates a moral switch, similar to the 
exchange of terminology between love and revenge: "Pour qui venge son 
pere il n'est point de forfaits, / Et c'est vendre son sang que se rendre aux 
bienfaits" (83—84), and later: "Je fais gloire, pour moi, de cette ignomi­
nie" (973). Duty, through this reversal, assumes all the verbal character­
istics of crime. 
Unlike the secretive Emilie, Cinna, according to the narrative of his 
meeting with his co-conspirators, knows how to manipulate an audience: 
Au seul nom de Cesar, d'Auguste, et d'empereur 
Vous eussiez vu leurs yeux s'enflammer de fureur, 
Et dans un meme instant, par un effet contraire, 
Leur front palir d'horreur et rougir de colere. 
[159-62] 
Cinna's imaginary audience, by thus achieving a physionomical impossi­
bility in responding to an identity, leaves far behind Corneille's real au­
dience which, at that moment, can hardly feel hatred against an emperor 
who gave his name to a century. Moreover, this imaginary audience 
serves as a magnifying mirror for both Cinna's and Emilie's postures: 
Tous s'y montrent portes avec tant d'allegresse 
Qu'ils semblent comme moi servir une maitresse; 
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Et tous font eclater un si puissant courroux, 
Qu'ils semblent tous venger un pere, comme vous. 
[149-52] 
In this manner, Cinna, even before he addresses them, has transformed 
the conspirators into performative extensions of himself and Emilie. 
Their behavior as audience leads from the beginning to an impossibility, 
as the models he provides for avenging a father and serving a mistress 
would seem to exclude one another no less than joy and wrath. Perhaps 
the behavior of the conspirators reflects the contradictions inherent in 
both Cinna and Emilie. Moreover, Cinna, in order to spellbind his audi­
ence, merely narrates the past; and the conspiracy against the emperor's 
life, by adding just another sacrifice and immolation, will do no more 
than repeat what has happened so frequently in the recent history of 
Rome. 
Although Corneille may not have entrusted Cinna with his own super­
lative intelligence and imagination as dramatist, he has given him a keen 
sense of the spectacular and a remarkable understanding of his various 
audiences—the conspirators, Emilie, and the emperor. Like Emilie, he 
shows a weakness for personified abstractions: 
Ma vertu pour le moins ne me trahira pas: 
Vous la verrez, brillante au bord des precipices, 
Se couronner de gloire en bravant les supplices, 
Rendre Auguste jaloux du sang qu'il repandra, 
Et le faire trembler alors qu'il me perdra. 
[312-16] 
Unlike Emilie, he makes his abstraction act in a spectacular and heroic 
manner. His narrative, written in the future tense, brings about another 
dramatic reversal, for it shows Auguste behaving like a craven victim and 
Cinna like an intrepid hero. The conspirator resembles La Fontaine's 
milkmaid Perette, even though he pitches his rhetoric on a somewhat 
higher plane. But recourse to rhetoric, particularly in the future tense, 
makes one suspect that Cinna does not exactly coincide with the heroic 
posture he intended for Emilie. In a sense, he sorely needs to limit himself 
to vertu, Roman of course, in the same way that Emilie has to exclude all 
but filial revenge. Both of them personify abstractions, perhaps because 
neither one has discovered a valid part to play or a suitable drama in 
which to perform. 
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Cinna achieves his greatest theatrical triumph in convincing Auguste 
to change his mind and continue to perform as emperor. Auguste had 
spoken of his political power in the vocabulary of personal, almost erotic, 
gratification, using such terms as aimer, beautes, jouit, deplait, assouvie, 
charmes, plaisirs, desir, possession. He has thus operated a lexical rever­
sal not unlike Emilie's, between personal and collective values. To con­
vince Auguste of his error, Cinna reinstates the emperor's public image 
and the idea of glory or, in theatrical terms, his spectacular role in the 
universe as opposed to his private identity. Cinna's strategy consists, so 
to speak, in reasserting the positive values and attitudes prevalent in prac­
tically every serious play Corneille ever wrote. Although Cinna expresses 
opinions at variance with those he had advocated in his fiery statements 
to the conspirators, he nonetheless reasserts the compelling influence of 
the past, whereby he differs from the emperor who sees only the present. 
Theatrically, these two opposed standpoints express the relationship be­
tween immediacy and historical representation, between presence and 
fable. Cinna paradoxically reaffirms the historical perspective of the au­
dience off-stage against the very statesman who had shaped the historical 
events! These events appear in three different perspectives: Auguste views 
them from the vantage point of personal gratification; Cinna, in his 
speech to the conspirators, as a pure unfolding; and, in his advice to 
Auguste, from the perspective of an admiring historian—after the fact 
and with an eye to the results: 
Si le pouvoir supreme est blame par Auguste, 
Cesar fut un tyran, et son trepas fut juste, 
Et vous devez aux Dieux compte de tout le sang 
Dont vous l'avez venge pour monter a son rang. 
[429-32] 
According to this advice, only a positive political attitude toward power 
can give meaning to the past. Corneille's Cinna, a prize pupil of the Jesu­
its, justifies the emperor in terms of an implicit declaration of intentions. 
He himself had merely redirected his own intentions in moving from one 
audience to the next. In both instances, he provides his listeners with 
precisely the ideas they wish and expect to hear. Although he knows how 
to appeal to any audience, he does so in the manner of a catalyst rather 
than a dramatist. Worse still, he falls under the spell his own words have 
cast. 
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In attempting to counter Cinna's argument, Maxime also invokes the 
judgment of posterity, but in terms of personal transcendence rather than 
history: 
Votre gloire redouble a mepriser l'empire; 
Et vous serez fameux chez la posterite 
Moins pour l'avoir conquis que pour Pavoir quitte. 
Le bonheur peut conduire a la grandeur supreme; 
Mais pour y renoncer il faut la vertu meme. 
[474-78] 
By following Maxime's advice, Auguste would admire his own transcen­
dent image in a sort of self-perpetuating immediacy. Maxime fails be­
cause the emperor must situate his role historically and perform actively 
rather than contemplatively in front of a vast and changing audience. 
Nonetheless, both Cinna and Maxime advocate complementary aspects 
of Cornelian drama: historical representation and heroic admiration, 
here given as antithetical, but that Auguste will reconcile and combine in 
the final scene. 
In clinching the argument, Cinna associates two apparently antitheti­
cal concepts: finance and, surprisingly, pity, an inconspicuous commodity 
in Octave's rise to power: 
Que l'amour du pays, que la pitie vous touche; 
Votre Rome a genoux vous parle par ma bouche. 
Considerez le prix que vous avez coute. 
[605-7] 
How can Auguste possibly resist the touching spectacle of himself as 
leading man in a historical love duet with suppliant Rome? By compari­
son, Maxime's abstract images of virtue and generosity would hardly 
hold the stage. 
Cinna, both in his address to the conspirators and his counsel to the 
emperor, merely catalyzes a mixture already present. He does not even 
possess a theatrical presence that he can claim as his own. His role in the 
imperial establishment derives from the emperor's miscasting, and his 
part in the conspiracy from Emilie's dramatization of past events. In both 
these contradictory capacities, he functions as a deputy, as an extension 
of competing playwrights, Auguste and Emilie. 
Torn between the two of them, he has recourse to a reversal, to a lexi­
cal switch, whereby the beloved Emilie assumes all the characteristics of 
 107 A Theatrical Reading of Cinna
a tyrant, while Auguste, because of his appreciation of Cinna, deserves 
only love and service. In a sense, his advice to the emperor, based, or so 
he tells Maxime and Emilie, on deception, untruth and illusion, has con­
vinced him as much as it has Auguste. He thus becomes an admirer, so to 
speak, of his own discourse, which happens to coincide with political 
truth, circa 1640. Through his mediation, the emperor has at last under­
stood the value of historically motivated performance. 
Caught between his newly discovered monarchical zeal and his oath 
to Emilie, or, if you prefer, two mutually exclusive scripts, Cinna once 
again falls back on a narrative written in the future tense: 
Vous le voulez, j'y cours, ma parole est donnee; 
Mais ma main, aussitot contre mon sein tournee, 
Aux manes d'un tel prince immolant votre amant, 
A mon crime force joindra mon chatiment, 
Et par cette action dans l'autre confondue 
Recouvrera ma gloire aussitot que perdue. 
[1061-66] 
The two irreconcilable texts will coincide, thanks to Cinna's imagination, 
in a spectacularly sacrificial display, hardly acceptable to Emilie or even 
the emperor. And like Auguste, Cinna combines, by means of illusion, 
the roles of sacrificer and victim. 
Once he has discovered the conspiracy, Auguste, like Emilie and Cinna 
before him, hesitates between incompatible roles of revenge and clem­
ency, but finally combines the part of victim with that of executioner in a 
spectacular narrative where Rome's sacrificial crisis reaches a climax: 
Meurs; mais quitte du moins la vie avec eclat; 
Eteins en le flambeau dans le sang de l'ingrat; 
A toi-meme en mourant immole ce perfide; 
Contentant ses desirs, punis son parricide; 
Fais un tourment pour lui de ton propre trepas, 
En faisant qu'il le voie et n'en jouisse pas. 
Mais jouissons plutot nous-meme de sa peine, 
Et si Rome nous hait, triomphons de sa haine. 
[1179-86] 
Auguste's narrative provides the same spectacular features as Cinna's, but 
stresses erotic, not to say sado-masochistic, gratification rather than he­
roic gesture and replaces the future tense by the imperative, in keeping 
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with the speaker's rank. Moreover, Auguste reverts to the private world 
from which Cinna's counsels had momentarily dislodged him, for once 
again he views power, punishment and sacrifice in terms of personal re­
action. Clearly, he has not yet succeeded in putting his role, his act, and 
his play together. He too compounds elusion, for he describes himself as 
a "Coeur irresolu / Qui fuit en meme temps tout ce qu'il se propose!" 
(1188-89). 
Another kind of discrepancy or displacement resulting from personal 
feelings occurs in Emilie: "D'ou me vient cette joie? et que mal a propos 
/ Mon esprit malgre moi goute un entier repos!" (1288-89). And she 
adds: "A chaque occasion le ciel y fait descendre / Un sentiment contraire 
a celui qu'il doit prendre" (1292-93). It would seem that no character in 
the play can maintain any kind of unity of focus. A civil war rages within 
every one of them, leading to betrayal and self-betrayal. 
Emilie's use of the word "descendre" may provide a clue to these dis­
crepancies. Ascent and descent throughout the play appear equally favor­
able or unfavorable. Emilie cannot accept Cinna as a gift from the 
emperor, for this downward movement would bring shame and servi­
tude, while an upward thrust on the part of Cinna, by immolating Au­
guste, would win her hand. However, Octave's usurpation of power, with 
its accompaniment of proscriptions, had certainly followed an upward 
movement, as the emperor himself suggests in a famous line: "Et monte 
sur le faite, il aspire a descendre" (370). Perhaps the trouble derives from 
the inevitability of displacement and from the tendency to confuse iden­
tity with position or role. 
Despite these contradictory feelings and movements, Auguste will 
nevertheless discover a solution acceptable to all, but only after he has 
uncovered the full extent of everybody's betrayal, proof of his descent 
into hell. Indeed, the downward movement must reach rock bottom be­
fore the resulting upward thrust can take over. Auguste exclaims: 
Je suis maitre de moi comme de l'univers; 
Je le suis, je veux l'etre. O siecles, 6 memoire, 
Conservez a jamais ma derniere victoire! 
Je triomphe aujourd'hui du plus juste courroux 
De qui le souvenir puisse aller jusqu'a vous. 
[1696-1700] 
The emperor, speaking authoritatively in the present tense, finally puts 
his personal reactions and the world on precisely the same footing, with 
 109 A Theatrical Reading of Cinna
the full knowledge that he must impose his will both inside and outside. 
He realizes that these personal reactions had mattered even more, per­
haps because they could do more damage, than all the conspiracies ar­
rayed against him. Indeed, he insists on his triumph over his wrath, 
without even mentioning his victory over the conspirators. He has laid 
the past to rest and takes charge of posterity. History, finally made mean­
ingful, or suitable for representation, fills the stage at the moment the 
curtain drops. 
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"Docere et delectare": Richesses de VAvare 
Marie-Odile Sweetser 
VAvare n'a pas beaucoup attire Pattention de la critique au cours des 
dernieres decennies, alors qu'elle continue a connaitre un succes soutenu 
a la scene, car elle fournit un role de premier plan, celui d'Harpagon, 
dans lequel se sont illustres bien des acteurs celebres.1 Si YAvare n'a sus-
cite ni a Pepoque de sa creation ni de nos jours les controverses passion­
nees dont YEcole des Femmes, Tartuffe, Dom Juan, le Misanthrope ont 
fait l'objet, on peut a bon droit supposer que Moliere s'est precisement 
employe a les eviter. Son theatre, traitant de sujets brulants: droits des 
femmes dans une societe patriarcale, escroquerie pratiquee sous le voile 
d'une fausse devotion, libertinage de moeurs et d'idees d'un "grand sei­
gneur mechant homme," reussite mondaine liee a l'hypocrisie, lui avaient 
attire des ennemis acharnes dans presque tous les camps. Le parti devot 
continuait a s'opposer a la representation de Tartuffe. 
En attendant la decision royale qui devait lui permettre de jouer cette 
piece qui lui tenait tant a coeur, Moliere doit, pour faire vivre sa troupe, 
remplir son theatre. Mais plus encore qu'une exigence economique, il 
s'agit pour un dramaturge de creer et de maintenir un rapport avec son 
public, comme Hugh Davidson Pa tres bien montre. L'homme de theatre, 
plus que tout autre createur a conscience de Pechange qui a lieu entre le 
poete, Poeuvre et les spectateurs. Cette situation se trouve renforcee au 
XVIIe siecle par des facteurs economiques et sociaux.2 
La societe a laquelle Moliere s'adresse, a laquelle il doit plaire et dont, 
dans Pensemble, il obtient Papprobation et la complicite chaleureuse, 
comporte essentiellement deux volets, la cour et la ville.3 Le dramaturge 
venait en 1668 de satisfaire la cour en lui fournissant des divertissements 
faits pour lui plaire: Amphitryon, comedie a sujet mythologique, trans­
posant dans un registre fabuleux Patmosphere galante de Versailles. On 
sait, en effet, depuis la grande these de Jean-Michel Pelous, que le climat 
mondain etait passe de la preciosite a la galanterie dans les annees 1660— 
1670. Pourtant Moliere avait su doser galanterie et comique avec les 
scenes ou paraissait Sosie. De nouveau, pour les fetes du Grand Divertis­
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sement Royal de Versailles en juillet 1668, il presente avec George Dan-
din un divertissement ou la farce traditionnelle du "Mari confondu," 
reprise de La Jalousie du Barbouille alterne avec des intermedes d'un tout 
autre style, relevant de la pastorale, si bien que Jacques Morel a pu decla­
rer: "George Dandin n'est pas en verite 1'histoire d'un homme qui 
est berne par sa femme; c'est le dialogue d'un genre litteraire et d'un 
autre . . ."4 
Pour satisfaire la ville, Moliere allait monter peu apres, en septembre 
1668, YAvare, sa premiere grande comedie de moeurs et de caractere 
depuis le Misanthrope. L'insucces de la piece du vivant de Moliere a ete 
largement compense par plus de deux mille representations depuis la fon-
dation de la Comedie Franchise en 1680. On a generalement attribue cet 
echec initial au fait que la piece etait ecrite en prose. Puisqu'il s'agissait 
d'une grande comedie en cinq actes, le public se serait attendu a une piece 
en vers. Pourtant, Moliere avait tente Pemploi de la prose dans Dom 
Juan; selon Hallam Walker, il aurait poursuivi Pexperience dans YAvare.5 
II s'emploiera d'ailleurs a se renouveler jusqu'au bout de sa carriere, 
comme les comedies-ballets en font foi.6 L'emploi de la prose accelerait le 
mouvement, note des 1661 par La Fontaine, a l'occasion de la represen­
tation des Fdcheux, vers le naturel: 
Nous avons change de methode: 
Jodelet n'est plus a la mode, 
Et maintenant il ne faut pas 
Quitter la nature d'un pas.7 
En composant YAvare, Moliere a certainement songe a ne pas donner 
prise a ses detracteurs habituels, les devots et les doctes. Pour satisfaire 
ces derniers, il puise dans une source classique, YAuluraria de Plaute dont 
il venait d'utiliser YAmphitruo. Du cote des devots, il pouvait s'estimer a 
couvert, puisque l'Ecriture avait proclame: "Radix omnium malorum 
cupiditas" (Epitre de Saint Paul a Timothee, I, 6, 10). Les devots ne pou­
vaient done accuser Moliere d'impiete ou d'immoralite, comme ils 
l'avaient fait pour YEcole des Femmes, Tartuffe et Dom Juan. Au 
contraire, les predicateurs ne cessaient de rappeler aux riches leur devoir 
de charite, d'encourager les bonnes oeuvres: on pense a St. Vincent de 
Paul, a Bossuet prechant sur "L'Eminente dignite des Pauvres dans 
PEglise" (1659). L'avarice etait le vice qui s'opposait a la vertu chretienne 
fondamentale, la charite, conc.ue dans son sens le plus large d'amour des 
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autres. Harpagon qui ne pense qu'a son or peche done contre la charite. 
La condamnation de son vice et de ses consequences ressort du tableau 
d'une famille en train de se desintegrer. La perte du respect, le degout et 
l'horreur ont remplace tout sentiment filial chez les enfants qui abandon­
nent leur pere a son or. Harpagon contrevient a la morale familiale et 
sociale, s'exprimant au XVIIe siecle dans les regies de conduite de "l'hon-
netete." L'honnete homme devait eviter tout exces, observer la regie du 
juste milieu, aussi eloigne de l'avarice sordide accompagnee de marchan­
dages honteux et de prets a taux usuraires que de la prodigalite des 
grands seigneurs libertins, dissipant leur patrimoine, tel Don Juan. 
Harpagon, de toute evidence, son train de maison l'indique claire­
ment: gouvernante, domestiques, chevaux, equipage et surtout intendant, 
appartient a la bourgeoisie bien nantie.8 Normalement, s'il etait un pere 
prudent et sage, un chef de famille eclaire, doue d'une legitime ambition, 
songeant a l'avenir de ses enfants et des futures generations, il s'emploie-
rait a doter sa fille, favorisant ainsi une alliance avantageuse qui permet­
trait a la famille de s'elever; il procurerait a son fils les "offices" qui 
aideraient l'ascension sociale de celui-ci et de ses descendants. L'egoisme 
d'Harpagon, illustre par une absence de vision d'avenir, est done total. 
Lorsqu'il prevoit pour chacun de ses enfants un mariage avec un parte­
naire beaucoup plus age: une riche veuve pour son fils, le seigneur An­
selme pour sa fille, non seulement il s'oppose a leur bonheur personnel 
attache a un libre choix, mais a l'avenir meme de son lignage, par absence 
probable de descendance9 et par un refus implicite du schema d'ascension 
sociale courant sous l'ancien regime. La reaction indignee de Cleante se 
trouve done justifiee: 
Voila oil les jeunes gens sont reduits par la maudite avarice des peres; et 
on s'etonne apres cela que les fils souhaitent qu'ils meurent.10 
On retrouve la meme attitude chez les domestiques qui ne peuvent plus 
respecter un maitre ayant perdu tout sens des convenances, de sa dignite, 
au point de ne pas leur fournir de livrees decentes ni d'exercer envers eux 
la protection attendue dans un systeme paternaliste, ni de leur montrer la 
confiance d'un bon maitre vis-a-vis des gens de sa maison: il les soup-
c.onne de le voler, les accuse sans preuve et se montre pret a les livrer a la 
justice. Au point que La Fleche se voit lui aussi justifie: s'il volait Harpa­
gon, ce ne serait pas par desir de gain ou pour recuperer les gages qui lui 
sont dus, mais par une reaction morale, pour le punir de son avarice 
sordide, moralement condamnable: 
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II faut avouer que le votre [votre pere] animerait contre sa vilanie le plus 
pose homme du monde. Je n'ai pas, Dieu merci, les inclinations fort pati­
bulaires . . . mais a vous dire vrai, il me donnerait, par ses procedes, des 
tentations de le voler; et je croirais, en le volant, faire une action meri­
toire. [II: 1, 535] 
Le vol de la cassette, dans cette perspective, apparait non seulement 
comme un procede dramatique utile au developpement de l'intrigue, mais 
comme un juste retour des choses de ce monde: Harpagon qui, par sa 
tyrannie et son vice, tend a etouffer les besoins vitaux de ceux qui l'entou-
rent, enfants et domestiques, se voit derober ce qu'il considere aussi pre­
cieux que la vie, son or. Ce premier chatiment comique est done 
proportionne a son vice. Puisqu'il s'agit d'une comedie, le "vol" restera 
un procede destine a supprimer les obstacles et a amener un denouement 
heureux. Un autre chatiment, plus durable, beaucoup plus grave, sera 
toutefois reserve a Harpagon: la solitude, l'exclusion de la vie familiale 
et sociale qu'il a reniee, la reification. II y a done bien une prise de posi­
tion morale de la part du dramaturge sous les rejouissances tradition­
nelles du denouement.11 
D'autre part, les doctes ne pouvaient traiter Moliere de simple farceur 
puisqu'il se reclamait d'un des plus celebres poetes comiques de l'anti-
quite. II avait probablement utilise des elements pris dans des pieces et 
dans la realite contemporaines. On cite La Belle Plaideuse de Boisrobert 
(1655), La Dame d'intrigue de Chappuzeau, le meurtre du lieutenant de 
police Tardieu et de sa femme, avares celebres, par des voleurs, exemple 
utilise egalement par Boileau dans sa Satire X. II montrait ainsi qu'il etait 
sensible a l'actualite. Surtout, il se souvenait d'experiences personnelles 
avec les usuriers. A Pepoque de Plllustre Theatre, dans les dures annees 
1645—46, il avait desesperement cherche de l'argent pour faire face aux 
depenses courantes et devait finir en prison pour dettes.12 On imagine 
facilement les couches successives d'experience, livresque et vecue, qui 
rendent compte de la genese de la piece. 
Du point de vue de la tradition comique, on retrouve la meme abon­
dance, la meme structuration en couches superposees. Le dramaturge 
tente de marier, d'harmoniser plusieurs types de comique. Cette tentative, 
selon certains critiques, aurait echoue et expliquerait l'insucces initial de 
la piece, le romanesque servant de hors d'oeuvre et de dessert a un plat 
de resistance constitue par une forte comedie de moeurs et de caractere, 
epicee de farce et de commedia del arte.13 Au contraire, selon d'autres, 
cette alternance est de toute premiere importance et ce serait mutiler la 
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piece, refuser d'accepter les intentions du createur que de la negliger. Un 
historien de la litterature, Antoine Adam, et un homme de theatre, 
Charles Dullin, sont d'accord pour souligner l'equilibre recherche par 
Moliere entre la comedie romanesque et sentimentale, et la comedie de 
moeurs et de caractere. Et Dullin, grand interprets du role d'Harpagon, 
condamne les mises en scene qui privilegient ce role au detriment des 
autres personnages.14 Comme le remarque Jacques Morel a propos du 
melange des genres dans George Dandin: "II faut bien voir que Partifice 
est qualite d'artiste, et que dans une fantaisie theatrale les rapports d'op-
position peuvent etre source d'harmonie."15 
Recemment, la critique molieresque a fait appel aux donnees de l'an-
thropologie culturelle et a celles de la psychanalyse pour eclairer la nature 
du comique.16 Northrop Frye distingue deux types de comedie: la 
comedie de caractere et la comedie romanesque; la premiere serait essen­
tiellement celle de Moliere, la seconde, celle de Shakespeare. Frye a cer­
tainement raison de distinguer les deux types de comique, mais dans le 
cas de Moliere, il convient de reconnaitre qu'il n'a pas neglige, meme 
dans une piece situee en milieu bourgeois et qui s'appelle YAvare, l'ele-
ment romanesque, les amours contrariees, les epreuves touchantes des 
jeunes premiers qui luttent contre un formidable obstacle, represente par 
le pere et son vice, afin de realiser leur desir naturel de bonheur dans 
l'amour et le mariage. L'intrigue romanesque debute avec Invocation 
d'Elise, sauvee des eaux par Valere, amoureuse de lui a la fois par recon­
naissance et par inclination mais craignant 
l'emportement d'un pere, les reproches d'une famille, les censures du 
monde; mais plus que tout, Valere, le changement de votre coeur . . . 
[I: i, 516] 
Valere, non seulement a montre une "generosite surprenante" en risquant 
sa vie pour sauver celle d'Elise, mais de plus, accepte pour rester pres 
d'elle de "negliger et parents et patrie": nous assistons done au triomphe 
de l'amour tendre, "Omnia vincit amor". Le jeune gentilhomme accepte 
aussi de se deguiser en domestique, humiliation insigne pour un homme 
de son rang qui fournit ainsi une preuve indeniable d'amour a sa bien-
aimee. Valere se voit oblige de s'abaisser a flatter le vice d'Harpagon pour 
gagner sa confiance, si bien que dans la fameuse scene du "Sans dot" 
(I: 5), la satire de l'avarice s'allie au paradoxe comique de l'amoureux 
pronant le mariage de la femme aimee avec un autre. 
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Moliere continue a etablir les jalons essentiels de l'intrigue roma­
nesque par un procede de parallelisme qui montre combien il soignait la 
construction de ses pieces: Cleante avoue a sa soeur, Elise, son amour 
pour la charmante Mariane, aimable mais sans fortune. Le frere et la 
soeur se heurtent au meme obstacle, celui d'un pere tyrannique, cruel, 
inhumain et de plus, dans un autre paradoxe comique, amoureux, lui 
aussi, de Mariane. Le conflit familial entre le pere et le fils, rivaux en 
amour, se revelera inevitable. Par suite, les jeunes premiers ici sont beau-
coup moins stereotypes, moins fades que Ton pourrait s'y attendre, cer­
tainement plus individualises que les "adolescentes" de Plaute ou de 
Terence. 
Harpagon remonte a l'archetype du "senex amans," du vieillard 
amoureux de la tradition comique, generalement amoureux d'une tres 
jeune fille qui aurait Page de sa propre fille, par suite saisi d'une passion 
contraire a la nature et ridicule dans ses manifestations: on se souvient 
des scenes d'un comique appuye touchant a la farce ou Harpagon fait la 
cour a Mariane qui eprouve une revulsion evidente devant Phorrible vieil­
lard (III: 4 et 5). 
Les jeunes premiers ne pouvant faire entendre raison a un pere endurci 
dans son vice et depourvu de tout sentiment paternel, devront avoir re­
cours a la ruse, a une serie d'artifices et de mesures desesperees. La pre­
miere sera la tentative d'emprunt faite par Cleante dans des conditions 
de plus en plus exorbitantes a un preteur anonyme qui ne sera autre 
qu'Harpagon. La confrontation entre le pere usurier et le fils aux abois 
provoquera une serie de reproches et d'insultes reciproques, scene 
comique par l'effet de surprise et l'outrance des propos, serieuse dans la 
denonciation de l'usure et de ses consequences nefastes. En se livrant a 
un commerce honteux pour un homme de son rang, Harpagon compro­
met l'honneur de sa famille, se declasse: 
Ne rougissez-vous point de deshonorer votre condition par les commerces 
que vous faites? de sacrifier gloire et reputation au desir insatiable d'en-
tasser ecu sur ecu .  . . 
et s'abaisse a un niveau moral veritablement criminel: 
qui est plus criminel, a votre avis, ou celui qui achete un argent dont il a 
besoin, ou bien celui qui vole un argent dont il n'a que faire. [II: 2, 537] 
La seconde manifestation du conflit fondamental entre les generations 
tourne autour de la rivalite amoureuse. Le vieillard, arrive a l'hiver de sa 
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vie, proche de la mort par consequent, veut empecher Parrivee et le tri­
omphe du printemps, de la jeunesse et de la fecondite.17 Mais Harpagon, 
quoique desireux d'epouser une tres jeune fille, ne renonce pas a l'avarice 
par amour: il n'y a en lui aucun sentiment humain, ni affection pour ses 
enfants, ni amour pour Mariane. Au moment de recevoir cette derniere 
chez lui a souper, Harpagon cherche par tous les moyens a economiser 
sur les frais de boisson et de nourriture. II recommande a ses valets de 
donner a boire "seulement lorsque l'on aura soif, et non pas selon la 
coutume de certains impertinents de laquais, qui viennent provoquer les 
gens et les faire aviser de boire lorsqu'on n'y songe pas" (III: i , 545); a 
Maitre Jacques qui souhaiterait montrer ses talents de cuisinier en servant 
un repas somptueux: 
II faudra de ces choses dont on ne mange guere, et qui rassasient d'abord; 
quelque bon haricot bien gras, avec quelque pate en pot bien garni de 
marrons. [Ill: 1, 548] 
Dans un contraste comique, Cleante a recours a la ruse pour assurer 
une collation elegante. II a fait venir, au nom et aux frais de son pere 
"quelques bassins d'oranges de la Chine, de citrons doux et de confi­
tures" (III: 7, 556). II parvient meme a forcer Mariane a accepter un 
diamant porte par Harpagon. La signification symbolique de ce cadeau 
met en valeur le contraste entre Cleante et son pere vis-a-vis de Mariane.18 
Sur des soupgons eveilles par la vue de son fils baisant la main de la jeune 
fille, Harpagon va, lui aussi, avoir recours a la ruse pour decouvrir les 
veritables sentiments des jeunes gens. Nous sommes done en plein dans 
"Pere du soupgon," chacun se voit oblige de jouer un role, de pratiquer 
mefiance et tromperie. 
Le pere ayant appris par la ruse que son fils est son rival en amour, il 
s'ensuit une seconde scene de confrontation, avec echange comique de 
repliques accusatrices. Elle se termine en un mouvement de farce, voire 
de guignol, Harpagon menac.ant son fils de coups de baton: le tragique 
est done evite. La situation de rivalite amoureuse entre pere et fils, utilisee 
dans la tragedie, subit dans la comedie un traitement different selon 
Charles Mauron. La situation angoissante de la tragedie montrant le fils 
rebelle ou le parricide chatie se trouve renversee: e'est le pere s'opposant 
a Pamour des jeunes gens qui est elimine.19 Cest le cas pour Harpagon 
qui renonce a ses projets matrimoniaux pour recuperer sa cassette, veri­
table "objet" de son amour. 
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Le bouleversement psychique cause par la perte de son or donne lieu a 
des scenes d'une grande force comique et dramatique. Harpagon, traitant 
sa cassette comme un objet d'amour prepare la personnification de cette 
derniere, donnant lieu au quiproquo comique au cours duquel Valere 
parle d'Elise et proteste de la purete de ses intentions, alors qu'Harpagon 
parle de sa cassette qu'il l'accuse d'avoir volee (V: 3). L'attitude 
d'Harpagon aboutit reciproquement a la reification des personnes. Dans 
un article recent, Ralph Albanese met en valeur l'aspect socio-culturel de 
la piece en le reliant a son aspect moral: " . .  . l'argent, qui semble a pre­
miere vue se preter aussi mal a Pesthetique comique que la religion—tous 
deux engendrent des vices dangereux en puissance—possede en fait une 
efficacite theatrale reelle."20 
Harpagon, "a la fois thesauriseur et usurier" va clairement contre la 
politique d'expansion economique et commerciale qui est celle du roi et 
de son ministre, souvent designee sous le nom de "colbertisme" ou de 
mercantilisme. John Cairncross avait note que "la bourgeoisie a cette 
epoque etait une force bien jeune et se laissait seduire par le prestige et le 
faste des aristocrates. De fait, elle tendait a renoncer a la tache utile de 
donner un essor a Peconomie du pays et cherchait a s'anoblir."21 Cette 
vue se trouve confirmee par les travaux recents des historiens. Ces tra­
vaux montrent que les efforts de Colbert dans la creation de manufac­
tures et de compagnies commerciales comme dans les constructions 
navales avaient rencontre bien des obstacles et surtout se heurtaient a la 
mentalite d'une bourgeoisie "attachee aux offices royaux et aux revenus 
terriens": "une mutation 'capitaliste' etait impossible, faute de gros ca­
pitaux a investir et faute d'une mentalite d'entreprise." 22 
Harpagon, par son usure, ruine les fils de famille qui ont recours a ses 
services. En amassant de Por et en Penfouissant dans son jardin, il le retire 
de la circulation et le rend improductif. Le vice d'Harpagon va done a 
Pencontre de la politique d'expansion economique de Colbert, soucieux 
d'enrichir PEtat. En ridiculisant et en condamnant implicitement Pava­
rice, Moliere avait certainement Pintention de plaire au roi, son protec­
teur, qui offrait, dans un but nettement politique, des spectacles a 
Versailles. Comme le note Hugh Davidson: 
Selon d'Aubignac, le theatre remplit une fonction politique bien definie 
. . . Apres les exploits, les divertissements . . . On ne nous parle pas, ce-
pendant, de simples passe-temps. Ces plaisirs publics se chargent bientot, 
dans la pensee de d'Aubignac, d'un ensemble de valeurs morales." 
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Le sens psychologique et moral de la comedie se trouve renforce par 
l'emploi structurel de figures rhetoriques de base, antithese et paradoxe: 
puissance destructrice de l'argent, le possesseur possede. L'avare se des­
humanise en traitant en objets les etres les plus proches, ses enfants, la 
jeune fille qu'il voudrait epouser sans Paimer. La cassette devient objet 
d'amour, comme une personne dans le celebre monologue: 
Helas! mon pauvre argent, mon pauvre argent, mon cher ami, on m'a 
prive de toi; et puisque tu m'es enleve, j'ai perdu mon support, ma conso­
lation, ma joie . . . sans toi, il m'est impossible de vivre. [IV: 7, 569] 
La derniere replique est probante: Georges Couton souligne que "la piece 
se termine veritablement par ces retrouvailles d'un homme et d'une cas­
sette, et que le dernier mot est cassette."24 Harpagon s'identifie ainsi a 
l'objet de sa passion, se reifie. Son alienation est totale: il est seul en face 
d'une famille nouvellement constitute qui aurait pu etre la sienne, mais 
qui se groupe autour d'un pere vraiment humain lui, bon et genereux, 
soucieux de remplir sa fonction sociale qui consiste a assurer l'avenir de 
ses enfants et de substituer la reciprocity a l'egoisme.25 
Moliere se montre, lui aussi, genereux dans cette comedie sur l'avarice, 
diversement qualifiee de piece noire, apre et gringante, rosse, de drame 
bourgeois. On a tente d'en degager les nombreux niveaux d'expressivite 
et de signification: la comedie romanesque et sentimentale, agrementee, 
comme chez Shakespeare, de naufrage, sauvetage, deguisement, separa­
tion, retrouvailles et double mariage; la grande comedie de moeurs et de 
caractere se jouant dans le cadre d'une famille bourgeoise dechiree; les 
droleries et jeux de scene de la farce et de la commedia del arte. Moliere, 
comme dans une piece montee, n'hesite pas a utiliser en couches super­
posees toutes les grandes traditions comiques, la realite contemporaine et 
sa propre experience. Le dramaturge fait fleche de tout bois, mais 
combine, repense, reinvente les donnees traditionnelles, y ajoute du sien 
et remplit ainsi le double but de plaire et d'instruire. 
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Doubling and Omission in the Text 
of Anne Ferrand/Belise 
Charles G. S. Williams 
Anne Ferrand's anonymously published novel, L'Histoire de Cleante et 
Belise (1689, 1691),1 and the love letters included with it (1691) capped 
with scandal a notoriety that had begun in 1686, when her husband, the 
magistrate Michel Ferrand, instituted legal separation from his wife after 
ten years of marriage. Keys to manuscripts, letters, and other public no­
tices show that contemporary readers connected fiction with lawsuit and 
read the novel as the inside story of Mme Ferrand's affair with Louis-
Nicolas Le Tonnelier de Breteuil, begun in 1680 and ended, the letters 
imply, some two years before the court action. A thousand persons know 
of the affair, remarks one of the novel's narrators, and that figure was 
increased, in a 1696 manuscript note, to an expressive if hyperbolic 
io,ooo.2 
The scandal of Mme Ferrand's writing brought some exclusions, es­
pecially from the society over which Mme de Maintenon held sway. "Je 
trouve les femmes plus meprisables dans la devotion que dans la galan­
terie" (72), Belise had written and was no less direct about herself: 
"Je n'ay ny le bonheur ny la foiblesse de devenir devote, &c vous pouvez 
vous asseurer que vous ne me verrez jamais que philosophe amante & 
fidelle . . ." (27-28). For at least one key-supplying reader of Les Carac-
teres,3 and enterprising publishers for over a century,4 Anne Ferrand's 
letters put her into another company, that of Heloise and the narrator 
of the Lettres portugaises. Belise's desire had already found this commu­
nity: "Qu'une veritable passion est noble, &c qu'elle inspire des sentimens 
elevez! Si jamais je parviens a avoir quelque merite, je le devray a 
la mienne. Je suis touchee d'emulation pour toutes les femmes qui en 
ont" (38). 
Recent attention, almost exclusively to the technical and historical fea­
tures of Anne Ferrand's single published novel, has separated the consti­
tutive letters and recit of what may be a historically unique text.5 Like the 
earlier biographical tradition which conflated the Belise of the text with 
the historical Presidente Ferrand, this new criticism also separates the 
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writer Anne Ferrand/Belise from other texts, later extant writings left in 
manuscript during her long life (1657?—1740). My intention here is to 
bring these texts together and with them the image of the woman to be 
found in legal documents that gave Anne Ferrand a place among the cu­
riosities of legal history. The resulting interplay of textuality points finally 
in her writing to a central drama obscured by traditional interpretative 
scenarios of the femme abandonnee and/or mal-mariee. With this disclo­
sure comes, I believe, clarification of what the act of writing meant for 
this woman who first wrote about her life during five years of confine­
ment enforced by lettres de cachet. 
1. A femme forte 
Shortly after Mme Dacier's death, Anne Ferrand wrote a lengthy and 
detailed letter about her.6 Distinction as a scholar initially seemed, she 
confesses, good reason for not making Mme Dacier's acquaintance. But 
friendship and admiration followed the surprise of meeting a remarkable 
woman "qui ne faisoit jamais sentir le Moi" (184)—happy and devoted 
in marriage and motherhood, practical in management and an idealist of 
firm commitment, as sensitive in conversation as in her love of music. 
The fullness of Anne Lefevre Dacier's life, different from her own in so 
many way, captivated Anne Ferrand and elicited in her letter a response 
of friendship remarkable in its fullness. When the easy tone of the letter 
changes, as it does three times during its reminiscences, much is revealed 
about the writer Anne Ferrand. To one of these changes, especially signif­
icant for the writer's sense of difference, I shall return in my concluding 
section; the other two, related as they are, suggest a strategy fundamental 
to her writing. 
Evoking the "pretendues fautes" other scholars found in Mme Da-
cier's "excellents ouvrages," Anne Ferrand launches a general denuncia­
tion of male vanity: "Je n'ai pu m'empecher de soupc,onner les hommes 
de voir d'un oeil d'envie la science dans les femmes, et que ce ne soit a 
eux que nous devions nous prendre la puerile education que Ton nous 
donne." Continuing to meditate combatively, she describes the triumph 
of Mme Dacier as that of a style containing the best that men have to 
offer and going beyond it. Mme Dacier's writing has, she judges, "la force 
et Texactitude du stile des hommes, jointes a une certaine douceur propre 
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aux femmes, qui rendoit sa maniere d'ecrire superieure a tout autre" 
(i84v). 
This judgment's independence—from the emerging cliche that in po­
lemics Mme Dacier's prose was the "best man's"—suggests Mme Dacier 
had won a reader in the always self-taught Anne Ferrand. She may well 
have begun at the beginning with what she calls the "excellent works" 
prepared with special pedagogical care and skill for another restive 
reader (the Dauphin). There douceur was evident both in Mme Dacier's 
desire to address her text to an adolescent and to convey filial piety in her 
continuation of the pedagogical and scholarly work of her father; "force­
fulness and exactness," in the establishment of text, in her self-assurance 
in annotation, and in at least one, uncharacteristic denunciation of male 
educators that Anne Ferrand echoes.7 
The dedoublement Anne identifies, with its particular authority/supe-
riority, speaks a long-cherished desire at work in the writings collected in 
view of a never-finished volume of memoirs recently begun when the let­
ter on Mme Dacier was written.8 The intention of that project of writing, 
evident in part 1 of the papers, is a defense of Colbert that would be 
polemical as well as historical. Anne Ferrand applies the lesson taken 
from Mme Dacier's style in an experiment of her own with dedouble­
ment. She plays the stylistic game of hiding grammatical indicators of a 
nonmale narrator. 
After a brief, conventional justification of "eye-witness" history, Mme 
Ferrand attacks the recently published Histoire d'Henriette d'Angleterre 
by Mme de Lafayette9 (sects. 7—20) and the abbe de Choisy's Memoires 
(sects. 21-36).1 0 Both are heatedly denied credibility for their misrepre­
sentations of the minister's character, actions, and historical stature. 
Choisy's writing is simply gossip; Mme de Lafayette's—significantly for 
the orientation of the sometime novelist now apprentice historian—a bad 
imitation of her novel La Princesse de Cleves.11 Commentary on these 
sources, to the end of the larger project, is subordinated to a shrewd 
historical analysis (sects. 2-6) of the anti-Colbertian feeling that they 
illustrate and unjustly continue. 
Intelligent as she was, Anne Ferrand could not long have supposed that 
third-person narrative might shield the historical subject; nor could she 
have been unaware of its fundamental contradiction with the desire to 
speak her own truth. Although political subjects (and a recent unfounded 
implication in the Cellamare conspiracy)12 might make it seem desirable, 
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the narratorial "il" is less a strategy of clandestinity than one of a double, 
enforcing the historian's authority already evident in the vigor of its crit­
icism. Other "titles" are prepared to the same end in the two series of 
reflections assembled in the shorter part 2 of the papers. Placed like "jus­
tificatory pieces," a series of moral reflections (sects. 38-55) professes an 
unassailable belief in God's order as the basis of all morality. This might 
be reassuring to anyone associating the writer with her son Antoine (d. 
1719), who had frequented the circle of the Temple.13 The closing sen­
tence of part 2 could be equally so to any reader who remembered Belise's 
extravagance and disruptiveness: "II y a en toutes choses une abondance 
vicieuse: le 'ne quid nimis' me paroit le chef-d'oeuvre du discernement." 
The ne quid nimis topos here appears to be a kind of memorandum by 
the writer to herself for a closing "in beauty" she would need in the 
finished volume. At this stage of writing its conventional wisdom remains 
at war with the immediately preceding notes on satire, with the aggressive 
tone of earlier criticism, even with the moralist's assertive statements of 
principle. Few direct appeals to or use of authoritative sources occur; 
general allusions, like those to Pascal on humility, also seem notes for the 
future ornaments of a finished work.14 They soon give way, as do gener­
alized principles, to the more congenial anecdotes and pointed questions 
of social comedy, as the moraliste considers the subjects of conversation, 
confidentiality and gossip, promises and lying, the proper spirit of alms­
giving. The signs of authority summoned for the "je," engaging combat 
on several fronts, mobilize a special talent for spying out the ridiculous. 
This part of Anne Ferrand's voice (not unlike that of the fifth Provinciale) 
doubtless kept Remon among others in her "salon" and prompted the 
comtesse d'Uzes to put a young kinsman to finishing school there.15 
The notes on satire reveal a woman still insoumise,16 issuing a double 
warning: "La piete, mal entendue, est dangereuse" (531) and "II faut 
entendre raillerie." Indeed she wishes Mme Dacier had had one more 
lesson to teach her. Her desire specifically to go La Bruyere one better is 
inscribed as discontinuous reflections that pursued insistently assert her 
mind's right to free movement: 
[56.] Dissertation sur le ridicule—II me semble que c'est une curiosite 
raisonnable que celle qui nous porte a vouloir connoitre la cause de nos 
sentiments. Aussi, apres avoir joui du plaisir de voir, sur le theatre et sur 
la scene du monde, beaucoup de differents ridicules, j'ay essaye de demeler 
en quoi consiste le ridicule. 
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II y a longtemps que j'ai souhaite que l'illustre Mme Dacier n'eut pas 
dedaigne de nous instruire . . . 
[57.] Les Caracteres de La Bruyere sont bons, et Ton ne peut douter qu'il 
n'eut de l'esprit; mais, je crois qu'ils pourroient etre encore meilleurs. II 
allonge ses descriptions sans necessite, il semble qu'il veut faire voir qu'il 
sait les termes de l'art; affectation puerile, quand ces termes ne sont pas 
necessaires pour Pintelligence du lecteur. [537] 
To defend Colbert was also to defend Francois Bellinzani, Anne's fa­
ther, who had risen to prominence through Colbert's patronage, then 
fallen into disgrace for alleged peculation after Colbert's death.17 At the 
heart of the "memoirs" is the daughter's account of attempts to visit her 
father (521), successful only through the offices of the duchesse 
d'Aumont. Success came too late: "le pauvre M. Bellinzani" was dead 
when his daughter reached Vincennes. The potentially Greuzian narra­
tive is marred by no sensiblerie. And nothing detracts from the accusation 
of royal injustice to which it leads. "Sa majeste ne fut point susceptible 
du scrupule d'avoir cause la mort d'un homme qui avoit bien servi, et la 
ruine de sa famille, sur une faussete" (522). Through her defenses, Anne's 
writing becomes a renewed act of friendship extended to Colbert's family. 
She retained ties, with Mme de Menars,18 and kept Colbert's daughters 
in a special place of reverence in her memories of difficult times. It was 
they, she confides, who had inspired her in her own grief to emulate 
19 courage.
The project of memoir-writing centers finally around a commemora­
tion of Anne's friendships with women who had been kind to her. She 
returns that kindness to special friends and in her critical appraisal of 
sources defends others—like her mother's friends Mile de la Valliere and 
the comtesse de Soissons—against a variety of thoughtless allegations, 
from the distortions of gossip to those made by historians mistaking their 
proper names. "Touchee d'emulation pour toutes les femmes" as Belise 
once professed herself, the memoir-writer's community is one of friend­
ship, rather than passion, which opens with "douceur propre aux 
femmes" to her own mother (nee Louise Chevreau). 
"Ma mere," Anne writes, giving away the stylistic game (510-11). 
And if the writer's fantasy had been to do La Bruyere one better, it could 
well have been for this additional defense that came with writing. La 
Bruyere, readers believed, had ridiculed Mme Bellinzani in the character 
of the parvenue Arfure.20 Filial piety had not earlier been available for 
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her, as Mme Ferrand's novel had shown the world that knew her mother. 
At the point of writing the "memoirs," however, it extends to the woman 
who was absent when needed by her daughter and for her own safety had 
fled to Brussels "deguisee en homme." 
[32.] Les Le T[ellier] ne s'etoient pas contentes d'avoir fait perir en prison 
un homme, qui n'avoit rien a dire, mais qui auroit parle s'il en fut sorti,— 
ils craignoient le courage et le ressentiment de Mme de Bellinzani, qui 
n'etoit pas moins bien instruite que son mari; on resolut de Parreter 
[ . . . U 5 2 2  ] 
By giving Louise Bellinzani her place in the adversity they had shared, the 
once-abandoned daughter who became Belise rights with this writing, 
after her mother's death (1710), at least one wrong born with the creation 
of the dedoublement Anne Ferrand/Belise. 
2. A femme abandonnee 
The distinguishing feature of Anne Ferrand's novel, technically and his­
torically, is its shifting point of view. The text enacts an experiment, in 
dedoublement, largely unrecognized because of the unclear relationship 
of its parts. No sources have yet documented the exact moments, between 
1684 and 1691, when the four segments of the text were composed nor 
the way they were combined for the Rouen printers who published the 
novel both in 1689 and 1691 without permissions and under false im­
prints. Like Anne Ferrand's later writings, however, this text inscribes its 
own desires for publication. 
In part 1 of the Histoire an older and sadder Belise recounts to Zelo­
nide, one of a series of older confidantes, the adventures of her early 
adolescent attraction to Cleante and its history over almost a decade be­
fore it was shared. On the one hand, passion was allowed to become the 
driving force of her life—reason for self-cultivation as compensation for 
a lack of physical beauty, for her movements in society and at home, 
finally for the spontaneous "pledge" of a gift to him of // pastor fido— 
while on the other, she fought passion by flights from home, refuge in 
convents, counsel sought from older women. "Quelle honte pour une 
femme de dire la premiere qu'elle aime!" (19). Part 1 ends with the inter­
vention of a suspicious mother and a father who "m'aimoit trop pour se 
resoudre a me perdre pour toujours." In her interest they abandon their 
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daughter to an arranged marriage, sealing the "cruelle destinee" of the 
mal-mariee told in part 2 when Belise has recovered from the memory of 
that moment of abandonment (25). 
Belise again attempts to find shelter from passion, since "la vertu . . . 
jusques la ne m'avoit pas encore abandonee" (28). Even in her family, 
through an unwelcome suitor, she discovers that she is not free from the 
pleasure of love with Cleante she had fantasized. Pleasure and vanity are 
clearly identified at the outset of the continuing confession of the aban­
donment of all virtue. It was she who pursued Cleante, largely through 
letters, overcoming his physical repugnance and moral distaste for her. In 
the retelling, moments of the shame of "indigne ardeur" alternate with a 
rekindling excitement as obstacles once sought now give way. Love comes 
alive again, indeed seems never to have been otherwise, as Belise 
concludes—"Je Pay toujours aime & l'aime encore avec une ardeur qui 
n'eut jamais d'egale" (42). 
As the femme abandonnee pursues her seduction, and the narrator 
gives herself to it, settings are rapidly noted, details of plots elided; other 
actors are at best bit players until their insistent presence forces her to 
take greater notice of them. "Mon pere sur tout plus eclaire & plus jaloux 
qu'un autre. . . . et la violence dont il etoit sur tout ce qui me regardoit, 
l'aveugla . . ." (52). With this new abandonment by the father who had 
remained physically and financially present in his daughter's household, 
the adolescent is audible. "II m'ota mon equipage 6c me fit garder a 
vue. . . ." Henceforth the father is reduced to the common enemy, the 
"jaloux," as Belise's mother unnamed in part 2 had already been. The rest 
of the family has no specified characterization apart from the importu­
nate other. Belise's narrative ends with her triumph over this other by 
"perseverance et vivacites." Again overcome, she abandons her friend 
and subsequently society itself, with the promise that the end of her tragic 
affair will be revealed to Zelonide in "la pluspart de mes Lettres." 
Part 3, which ends the 1689 printing, shifts to Cleante, though neither 
he nor Belise is directly present. After "quelques annees," it is a friend of 
Zelonide (told Belise's story despite vowed confidentiality) who seeks the 
denouement and learns it at second hand from a very knowledgeable 
friend of Cleante (who also breaks confidence). What was once known 
only privately is now public record for others to examine and judge. And 
judgment is the question. The tone changes with an early signal of male 
point of view given by an allusion to the story of the matron of Ephesus.21 
That story becomes the framing exemplum for the completed narrative 
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of the would-be heroine Belise. Finally fixed as the subject of a cautionary 
tale, and meriting no better, Belise's "bizarre a venture" becomes uun por­
trait si terrible de la mauvaise foy de la pluspart des Dames" (59). Final 
judgment is thus humiliation. 
Repeated airings of injured male honor for which Cleante is given mo­
ral justification necessitate a thickening of plot in part 3. Belise is now 
seen as the fickle lover faithlessly abandoning Cleante as she had the hus­
band in whose house, it is added, she had repeatedly hidden her lover. 
First from boredom during Cleante's two-year absence for a diplomatic 
mission—when Belise wrote to him some of her finest letters (64)—then 
brazenly after his return, she conducted an affair with the grotesque rival 
of a "Pedant"—"ce petit colet!" (85).22 Moving in the direction of the 
contemporary nouvelle (of the "desordres de l'amour" variety), and 
away from the earlier narrative's confessional directness, Cleante's highly 
plotted story, within its third-person scaffolding, sets at a distance of se­
vere moral judgment all those things most important to Belise. 
The letters that were the direct record of passionate life are reduced to 
the wit and art of an "artificieuse Belise." Passion itself proclaimed in 
them as eternal becomes nothing more than time-bound, intermittent 
"emportements" of a violent temperament. Already reduced to the ad­
versary in Belise's scenario, her family is further humiliated. Its "affaires 
fort facheuses"—Bellinzani's fall—are held only to be a pretext for Be-
lise's "chagrin" (65). Subsequent alarm over surveillance (now without 
her father), like pleas to Cleante for discretion or even temporary sepa­
ration, are viewed only as strategies to cover the new affair. Changes in 
circumstances that allow Cleante to visit her are now put down simply to 
Belise's inexplicable caprice, to the point that Cleante's patience breaks 
in "la lettre la plus outrageante que le depit & la rage puisse jamais die­
ter" (85). Belise's unabashed admission of "preuves de son crime" justi­
fies Cleante's decision to abandon Belise "pour jamais a toute l'horreur 
de sa mauvaise conduite" (88). The closing paragraph of the Histoire 
justifies this judgment and apparently gives the last word to Cleante. 
As promised, Belise's letters are added, in the 1691 printing, seemingly 
as evidence for Cleante's case. The selected letters have an order of their 
own (as did most probably those circulated before the novel's publica-
tion).23 They neither correspond to the letters evoked in part 2. nor in­
clude any of those cited in part } as most incriminating Belise during the 
last stage of the lovers' relations. The seventy-two letters, mostly short, 
all undated, now close with the separation of Cleante's voyage. The 
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ending "in beauty" was prepared in part 3 by praise of the letters of 
separation and has succeeded in its rhetorical intention for recent readers 
like Maurice Lever.24 
Belise's last adieu and solitude as she is abandoned, by a lover whose 
ambitions prolong absence, and abandons herself to silence and death 
are not without echoes of the Lettres portugaises.15 But like Racinian 
overtones they are fleeting. The dominant register is resolutely practical 
and briskly orders the course of the story the love letters memorialize. 
With unrelenting clarity about herself, physically and morally, and no 
illusions about the "naturalness" of her passion, Belise typically refuses 
Cleante's idealizing portrait. "On se connoit toujours malgre les efforts 
que fait l'amour propre pour nous tromper . . . je ne suis pas belle" (57— 
58; again, 63). Vanity is savored—"J'en jouis avec . . . plaisir" (49)— 
and Cleante is more than once warned against its power to blind as he is 
against other weaknesses. He has more than ample warning of Belise's 
special pleasures—"Je suis une amie difficile et une maitresse glorieuse" 
(65) and "N'admirez vous point la foiblesse des femmes & leur lege-
rete?" (72). 
The dedoublement of a male voice, as the letter writers themselves 
would hear it, is evident, in a letter on Cleante's ambition worthy of a 
Cornelian father (no. 47). But that voice's intermittent presence gathers 
cumulative strength throughout the letters: in the aggressiveness of the 
seduction pursued in the first grouping (nos. 1-25) as in the willful aban­
donment to pleasure of those at the center that celebrate mutual love 
(nos. 26-54). "Si j'etais homme . . ." (43) is often assumed. 
Enjoyment of passion is at first fearful, inhibited in the temporary se­
curity of the eluded gaze of the family. "Je puis m'abandonner toute en­
tiere aux movemens de mon coeur, je suis delivree de tout ce que je hais." 
But sensual abandon radiates through the letters at the heart of the pub­
lished collection. "Peut-on mieux faire que de travailler a se rendre heu­
reux &c peut-on l'etre sans s'aimer . . . ?" (39). It is a repeated total gift 
of self that Belise's passion demands. Her desire remains inscribed in the 
commemorative closing letter and in her last words of part 2 before her 
withdrawal from society: 
Je m'abandonne a vous & a la tendresse, sans reserve, & sans crainte . .  . 
Jouissez de cette victoire, mon cher Amant. (35) 
Abandonnons nous sans reserve a l'amour pendant le peu de jours qui 
nous reste a nous voir. . . . (55) 
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Cleante too is to be judged in terms of this absolute during separation 
and by inference after the reader's separation from the text: 
Si vous m'aviez bien connue, vous ne m'eussiez point abandonnee pour 
elle [ambition]. (78) 
Vous renoncez a des plaisirs .  . . Savez que quand on veut etre plus 
qu'un homme, on devient beaucoup moins quelquefois. Thesee fut moins 
blame d'avoir ete sensible aux charmes d'Ariane, que de l'avoir abandon-
nee. (8o)26 
The return to Belise and the first-person of the letters reinforce the 
already striking differences that distinguish part 3 from the first two parts 
of the Histoire. But rather than see in part 3 Anne Ferrand's inventiveness 
in constructing a typical male narrative, looking forward uniquely in its 
time to relativist experiments (Jules Romains's Psyche, say, or Monther-
lant's Andree Hacquebaut, whom Belise sometimes curiously resembles), 
a continuing male critical tradition has without external evidence con­
tested her authorship. At one point, the hypothesis goes, Breteuil/Cleante 
intervened and through a hired author—Fontenelle?—inserted the last 
word on Belise.27 Part 3 is held to be the man's writing, marked as it is by 
judgment; 1-2, with its passionate first-person, the woman's {a fortiori 
an Italian woman's). In the perspective of Anne Ferrand's later writings, 
and the letters as published, these lines of argument cannot be taken se­
riously. "II faut entendre raillerie," she warned, and engaged it through 
dedoublement. Irony is the weapon of a desire for vengeance that began 
with a renewed self-affirmation found in writing. 
Irony, and self-punishment with it, is initially audible in the name cho­
sen for Anne Ferrand's persona. The inescapable association with Belise 
is Moliere's character, in Les Femmes savantes, whose delusion is that all 
men are courting her.28 Angry and disabused, the woman who later 
moved from particular "ridicule" to the question "en quoi consiste le 
ridicule" and reflected on La Bruyere may have found Moliere's staging 
of Belise's ridicule irresistible grounds for reflection. "Tu l'as voulu, Be­
lise" (to change plays) is as probable as any other response of Anne Fer-
rand's alert mind as she revised the letters for publication in 1691, and 
with freedom in sight, a fuller settling of accounts. That irony may be 
seen focused in the changed title of 1691, in which the older Belise then 
writing excised the special pleading of the first title's "jeune Belise." "On 
a peine a comprendre qu'une femme, peu eprise de son mari, dans un age 
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ou Ton prend la vanite pour la gloire . . . ne fut point touchee de sa pre­
tendue passion," Anne reflected in her memoirs (524). In the clarity of 
loss, with the dark days of 1 6 8 6 - 8 7 ,  t n  e distance for the same judgment 
on herself—through Cleante—could have been hers as probably as 
another's. 
Critical readers have from 1880 to the present invariably preferred 
Belise's letters over Cleante's narrative. By comparison it has seemed con­
ventional, wooden; Cleante himself, self-righteous and lacking in gener­
osity. The placement of the letters as "justificatory pieces" by the 
ordinary legal logic of a writer surrounded by judges (as Anne Ferrand 
literally was in her husband's family) turns against Cleante. The letters in 
fact force dissatisfaction with part 3, a questioning of its devices of story­
telling, even a search for Cleante's errors. Vanity rather than honor? Be­
lief in gossip and appearances rather than an abiding love? Surely love 
could have seen through the Pedant, in the circumstances of the Bellinzani 
debacle? Or if the scenario were different, could not love with its old 
teasing spirit of complicity have seen through a new ritual testing? The 
worst of Belise gleaned in the letters is made literally true in part 3 and 
used against her to the point of overshadowing the fact that the worst of 
Cleante—his vanity and weakness—also if more insinuatingly appears 
there. Cleante's final "moral portrait"—offered at second hand—elicits 
retrospectively from the reader of Belise's letters a response not unlike 
that Prevost invites with Des Grieux's ambiguous "perfide Manon," "per-
fides larmes." The accounts closed by the writer in 1691 are balanced by 
a "femme forte qui se retire du monde." Through Cleante's final severity, 
as through Belise's raised tones, there remains an insinuating doubt: "Et 
cet Amant qui crie qu'on l'abandonne est peut-etre tout prest a m'aban-
donner" (57). 
In Anne Ferrand's letters, as Bernard Bray suggests, there is a pure 
melody of pleasure.29 But there is also an edge of nastiness, particularly 
in dealing with the "hated family," not only the all-too-present-husband 
but also the absent mother. Exulting over foiling their surveillance, Belise 
covets a satirist's revenge: "Disons leur pour nous venger" (42). And 
when her husband waxes "galant," she promises it—"la vengeance est 
certaine" (72). The promise is raised to a solemn oath: "Que l'union qui 
sera desormais entre nous serve de punition a ceux qui me persecute, & 
qu'elle me venge de tout ce qu'ils me font souffrir" (47-48). With calcu­
lated self-interest "young Belise" restrained this desire to avenge "les cha­
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grins que me cause la bizarrerie de ma famille": "Si je ne me contois pour 
beaucoup, j'agirois d'une maniere que je leur ferois bien voir que je les 
conte pour rien" (62). After the death of her father, and with the destruc­
tion of her past in 1 6 8 6 - 8 7 ,  t n  e desire is no longer restrained. The trans­
gressive writing of the four parts of the text of 1691 is a self-affirmation 
that settles more than accounts with Cleante/Breteuil. 
3. Mother and Daughter 
As Anne Ferrand lingers over intimate scenes between Mme Dacier and 
her daughter, who died prematurely, her tone changes dramatically. Her 
own loss of a daughter and with it the difference of her own life from 
Mme Dacier's break the text. Solitude had been her lot rather than the 
consolation friends and family offered Mme Dacier, "bonne mere, apres 
avoir rempli les devoirs de fille." 
Cet endroit de ma lettre me rapelle le souvenir de mes propres pertes. 
Quelle douleur de voir perir ce qu'on a aime, quand 1'estime publique 
s'accorde avec notre tendresse! Md Dacier meloit ses larmes avec celles 
d'une autre elle-meme; et ce qui sembloit augmenter son affliction servoit 
a l'adoucir; mais mes larmes avoient tant de differentes causes, que je ne 
puis comprendre comment j'ai resiste a une situation si cruelle. Je suis 
presque honteuse de vivre. [f. 187] 
The time of recollection in this moment of emptiness and lack is not 
simply that of the death in 1698 of Anne's elder daughter, who died at 
twenty-one in Riom, far from her mother. The multiple causes of grief 
and shame reactivate the loss and solitude of the year 1686 and the fol­
lowing years of internment (at the abbey L'Eau-Notre Dame south of 
Chartres). Legal documents begin to show that Anne's memories did not 
exaggerate.30 
Michel Ferrand made no secret of the "rixes" between spouses, mainly 
relating to Bellinzani's disgrace, that raised his fear of more violence. Nor 
did he hide the fact that he could no longer tolerate life with the "daugh­
ter of a criminal."31 Although a separate establishment in the rue du Bac 
was legally stipulated, the Ferrands' son remained with his father. If their 
two daughters lived with their mother at all, it could only have been 
briefly. The moment was right for them, at ten and twelve, to board at 
the nearby Filles de Sainte-Marie. There the younger remained. With the 
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elder's betrothal during her exile, Anne Ferrand in fact lost both daugh­
ters in 1686-91. 
When the letter on Mme Dacier was written it was thus too late for 
Anne Ferrand to have with her own daughters the friendship so valued in 
her writings. And so it seemed too with her own mother, by transference, 
as Anne made amends to Louise Bellinzani: the daughter, the Histoire 
indicates, had not sought her friendship in adolescence and could not in 
1686 when exile separated mother from daughter. Turning to writing 
during exile—rather than to devotion—the daughter had effected an act 
of independence from her mother. But her daughters are the major omis­
sions of that text. They are cruelly subsumed by the generalized other, 
then again displaced by the "mon enfant" incongruously lavished on the 
lover Cleante.32 Like the dedoublement Belise-Cleante at the moment of 
writing, the "mon enfant" becomes with this second displacement of 
memory a synecdoche of writing, now the shame of having written. 
"Belise" is born fully armed with the literary transformation of the 
letters to Breteuil, that of the epistolier into auteur-epistolier. Stylistic 
corrections, re-ordering, excisions, occasional rewritings all appear in the 
Arsenal manuscript.33 Typical of these procedures is the reworking of the 
last letter, admired by Maurice Lever for raising the femme abandonnee 
from melodrama to the tragic. But beyond excisions and other alterations 
of levels of style, emendation has special significance at this climactic 
moment. 
1691: Je n'ai jamais ete heureuse, et je meure encore plus malheureuse 
que je n'ai vecu. Si ma mort ne pent mettre ma gloire a convert, et que 
ceux qui me haissent veulent, pour se venger de moi, publier ce qu'ils ont 
pu decouvrir de mon adventure [.. . ] Asse, 155-56 [fac. ed., 89; empha­
sis added] 
MS: Je n'ay vescu que pour vous. Je n'ay jamais vescue heureuse et je 
suis encore plus que je n'ay vescu si ma mere ne peut mettre ma gloire a 
convert et [ . .  . ] [f. i4v] 
Whatever is lost in revision, the suppression of the mother is gained. 
Following failure to forestall publication alluded to here, and with the 
felt abandonment of 1687-91, se venger is defiantly enacted by writing 
for publication (Cleante is of course also served as Belise herself preempts 
her challenge to him—"publiez mes lettres si . . ."). This closing letter, 
originally part of the earliest sequence charting the course of the love,34 
translates Louise Bellinzani from a point of usefulness in it (revealingly, 
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since this role is elided in the Histoire) to the climactic instance of failure. 
The apparently semic link merelmort at this moment of lack and aban­
donment again opens into the present particular events of 1686. Anne 
Ferrand in her last years was forced to dwell on them and to relive the 
association mother/death with new cruelty. 
Seven months after separation from her husband, in November 1686, 
Anne Ferrand gave birth to a third daughter. The baby was taken from 
her for nursing, it was later revealed, and was not returned to her before 
her exile. In 1725, in the wake of Michel Ferrand's death (1723), a thirty-
nine-year-old woman appeared claiming her part in the estate as the Fer-
rands' last and indeed long lost daughter. Mme Ferrand and collateral 
heirs contested, then appealed the judgment won for the plaintiff by the 
illustrious Cochin.35 The legal documents of what became twelve years' 
litigation, as complicated as any novel, afford a last dramatic view of 
Anne Ferrand—unable or unwilling to find in this woman the daughter 
and friend she desired for her own advanced age, unable as well perhaps 
to maintain the "reprieve" of Louise Bellinzani the dutiful daughter 
granted in the first stages of memoir-writing. 
Her mother, Anne's testimony divulges, had lied to her: "She informed 
me that the baby had died."36 Evidence was produced and sustained that 
Louise Bellinzani had in fact had the infant christened as a foundling, 
then arranged through servants for pensions under a variety of assumed 
names through a succession of convents. Taking on what she supposed 
were her mother's charities, Anne testified, she continued support of this 
girl, who was identified to her as the illegitimate offspring of her younger, 
wayward brother. That birth had been hidden, after Bellinzani's death, to 
avoid further troubles for the family that he then at least nominally 
headed (after leaving his monastery at eighteen). 
Whether or not Anne Ferrand finally accepted that her mother had lied 
to her about her youngest daughter's death, she could not have avoided 
reflection on the possibility. And she could not have escaped some painful 
reflection on the inextricably linked relationships she had had with her 
own daughters. Having outlived immediate family, Anne Ferrand retired 
to the convent du Cherche-Midi for the last year of her life. Accounts 
with Breteuil and with Michel Ferrand had long been closed, the drama 
of the mal-mariee closed by her own writing and by litigation.1" But the 
femme abandonnee again alone had yet some dramatically unsettled ac­
counts on which to reflect in the final shelter of the convent that she had 
once upon a time so clamorously sought. 
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La Fontaine, Les Vautours et les pigeons 
(VII, 8): An Intertextual Reading 
Jules Brody 
. . . il en est de la lecture comme des auberges espagnoles, et de 
l'amour . . . : on n'y trouve que ce qu'on y apporte. 
—ANDRE MAUROIS1 
The most striking single feature of so-called French classical literature is 
its extraordinary, programmatic commitment to the binary. This is no 
doubt why the uninitiated reader often finds this kind of writing so mo­
notonous and difficult to appreciate; this is also why certain individual 
passages are so easy to remember, often impossible to forget. It is a mat­
ter of evidence that the works of Corneille, Pascal, Racine et al., are lit­
tered with such statements as these, in which antithesis is the central 
rhetorical support: 
Je consens, ou plutot j'aspire a ma mine. 
[Corneille, Polyeucte, IV, 2, 1139] 
S'il se vante je l'abaisse, s'il s'abaisse, je le vante. 
[Pascal, Pensees, Lafuma, no. 130] 
La magnanimite meprise tout pour avoir tout. 
[La Rochefoucauld, Maximes, no. 248] 
J'ai pour moi la justice et je perds mon proces. 
[Moliere, Misanthrope, V, 1, 1492] 
Toujours prete a partir, et demeurant toujours. 
[Racine, Andromaque, I, 1, 131] 
What these texts have in common is a style which asks to be read as the 
surface manifestation of a deep semantic structure, and more pointedly 
This essay had its origins in an MLA panel discussion (Chicago, 1985) orga­
nized by David Lee Rubin under the title "New Approaches to the Fables of La 
Fontaine"; Les Vautours et les pigeons was the text on which Richard Danner, 
Marcel Gutwirth and myself were invited to focus our remarks. 
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still as the rhetorically and syntactically coded expression of a habitual, 
collective way of thinking about human psychology and behavior: its 
duplicity, its tensions, its incompatibilities, and its perversity. Turn this 
style inside out, and it becomes a moral content. Open Corneille or Ra­
cine to any page, and you are knee deep in ambiguity, alterity, asperity: 
the then and the now, the inner and the outer, the lesser and the greater, 
master and slave, monarch and subject. French classical literature at its 
most typical surrounds us with nervous, anxious people locked in con­
flict, often within the claustrophobic space of an alexandrine line. 
Open La Fontaine's Fables to almost any page and what do you find? 
Sweetness and light, smoothness, polish, sinuous fluidity—what Leo 
Spitzer describes, in his magisterial study of the transition in La Fontaine, 
as an updated version of Horatian suavitas.2 You will look in vain for 
those charged, tension-ridden antitheses that are endemic to the writing 
of Racine: "Presente je vous fuis; absente je vous trouve" (Phedre, II, 2, 
542); the dominant figure in La Fontaine is the mocking, the witty, the 
often whimsical periphrasis: "Le plus terrible des enfants/Que le Nord 
jusque-la eut porte dans ses flancs" {Le Chine et le roseau, I, 22, 26-27). 
In this respect, our access to La Fontaine is oddly skewed and, in the end, 
severely limited. Or, to put the matter in terms of my earlier characteri­
zation of French classical writing: if antithesis is a polarizing figure whose 
function is confrontational, periphrasis is a figure of avoidance, whose 
function is cosmetic, in that its essential role is to interpose aesthetic dis­
tance between the reader and the semantic content that it purports to 
convey. The pages of La Fontaine are filled, to be sure, with concrete, 
graphic examples of deceit, greed, injustice, and violence. All this evil 
transpires, however, so decorously and naturally, at times even so pleas­
antly and appealingly, that the French can still think of the Fables as 
suitable for memorization by their children.3 
And yet, the memorizable, delightful, elegant La Fontaine is not a fig­
ment of the mind either, for it harks back to a perception of the Fables 
that is also firmly grounded in the text; it often seems in fact as if, under­
neath all that bonhomie and naturel, there is really nothing much going 
on. Once begun, the reading progresses with a limpidity and a simplicity 
that can be highly unsettling, especially to professional, academic readers 
who labor in the conviction that they should somehow be able to talk 
about La Fontaine in the same detail and at the same depth as they are 
accustomed to do with Pascal and Racine. For the serious reader, the 
problem is always the same: to find some break in the flow of the text, 
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some palpable sign of a hidden complexity, some ungrammaticality to 
tell us that everything is really not alright after all. Where, so we ask, is 
the catachresis that will lead us to the hypogram? Where in a given fable 
is La Fontaine's counterpart or equivalent to "La fille de Minos et de 
Pasiphae" (Phedre, I, 1, 36)? In the following pages I would like to offer 
an empirical description of the ways in which one reader has gone about 
confronting these and related questions as they pertain to a consideration 
of Les Vautours et les pigeons. 
My first reaction to this fable was triggered by a personal association 
to the apparently coincidental collocation in the opening lines of the 
proper names "Mars" and "Venus": 
Mars autrefois mit tout l'air en emute. 
Certain sujet fit naitre la dispute 
Chez les oiseaux, non ceux que le Printemps 
Mene a sa cour, et qui, sous la feuillee 
Par leur exemple et leurs sons eclatants, 
Font que Venus est en nous reveillee; 
Ni ceux encor que la mere d'Amour 
Met a son char; mais le peuple vautour . .  . 
[11. 1-8] 
These same two deities—as I first vaguely recalled, then verified—play a 
prominent role and, according to the standard authorities, fulfill a semi­
nal allegorical function in Lucretius's prologue to De rerum natura. 
There, in her capacity as Venus physica, as what Lucretius will later call 
"rerum natura creatrix," Venus represents "the creative power of nature," 
whereas Mars, as god of War, stands by contrast for the countervailing 
principle of destruction.4 Taken together, these two antinomial figures 
recapitulate the complex, conflictual totality of Being, the way Life is, the 
Nature of Things. 
The possibility of a central, structuring Lucretian intertext which, in 
the absence of any more compelling insight, I chose as my working hy­
pothesis, needed more, however, than my chance personal association for 
its validation. And upon closer inspection, I was able to bring into play a 
number of additional elements. I noted first that Venus is not merely re­
ferred to in passing, but that her presence in the poem becomes the object 
of a double overdetermination: 1) the mention of her name in line 6 ("Ve­
nus est en nous reveillee. . . .") is immediately relayed in the next line by 
the periphrasis "la mere d'amour"; 2) this rather mannered redundancy 
draws further attention to itself by virtue of the emphasis placed on Ven­
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us's connection with birds; first with nightingales as harbingers of Spring 
(1. 3: "ceux que le Printemps/Mene a sa cour"), and then with the doves 
that draw her chariot (11. 7-8  : "que la mere d'Amour/Met a son char"). 
This marked feature—the bird-relatedness of Venus—has in turn a dual 
reference: 1) to the fable's title, specifically to the word pigeons, of which 
Venus's doves—snow white, gentle, tender—are a noble variant, and 2) 
to the passage in Lucretius's prologue in which Venus is described in 
terms of the same two characteristics as La Fontaine was to place in the 
foreground: her connection both with the onset of Spring and with birds 
of/in love: 
Nam simul ac species patefacta est verna diei 
Et reserata viget genitabilis aura favoni, 
Aeriae primum volucres te, Diva, tuumque 
Significant initum, perclusae corda tua vi. 
When first the day puts on the aspect of spring, 
when in all its force the fertilizing breath of 
Zephyr is unleashed, then, great goddess, the 
birds of air give the first intimation of your 
entry; for yours is the power that has pierced 
them to the heart. 
[Ul.10-13]5 
I hasten to add that, never having read Lucretius in Latin, I had no per­
sonal recollection of these lines, and that I gained knowledge of them 
from a note in Regnier's edition of the Fables in the Grands Ecrivains de 
la France collection. It is significant in this regard that Regnier prints the 
passage from Lucretius with no gloss or commentary, as if he considered 
it so well known and the Latin so accessible that his intended reader of 
1884—whether this reader existed in reality or in his own idealization— 
would be able to decipher it without difficulty. The baldness of Regnier's 
note also suggests that, within the cultural preview of his classically edu­
cated reader, the nature of the kinship between La Fontaine's and Lucre-
tius's juxtaposed descriptions of Venus would be self-evident. 
However this may be, I attach considerable importance to the fact that 
Regnier, although by another avenue, had been led before me to posit or, 
at the very least, to suspect a trace of the Lucretian presence in La Fon-
taine's poem. On second thought, I should perhaps have said that I found 
Regnier's note particularly meaningful not "although," but because he 
reached Lucretius for other reasons and by a different route from my 
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own. The fact that he identified La Fontaine's "source" presumably as a 
result of explicit verbal reminiscence, whereas I hypothesized an intertex­
tual relationship through having read Lucretius thirty years earlier in En­
glish translation—the fact that two such different readers, at an interval 
of a hundred years, coming from two widely separated corners of history, 
geography, and literary tradition, should have converged in this instance 
on Lucretius's prologue, points to something basic in the way that Les 
Vautours et les pigeons has been programmed to produce meaning. That 
is to say, the Lucretian intertext would seem to be so snugly embedded in 
La Fontaine's poem that, by one means or another, some careful, curious, 
alert reader had to come along sooner or later and notice it. If both Reg­
nier and I were led back independently to the same passage in Lucretius, 
does this not suggest that it was there all the time waiting to be recovered? 
In any event, it is certain that some sensitive, perceptive reader was bound 
to observe, even in complete ignorance of the parallel passage in Lucre­
tius, that Venus and Mars, although not specifically contrasted with each 
other in La Fontaine, do in fact represent, by the mere presuppositions of 
their names, such polar qualities as tenderness and violence, creation and 
destruction, peace and war, or as echoed in the title of the Woody Allen 
film of some years back, Love and Death. In the business of reading, all 
roads, however circuitous or divergent they may appear to be, eventually 
lead to Rome. 
As an editor working within certain artisanal-formal conventions and 
within a historically circumscribed notion of literary transmission, Reg­
nier also felt called upon to provide his reader with this note at the proper 
name Mars: "Le Dieu de la guerre, pour 'la guerre, une guerre.' C'est le 
ton de l'epopee que La Fontaine sait prendre avec tant d'art quand il veut 
relever ce qu'il dit." What Regnier did not do—and it is this considera­
tion that distinguishes between the respective dynamics of source criti­
cism and intertextual reading—was to observe or, if he did so observe, to 
mention, that Mars is also present in the prologue to De rerum natura, 
and at a distance of less than twenty lines from the description of Venus 
that he himself was to allege at line 6 of Les Vautours et les pigeons; 
Effice ut interea fera moenera militiai 
per maria ac terras omnis sopita quiescant. 
Nam tu sola potes tranquilla pace iuuare 
mortalis, quoniam belli fera moenera Mauors 
armipotens regit, in gremium qui saepe tuum se 
reiicit, aeterno deuictus uolnere amoris . . . 
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Meanwhile, grant that this brutal business of war by sea 
and land may everywhere be lulled to rest. For you alone have power to 
bestow on mortals the blessing of quiet peace. In your bosom Mars 
himself, supreme commander in this brutal business, flings himself down 
at times, laid low by the irremediable wound of love. 
[I, H. 29-34] 
Once we have, for whatever reason and by whatever process, traced the 
names Mars and Venus back to their common locus in De rerum natura, 
it is no longer possible to prevent the dialectical resonance that inheres in 
this conjunction at least from impinging on our reading of the "Mars"/ 
"Venus" collocation in La Fontaine. Whereas the indication of a source 
or model allows for the assertion of a contact or an "influence," the per­
ception of an intertext, as I am using the term here, invites us to open up 
a process of exploration and interrogation. Having been sent out by the 
names "Mars" and "Venus" in Les Vautours et les pigeons to the begin­
ning of De rerum natura, the reader brings back from it, willy nilly, as 
s/he resumes contact with La Fontaine's words, a suggested vision of the 
world as it might be, if the antagonism distilled by these two names could 
be subdued or dissolved. Lucretius's prologue contains an unexpressed 
idea which is actualized and disengaged by the reader when s/he com­
pares Venus's identical effect on the birds in the sky and the God of War: 
the former, necessarily, as part of nature, "pierced . . . through the heart" 
(perclusae corda), succumb to the controlling force of Love; in the same 
way, Mars, so it must be earnestly hoped, will similarly be "laid low by 
the irremediable wound of love" (aeterno deuictus uolnere amoris). This 
double seduction by Venus subtends a world view and builds on a cos­
mological theorem that have found lasting, proverbial expression in the 
Virgilian maxim: Otnnia vincit amor {Eclogues, X, 1. 69). 
I readily admit that my interest in wanting to link Les Vautours et les 
pigeons intertextually with Lucretius's prologue may appear idiosyn­
cratic or arbitrary. I might also concede for the sake of argument that the 
convergence of my associations with Regnier's was fortuitous and coin­
cidental. On one point, however, I would stand absolutely firm: the over­
determined status of the name "Venus," her bird-relatedness, and the 
equation pigeon = colombe are inherent, objective properties of the text. 
In the absence of any knowledge of Lucretius or of any earlier literary 
treatments of Venus and her doves, the careful, docile reader must never­
theless attend to the emphasis laid on the generic word "oiseaux" (1. 3), 
which La Fontaine first pushes into relief through the enjambement 
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Mars autrefois mit tout l'air en emute. 
Certain sujet fit naitre la dispute 
Chez les oiseaux . . . 
and then foregrounds further in the polarizing sequence: unon ceux . . . 
Ni ceux encor . . . mais le peuple vautour . . ." (11. 3-8). Whereas the 
vultures are named outright, the other birds that are mentioned in antic­
ipatory contradistinction to them ("wow ceux . . . Ni ceux encor"), are 
not identified, but presented to us at one remove from behind the veil of 
periphrasis, which it becomes the reader's first order of business to pene­
trate. To take up this challenge, to defeat La Fontaine's periphrastic eva­
sion, and thus fill the semantic void which it is designed to create, is to 
participate in the production of meaning and to collaborate with the poet 
in his chosen distribution of emphasis. But, even the lazy, insensitive, or 
ignorant reader who declines this invitation will not be let off that easily, 
since La Fontaine's editors, as self-appointed or commercially enlisted 
guardians of his text, are there in chorus to remind us that our response 
to Les Vautours et les pigeons will be incomplete and deficient as long as 
we do not know that the bird of spring is the nightingale and the bird of 
Venus is the dove. Only with this information at our command, so they 
insist in behalf of the poet who is no longer there to defend the integrity 
of his words, are we equipped to read on intelligently.6 
Having said this much, however, and having recovered the submerged 
content of La Fontaine's circumlocutions, the editors still do not tell the 
story in all its intricacy, for La Fontaine's periphrastic overdeterminations 
are compounded further by the fact that the nightingale is not only the 
harbinger of Spring, but it is also, in the same way as the dove, a bird of 
Venus, inasmuch as Spring stands metaphorically for the season of Love. 
Thus, at line 8, with the long-heralded, long-awaited mention of the word 
vautours, several preliminary generalizations become possible: 1) The se­
quential set: bird of spring > season of Love > birds of Venus signals a 
first amplification of the titular word pigeons by way of a proleptic and 
gratuitous actualization of the word colombe. I say "gratuitous," because 
nothing at this point in the text's narrative line requires such specializa­
tion of meaning. La Fontaine is doing here by indirection what he had 
done straightforwardly in La Colombe et la fourmi (II, 12, 12), where he 
describes the bird in the title periphrastically as a "oiseau de Venus." 2) 
We find next, parallelwise, a proleptic and gratuitous mention of Venus, 
first as metaphor for love or desire (line 6: "Venus est en nous reveillee"), 
then, periphrastically and tautologically, as mother of cupid (line 7: "la 
150 JULES BRODY 
mere d'Amour"), who, in that capacity, rides in a chariot drawn by doves. 
The contextual function of this powerfully concatenated network of per­
iphrases, is to attune the reader's response to the idea that the pigeons of 
the title are to be read, retroactively, not as the common, mottled, dirty 
rooftop or courtyard kind, but as the snow white, sentimentally and po­
etically refined variety, of noble affect and irenic disposition, perched at 
the very top of the columbiform paradigm, or in Littre's terse definition, 
s.v. Colombe; "Pigeon, en style eleve." 3) If once we take the word pigeon 
(= dove = bird of Love) as emblematic of the presence of Venus, we may 
go a step past description to interpretation and attribute proleptic semi­
otic value to the juxtaposition of "pigeons," the last word in the fable's 
title, and "Mars," the first word in the fable's text. 4) The first eight lines 
of Les Vautours et les pigeons may now be read as a tautological ampli­
fication in Greco-Roman or mythological code of the same polarity that 
the fable's title expresses in ornithological code: 
Vautours _ War Birds _ Mars _ War 
Pigeons Love Birds Venus Peace 
Moreover, this opposition between "Mars" and "Venus," as representa­
tive of two antiphrastic affective postures and cultures, is exemplified 
elsewhere in La Fontaine: in he Meunier, son fils et Vane (II, 1, 81), we 
read: "Quant a vous, suivez Mars, ou 1'Amour ou le Prince . . ."; and in 
A Monseigneur, le due de Bourgogne, (XII, 1, 9 and 17), "Le metier de 
Mars" is set contrapuntally against "les Ris et les Amours." There is fur­
ther evidence of calculated antique resonance both in the mock-epic de­
scription "Maint chien perit, maint heros expira" and the ensuing 
reference to "Promethee" (11. 14-15), as well as in La Fontaine's pseudo-
Homeric description of the battle scene, 
Tout element remplit de citoyens 
Le vaste enclos qu'ont les royaumes sombres 
[11. 23-24] 
a clear echo of the invocation to the Muse at the beginning of the Iliad, 
where the wrath of Achilles is described as having "hurled in their mul­
titudes to the house of Hades strong souls of heroes" (Lattimore trans.). 
When the reader reaches lines 25-27, 
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Cette fureur mit la compassion 
Dans les esprits d'une autre nation 
Au col changeant, au coeur tendre et fidele .  . . 
the equation pigeon - colombe and the polarizing thrust that it portends 
become, in Riffaterre's aggressive formulation, "obligatorily perceptible." 
This "autre nation," soon to be identified as "le peuple pigeon" (1. 30), is 
presented to us by means of a periphrasis ("Au col changeant, au coeur 
tendre et fidele") that actualizes the two essential features in the tradi­
tional descriptive system of the dove: its loving, faithful nature and its 
iridescent neckline. The dove's susceptibility to variegated color change 
is listed in the Thesaurus linguae latinae (s.v. Columba II) as foremost 
among its proverbial characteristics {de proprietatibus columbarum, 
quae in proverbium venerunt). Cicero mentions the dove's "plumae ver­
sicolores" {De fin. 3, 18) among nature's ornaments, along with the 
beards of men and peacocks' tails; many other writers, among them Lu­
cretius, specify that this distinctive coloration is localized in the region of 
the neck; 
pluma columbarum quo pacto in sole uidetur, 
quae sita ceruices circum collumque coronat. .  . 
Observe the appearance in sunlight of the plumage that 
rings the neck of a dove and crowns its nape . .  . 
[De rerum natura, II, 11. 799-802] 
Apuleius describes the doves that pull Venus's chariot in terms of the same 
stereotypic feature, "quattuor candidae columbae . . . picta colla tor­
quentes" ("Four white doves . . . bowed their rainbow-colored necks," 
Golden Ass 6, 6, Aldington-Gaselee trans., Loeb) that La Fontaine was 
to subsume in the expression "Au col changeant."7 As for the pigeon or 
dove as lovebird, not even the casual reader of La Fontaine will fail to 
summon up at the words "au coeur tendre et fidele" the corresponding 
verse that opens one of his best known fables: "Deux pigeons s'aimaient 
d'amour tendre" (IX, 2, 1). This association, once it has been made, is in 
itself sufficiently powerful to send us back to the beginning of Les Vau­
tours et les pigeons, specifically to the periphrastic description of those 
birds affected to the service of "la mere d'Amour" (1. 7). At all events, it 
is now possible to view the words vautours and pigeons, both in the title 
and in the body of the fable, as semiotic markers that point attention to 
the same antagonism which pits Mars against Venus, killers against lov­
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ers. This theme or scheme of irreconcilable alterity is instinct and in­
scribed, moreover, in the very word colombe, which, again according to 
the Thesaurus linguae latinae (s.v. Columba II A), is opposed, in a bevy 
of examples from across the range of Latin literature, to such "wild and 
rapacious birds" {opponitur avibus ferocibus et rapacibus) as eagles, 
kites, crows, and vultures.8 
When I originally suspected that the "Mars'V'Venus" opposition in 
Les Vautours et les pigeons might be read as a tautological variant of the 
Lucretian message—"That's the nature of things," "That's the way things 
are"—I did not know that the binary idea of the prologue to De rerum 
natura was itself tributary to a larger, even more ancient cosmological/ 
metaphysical vision. It was in Cyril Bailey's standard English edition and 
commentary (II, 1. 590), which I consulted out of a mixture of curiosity, 
ignorance and obstinacy, that I learned of the tendency in classical schol­
arship to view Lucretius's conjunction of Mars and Venus as the intertex­
tual excrescence of an Ur-text in Empedocles (ca. 493—ca. 433 B.C.), who 
had reduced the secrets of the universe and the nature of things to a series 
of dialectical encounters between Strife and Love (Neikos and Pbilotes). 
My fortuitous access to this bit of information proved useful in several 
unpredictable ways. To begin with, the emergence of the word "Strife"— 
not the idea, but the mere word—in polar conjunction with the word 
"Love," set me to wondering whether the Mars/Venus binary in Lucretius 
and La Fontaine were not simply continuous with the venerable discordia 
concors-concordia discors motif that had become so familiar to me as a 
reader of Montaigne.9 This question was sufficiently tantalizing to send 
me on a trip to the Oxford Latin Dictionary, where I was quickly and 
well rewarded for my pains, since I was able to recover there, under the 
entry Discors 2, the Horatian "rerum concordia discors," which when 
traced to its source reads thus: 
quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors, 
Empedocles an Stertinium deliret acumen? 
What is the meaning and effect of nature's jarring concord? 
Is it Empedocles or shrewd Stertinius that's talking nonsense? 
[Epist. I, 12,11. 19-20]1 0 
Re-enter through another door Empedocles and, fast on his heels, Lucre­
tius! I found some cause for satisfaction in the fact that the concordia 
discors topic had proven to be the missing link in an intertextual chain 
 153 La Fontaine, Les Vautours et les pigeons
that extended from Empedocles—at first a proper name on which I had 
stumbled, but eventually a conceptual fountainhead—to Lucretius, Hor­
ace, Montaigne, and La Fontaine, while passing on the way through a 
number of equally noteworthy intermediary stations in Lucan, Manilius, 
and Ovid.11 In short, I was encouraged to observe that, whatever its ulti­
mate utility in interpreting Les Vautours et les pigeons, the Mars/Venus 
collocation seemed to be branching out, taking on a life of its own, and, 
in the course of its peregrinations, generating an expanding nexus of tau­
tological examples. What Regnier had casually noted as a "source" was 
emerging as a prominent strand in an increasingly intricate intertextual 
web. 
Although I was not prepared to say whether La Fontaine knew any­
thing about Empedocles and pre-Socratic philosophy or, even, for that 
matter, whether he had any serious first-hand knowledge of Lucretius, I 
was convinced, as a matter of principle—even as an article of faith—that 
whatever he did have to say about the idea of cosmic, universal "Strife" 
would somehow have to crystallize around the French word discorde 
which, as I quickly ascertained through the concordance to his writings, 
he does in fact use. La Querelle des chiens et des chats, et celle des chats 
et des souris (XII, 8) opens with this series of declarations: 
La discorde a toujours regne dans l'univers. 
Notre monde en fournit mille exemples divers: 
Chez nous cette deesse a plus d'un tributaire. 
After this exordium there follows the body of the fable, which illustrates 
the permanence of Discord in human affairs, and, later on, the moral: 
J'en reviens a mon dire. On ne voit sous les cieux 
Nul animal, nul etre, aucune creature 
Qui n'ait son oppose: c'est la loi de nature. 
[11. 38-40] 
With the recovery of this passage, a third, major superimposition be­
comes possible: we need only look in isolation at the words "discorde" 
and "univers" (1. 1), "oppose" and "nature" (1. 40), to witness yet an­
other replication of the message shared by the Lucretian prologue and 
Les Vautours et les pigeons: Mars and Venus, by their mythological his­
tory and the accumulated presuppositions of their names, recapitulate a 
primal, conflictual dispensation, instinct in the Cosmos, which La Fon-
taine, in the wake of Lucretius and Empedocles, now compresses into the 
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single word "Discorde" as locus of an overarching principle that governs 
the relations between dogs and cats, cats and mice, vultures and pigeons, 
Love and War. This is the way of the world and the nature of things. 
"C'est la loi denature."12 
Now this latter formulation, which is exceptionally forthright and 
outspoken for the habitually understated La Fontaine, happens to figure 
elsewhere in the Fables; as Regnier points out in a note to line 40 of La 
Querelle des chiens et des chats, this very same hemistich appears earlier 
in the opening line of UAne et le chien (VIII, 17): "II se faut entr'aider; 
c'est la loi de nature . . ." In the context of this fable, La Fontaine's liminal 
maxim proves to be cruelly ironic in that, in practice, the reverse turns 
out to be true; it is the case here, with all the rigor of natural law, that no 
one helps anyone except with stale, platitudinous, indifferent advice. In 
Les Vautours et les pigeons, to which I now revert by way of the word 
"s'entr'aider"—a verb that aptly describes the doves' treatment of the 
vultures—altruism is in fact depicted as destructive and suicidal. It is as 
if it were also written into the scheme of things that the attempt to "s'en-
tr'aider," to eliminate conflict and harmonize dissonance—"accorder une 
telle querelle" (1. 29), "accomoder un peuple si sauvage" (1. 40)—as if 
the effort to unravel the concordia discors, to reconcile Mars and Venus, 
were to violate the order of nature and to unleash disaster. 
In further illustration of this pattern, I would now like to offer a last 
example, which, just like all the others, came my way in a completely 
fortuitous manner. Very late in my reading, just to see whether I might 
not have overlooked other significant parallels, I checked in the Littre 
under the word Colombe, and this is what I found as the first entry: 
Pigeon, en style eleve. Le Saint-Esprit descend sous la figure d'une co­
lombe. Notre-Seigneur a dit: "Soyez prudents comme les serpents et 
simples comme les colombes." 
Since the dove/serpent binary was new to me, I naturally wanted to doc­
ument it further. More particularly, I was curious to know whether this 
opposition was current in La Fontaine's day, and soon learned from Fure­
tiere (s.v. Colombe) that it was: 
Femelle de pigeon. Le St. Esprit apparut en forme de colombe sur la tete 
du Sauveur, quand il fut baptise par St. Jean. 11 faut avoir la prudence du 
serpent, et la simplicite de la colombe. . . 
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I was struck here by two things: 1) the dove is identified as female of the 
species, and credited with spiritual and moral qualities (simplicity and its 
presuppositions) that are presumably less prominent in the male;13 2) the 
words of Jesus (which originate in Matthew X, 16) are cited by Furetiere, 
without indication of origin, as proverbial.14 
And when we return this saying to its source in Scripture, another 
series of intertextual connections and superimpositions begins to come 
into view: 
Ecce ego mitto vos sicut oves in medio luporwn. Estote ergo prudentes 
sicut serpentes et simplices sicut colwnbae. 
Voici: je vous envoie comme des brebis au milieu des loups. Soyez done 
prudents comme les serpents, et simples comme les colombes. [Segond 
trans., rev.] 
With the emergence of the dove/serpent and lamb/wolf variants of the 
original pigeon/vulture and Venus/Mars binaries, we can add to our list, 
now mediated in a familiar biblical code, yet another pair of tautological 
reductions of a recurrent and constant message. Matthew is telling his 
readers, as Jesus was telling his disciples, that the world and humanity 
are split down the middle, in internecine hostility, by a principle of dis­
cord and a force of moral disjunction that was built into the original 
Creation in the person of the serpent, who, we may now recall, was intro­
duced to the reader of Genesis (III, 1)—Matthew's intertext in the present 
instance—as cunning and clever, callidior cunctis animantibus.15 Doves 
are to serpents, as saints are to sinners, as angels are to devils, as lambs 
are to wolves. And, of course, the practised reader of La Fontaine can 
hardly write these words, or even begin to think these thoughts, without 
embarking on yet another intertextual journey, without effecting yet an­
other re-entry into the binary universe of the Fables, ruled by La Dis­
corde, where Les Loups et les brebis (III, 1. 13) and Le Loup et Vagneau 
(I, 10) had earlier and variously rehearsed the ritual encounter between 
crafty predator and innocent victim—the very same ritual that was to be 
duly re-enacted in Les Vautours et les pigeons.16 
The wheel has come full circle and I am back once again at my starting 
point, where I will indulge in one last observation, which derives and 
takes its substance, in turn, from La Fontaine's last observation in Les 
Vautours et les pigeons, just prior to his pronouncement of the moralite. 
Here are the words with which his fable proper ends: 
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La gent maudite aussitot poursuivit 
Tous les pigeons, en fit ample carnage, 
En depeupla les bourgades, les champs. 
Peu de prudence eurent les pauvres gens 
D'accommoder un peuple si sauvage. 
[11. 36-40] 
Here, at the word "prudence," Les Vautours et les pigeons coincides with 
Matthew X, 16, and relays the proverbial wisdom recorded in Furetiere; 
in so doing, it redeploys the reader's attention back down the intertextual 
chain to the fable's beginning and its subsequent reverberations. All roads 
lead to Rome. 
As for La Fontaine's moralite itself, it recapitulates in its fashion, but 
in no uncertain terms, the extensive and expansive intertextual message 
of the entire fable: division, discord, difference are built into the world 
order; any attempt, however well intentioned, to correct or alter this dis­
pensation will go down as an assault on the essential, radical alterity of 
life and the human condition. Why so? Because the innocent are not pru­
dent, because the prudent are not innocent. De deux choses I'une. One is 
wolf or lamb, vulture or pigeon, Mars or Venus. This, after all, is the real 
motivation behind the seemingly superficial, frivolous anthropomorph­
ism that informs such routine political and topographical periphrases as 
"le peuple vautour," "le peuple pigeon," "une autre nation, and "la gent 
maudite." The weak and the strong, the lovers and the killers of this 
world, are consigned by nature—c'est la hi de nature—to irrevocable 
difference, to be lived out extraterritorially in perpetual estrangement and 
alienation. This is the nature of things. If in the opening to this fable, we 
were allowed to entertain ever so briefly the intertextual image of Venus 
and Mars lying together in peaceful, exhausted exhilaration in illustra­
tion of the implicit maxim omnia vincit amor, by the time we reach La 
Fontaine's moralite this message has been turned upside down: 
Tenez toujours divises les mediants: 
La surete du reste de la terre 
Depend de la. Semez entre eux la guerre, 
Ou vous n'aurez avec eux nulle paix. 
Ceci soit dit en passant: je me tais. 
The fable that lies in between the original evocation of Venus and Mars 
and this negative and cynical conclusion, the space covered by the story 
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of columbine altruism and its lethal effects, illustrates, if anything, an­
other unstated maxim which, in parody of the Lucretian hope, might be 
rewritten thus: omnia vincunt amor em. 
Northrop Frye, writing in another connection, recalls the following 
remark by the 16th-century Anabaptist Hans Denck: "Whoever leaves 
an antithesis without resolving it lacks the ground of truth." Frye follows 
this fascinating quotation with this equally fascinating comment: "Brave 
words, but they are the words of a theologian who must put all things 
under his feet."17 It is not hard to see what position La Fontaine would 
take on this question. As a moraliste, with no melioristic expectation, he 
has chosen to tread a privileged and perilous piece of ground where the 
twain never meet, where contradictions elude simplification, where com­
plexity transcends reduction, where unresolved antitheses are multiplied 
and revisited in infinitely renewable, interchangeable variants. This state­
ment would be true enough as a mere intratextual catalog and description 
of the dramatis personae of the Fables, where reed and oak, fox and crow 
are squared off dialectically against each other, where lamb and wolf, 
pigeon and vulture are yoked together in exemplary prolegomena to 
violence. 
It has been the purpose of this essay to suggest and, with hope, to 
demonstrate and persuade how the divisions and tensions that are so 
obviously present intratextually in La Fontaine's Fables, have an intertex­
tual dimension as well—a dimension that far outstrips in importance the 
superficial affiliations between La Fontaine, Aesop, Phaedrus, Abstemius, 
and the other earlier fabulists. Given the inherent slightness of the fable 
as a vehicle, its lowly place in the generic hierarchy, and the irresistible 
tendency to think of it in terms of infantile pedagogy or overt didacticism, 
we are always in danger of reading La Fontaine down from his proper 
philosophical and intellectual eminence, when we study him within what 
seems to be his natural milieu. Or to put it in another way: when we view 
La Fontaine intratextually, we see with utmost clarity how consistent and 
coherent his ideas are as we move horizontally across his book from fable 
to fable, and sample the varied riches of their content. It is, however, an 
indispensable complement to this approach to La Fontaine tel qu'en lui­
meme to measure the status and impact of his message vertically and 
intertextually, by tracking it diachronically along a continuum that 
stretches from remote antiquity to the most impressive modern appro­
priations of classical culture. It is only along this axis that we can begin 
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to appreciate the true sophistication and toughness of La Fontaine's 
world view, as we watch it overlap and localize under a common grid and 
in a shared network with Empedocles and Lucretius, Horace and Ovid, 
Jesus and Montaigne—his true predecessors and his most appropriate 
intellectual and spiritual partners. 
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Generic Modulation in Consolations 
by Malherbe, Tristan l'Hermite, and 
Theophile de Viau 
Robert T. Corum, Jr. 
The concept of genre has been a fundamental means of literary classifi­
cation for many centuries, yet critics have invariably complained that the 
study of genre theory is deficient. Northrop Frye, for example, laments 
that literary criticism lacks precise terminology for many kinds of works 
and that three general labels of drama, epic, and lyric are inadequate to 
distinguish among an enormous diversity of poetic types.1 On the other 
hand, one may argue that the indiscriminate extension of generic cate­
gories is neither feasible nor desirable. In such an enterprise the critic 
would have to consider a myriad of artistic features before granting a 
label to a particular text. Which factors to weigh—subject matter, struc­
ture, tone, mode of presentation, intended emotional effect, cultural atti-
tudes—as well as relative weighting of each, pose added difficulties to the 
dogged critic who persists in categorizing literature. That the concept of 
genre encompasses so many qualities explains the proliferation of labels 
used in delimiting literary sets and subsets. 
Despite taxonomic imprecision, genre provides the reader a ready 
means of orientation. Indeed, a genre functions as "a code of behavior 
. . . between the author and his reader," who may be drawn into the 
"proper" mode of experiencing the text.2 In other words, the genre cre­
ates a set of expectations and, consequently, particular responses in the 
reader. The generic "fix" becomes in this light another means by which 
the author manipulates his reader and conveys meaning: certain interpre­
tative possibilities may be eliminated or remain unconceived because of 
generic assumptions made by the reader.3 Inasmuch as the author may 
narrow interpretative possibilities by focusing upon a specific genre, the 
poet, by mixing his generic signals, may disrupt the reader's expectations 
and thereby create new meanings.4 
The Soviet structuralists have provided a useful vocabulary for the 
critic interested in describing the phenomenon of mixed genres. This 
method is based upon the Russian formalists' notion of hierarchical levels 
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forming an interdependent system which possesses informational content 
inherent to its structures. A network of oppositions within and between 
these textual strata creates tension within the reader and tends to disrupt 
the automatism of his perception. Disruption of automatic responses is 
proper to the poetic text; nonartistic languages depend upon perceptual 
automatism.5 
The Soviet critic Yury Lotman has suggested an important extension 
of the concept of levels. For Lotman the textual-strata concept extends to 
the reader insofar as he interprets the poem in the light of his own cultur­
ally determined system of knowledge, experience, and expectations. The 
process gives rise to what Lotman calls the "alien word" in the poetic 
text. Accompanying the tension in and among various levels and the re­
sultant deautomatization of the reading, the alien word comes into play 
when the reader's expectations are disrupted by the introduction, in a 
particular level, of a mode incongruous with the dominant mode of that 
level.6 A poem by Saint-Amant may serve to illustrate this device. In his 
well-known sonnet "L'Hiver des Alpes," the second word, "atomes" 
("Ces atomes de feu qui sur la neige brillent"),7 evokes the scientific-
philosophic domain of such ancient thinkers as Democritus, Epicurus, 
and Lucretius. This circumstance constitutes a clear departure from the 
dominant topographical-descriptive code of this lyric poem. Although 
"atomes" is proper to an "alien" code, it integrates into the rest of the 
piece and actualizes a possible interpretation, namely, that the work pro­
vides a playful "scientific" explanation for the absence of thunder during 
the winter months. The alien word has implications which bear directly 
on fixed generic categories and their disruption. While generic expecta­
tions draw the reader into the "proper" mode of experiencing a text, the 
alien word forces him to abandon one code and to invoke a new system 
based upon his cultural and personal resources. 
Recent criticism of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century French poetry 
has revealed a general tendency to redefine inherited systems.8 This spirit 
of innovation strove to "deautomatize" the reader's reactions, to create 
"new" works derived from older schematisms, and, perhaps, to create a 
new audience capable of assimilating these artistic innovations. Utilizing 
the basic concepts of deautomatization and alien word, I will examine a 
genre common in the period, the consolation, in order to test this 
assumption. 
Derived principally from the Senecan model found in the Epistulae 
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Morales, LXHI and XCIX, this poetry of bereavement forms a group of 
works which share similar themes and generic norms. Close reading of 
Seneca reveals the major themes of this genre: grief is an indulgence too 
often abused; one must mourn sparingly; death is part of life; we are all 
subject to death's rigors; one must resign oneself to its inevitability. In 
keeping with the somber subject, the standard consolation presents re­
curring images of destiny and death, often personified, with attendant 
images of transience and separation. The speaker poses as an affectionate 
but strong-willed and logical friend whose tone of moral exhortation is 
intended to jolt the addressee out of his self-pitying malaise. The speaker 
is careful, however, not to scorn the bereaved or to belittle the dead. 
Often the speaker alludes explicitly to grief-stricken mythological or his­
torical figures as noble examples or to dead heroes as a means to empha­
size death's inevitability. 
The best-known consolation in seventeenth-century poetry is Mal-
herbe's "Consolation a Monsieur du Perier, Gentilhomme d'Aix en Pro­
vence, sur la mort de sa fille."9 In this poem Malherbe follows closely the 
Senecan themes: his emphasis on God's will and design in the poem's 
conclusion corresponds to the Roman's frequent recourse to destiny and 
fate. The piece also contains an abundance of mythological and historical 
allusions, frequent images of death and flux, and personified nature sym­
bolizing death's inevitability. From a generic perspective this poem uti­
lizes a single code. Based upon knowledge of Malherbe's model and upon 
other contemporary consolations, the reader's generic expectations are 
not frustrated. 
Malherbe remains within the boundaries imposed on the genre in his 
other consolations.10 An exception is "Consolation a Caritee, sur la mort 
de son mary" (Oeuvres, I: 155). Adumbrated in the poem's second 
stanza, ("O tropfidelle Caritee:" v. 15, my emphasis), an alien code com­
peting with the standard consolation linguistic system belongs to the pop­
ular carpe diem mode.11 This circumstance, however, is not uncommon 
in consolations addressed to young widows, and would not lead the 
reader to make an incorrect generic guess in a first reading of the poem. 
The speaker refers to the grieving lady's "beaux cheveux" (v. 43), her 
"vive couleur" (v. 52), and that "vous semblez entreprendre / De miner 
vostre beaute" (vv. 41-42). Presented as a means to convince Caritee that 
the living must turn away from life-consuming grief, the carpe diem mo­
tifs yield to the sober admonition in the poem's concluding stanza: 
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Le temps d'un insensible cours 
Nous porte a la fin de nos jours: 
C'est a nostre sage conduite, 
Sans murmurer de ce defaut, 
De nous consoler de sa fuite 
En le mesnageant comme il faut. 
[vv. 73-78] 
The speaker's appeal to reason characteristic of Malherbe's other conso­
lation poems reasserts the generic confines of this piece. 
The limited intermingling of two generic codes in the 1598 poem 
emerges as a systematic interaction in a number of consolations by Tris­
tan PHermite written in the 1630s and 40s. In his "Consolation a son 
cher amy xxxx," the familiar Senecan commonplaces on the vanity of 
grief are underlined by the speaker's trenchant imperatives in the first two 
stanzas: 
ACASTE, c'est asses pleurer; 
Ta douleur est trop obstinee; 
Cesse enfin de plus murmurer 
Contre la Destinee, 
Etfinissant un si grand dueil, 
Laisse les morts dans le cercueil. 
Je sc.ay bien que ton pere avoit 
Tant de vertus & tant de charmes, 
Que ta piete luy devoit 
Un deluge de larmes. 
Mais quoy? tes pleurs moiiillent ses os. 
Et tes crys troublent son repos.12 
This tone of moral exhortation reminiscent of Malherbe's "Consolation 
a M. du Perier"13 leads to another stock device, explicit comparison be­
tween the addressee and a historical or mythological character, in this 
case Aeneas on the death of his father Anchises. Just as the mythical hero 
conquered his profound sorrow and proceeded to fulfill his noble destiny, 
so must the addressee set aside grief. This brief allusion (vv. 13-2.4) to 
Aeneas and his ultimate achievement ("II chercha PEmpire Latin / Que 
luy promettoit le Destin," vv. 2.^-24), unveils to the cultured reader a 
vast literary backdrop. Immediately subsequent to the death of Anchises 
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in Virgil's epic is the famous Dido episode, in which love serves to miti­
gate Aeneas's pain over his father's death.14 The concluding stanza sug­
gests a parallel course: 
Pense done a te consoler, 
Et venir presenter ton ame 
A cet astre qui sc,ait brusler 
D'une divine flamme: 
Et qui promit l'autre jour 
D'estre sensible a ton amour. 
A second "Dido" has materialized, offering love and consolation to a 
young man lost in grief. In this poem Tristan has grafted onto the conven­
tional consolation the well-known carpe diem motif. Although the tem­
pus fugit topos naturally provides a common ground between the two 
genres, and indeed is implied in the consolation itself, Tristan's use of 
allusive comparison based on yet another genre, the epic, assures smooth 
transition from one mode to the other. The repetition of an adjective basic 
to the code of love lyrics ("beaux jours de ta vie," v. 28; "Ce que ton age 
a de plus beau," v. 30; "Le Sort Tyran des belles choses," v. 32) confirms 
this generic interpolation. As in Malherbe's "Consolation a Caritee," an 
"alien" linguistic system disrupts the reader's expectations, forcing a shift 
in generic orientation. Unlike Malherbe's poem, however, this piece does 
not revert to the conventional consolation's ultimate call to reason over 
emotion; the work's last word, "amour," verifies that emotion and desire 
can assuage the pangs of loss. 
Due, perhaps, to the exalted social position of its subject, another con­
solation taken from La Lyre makes abundant use of the amorous code 
without passing overtly to the carpe diem mode. In "Consolation a Ma­
dame la Princesse Marie sur le trepas de feu Madame la Duchesse de 
Longueville sa tante," the opening lines recall themes common to innu­
merable carpe diem love lyrics:15 
Le Sort dont la rigueur contraire aux belles choses 
Ternist si tost les roses: 
Pour les plus beaux Objets a le plus de couroux. 
Et e'est la raison seule, 6 charmante MARIE! 
De cette barbarie 
Que sa jalouse humeur exerce contre Vous. 
[vv. 1-6] 
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The speaker continues to praise and pity the desolate princess in the three 
subsequent stanzas and, after a perfunctory panegyric to the dead aunt 
("Ce miroir de Vertu qui n'eut point de pareil:" v. 27), he resorts to the 
standard moral admonishment: 
Apres avoir paye dessus sa sepulture 
Les droits de la Nature 
A quoy vos sentimens se trouvent obligez: 
Ne croyez pas tousjours en r'ouvrant vos blessures 
Rejetter les censures 
Que la raison veut faire a vos sens affligez. 
[vv. 37-42] 
The poem's final lines, however, revert to the lyric love code introduced 
in the opening stanza: 
Et Ton espere encor, que vos beautez divines 
Franchissant des Espines, 
Meriteront enfin de marcher sur des Fleurs. 
[vv. 46—48] 
Marie's "beautez divines" and her close association with flowers suggest 
a covert comparison with Venus—in Roman mythology goddess of gar­
dens as well as love. In this work the evocation of a poetic mode alien to 
the standard poem of bereavement obliquely suggests to the addressee 
that the pleasures of love may divert grief. Whereas in "Consolation a 
son cher amy xxxx" the speaker refers explicitly to the potential of love, 
here the speaker relies on the cultural apparatus of the reader to provide 
additional meanings. 
In these poems the speaker combines disparate genres, yet in each case 
the poem does not actually acquire all the features of the conventional 
carpe diem. The speaker, for a variety of reasons, does not offer his affec­
tions to the grieving addressee. This audacious, indeed irreverent, device 
diverges widely from the Senecan model, yet it is a logical step, given the 
nature of the two genres and their modulation observed here. Tristan's 
best-known consolation, "Consolation a Idalie, sur la mort d'un parent," 
opens on a familiar note.16 The deceased, although possessed of won­
drous merit, has met the fate reserved for all mortals: 
Puisque votre parent ne s'est pu dispenser 
De servir de victime de la guerre, 
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C'est, 6 belle Idalie, une erreur de penser 
Que les plus beaux lauriers soient exempts du tonnerre. 
Si la mort connaissait le prix de la valeur 
Ou se laissait surprendre aux plus aimables charmes, 
Sans doute qu'Etios, garanti du malheur, 
En conservant sa vie eut epargne vos larmes. 
[vv. 1-8] 
Despite the speaker's guise as moral counselor, the adjective "belle Idalie" 
immediately delineates the addressee and sets the tack of the poem. The 
same adjective applied to the unfortunate Etios ("les plus beaux lau­
riers") suggests an analogy between Idalie and Etios based on their 
shared mortality: she is also subject to death. The speaker affirms the 
physical attraction of Idalie in v. 6; her "aimables charmes" are power­
less to stay the hand of fate, just as the "valeur" (v. 5) of Etios had no 
effect. The speaker's pose as preceptor continues in the fourth stanza, in 
which the deaths of ancient heroes corroborate his teachings:17 
Alexandre n'est plus, lui dont Mars fut jaloux, 
Cesar est dans la tombe aussi bien qu'un infame, 
Et la noble Camille, aimable comme vous, 
Est au fond d'un cercueil ainsi qu'une autre femme. 
[vv. 13—16] 
Analogy remains the prime device in these lines. Alexandre and Caesar 
are to Etios as Camille is to Idalie. The speaker's repetition of the adjec­
tive "aimable" and his direct comparison in v. 15 intensify his rhetorical 
attack. The addressee should not fail to grasp his designs. The last three 
words, "une autre femme," initiate an associative transition to the fol­
lowing stanza, which sets aside considerations of Etios to focus solely on 
Idalie. This shift accompanies a distinct generic reorientation; the carpe 
diem emerges to displace the standard consolation mode: 
Bien que vous meritiez des devoirs si constants, 
Et que vous paraissiez si charmante et si sage, 
On ne vous verra plus avant qu'il soit cent ans, 
Si ce n'est dans mes vers, qui vivront davantage. 
[vv. 17-20] 
Despite the distressing impermanence of Idalie's earthly existence, the 
speaker offers immortality based on the eternal merit of his poetic art. 
This device recalls, of course, many sixteenth-century carpe diem love 
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sonnets intended to persuade the reluctant lady to accept the speaker's 
advances.18 Her acquiescence rewards the speaker's pains, while he in 
turn repays the lady by conferring figurative immortality upon her. Hav­
ing abandoned the conventional consolation at this point in the poem, 
the speaker returns in the following stanzas to the dreadful fact of death's 
omnipotence while concomitantly insisting on Idalie's divine perfection: 
Par un ordre eternel qu'on voit en l'univers 
Les plus dignes objets sont freles comme verre, 
Et le ciel, embelli de tant d'astres divers, 
Derobe tous les jours des astres a la terre. 
[vv. 21—24] 
The last stanzas conclude the speaker's argumentation: 
Des que nous commenc.ons a raisonner un peu, 
En l'avril de nos ans, en Page le plus tendre 
Nous rencontrons l'amour qui met nos coeurs en feu 
Puis nous trouvons la mort qui met nos corps en cendre. 
Le temps qui, sans repos, va d'un pas si leger, 
Emporte avec lui toutes les belles choses: 
C'est pour nous avertir de le bien menager, 
Et faire des bouquets en la saison des roses. 
[vv. 25-3 2] 
The parallelism in vv. 27-28 telescopes the carpe diem themes expressed 
here. Although the repetition of the key adjective "aimable" in earlier 
lines signaled the poem's orientation, the crucial word "amour" in v. 
27—in a rhythmic position identical to "mort" in v. 28—prescribes un­
mistakably both a remedy for Idalie's grief and, in a larger sense, a means 
of softening the harsh truth of death's inevitability. In this light, Tristan's 
poem remains a kind of "consolation." The speaker's role as wooer, al­
ready evoked in vv. 19-2 0 by the theme of eternal life through art remi­
niscent of the carpe diem mode, becomes more manifest in the last stanza. 
Tempus fugit, imperceptibly, perhaps, but all that is lovely (especially 
youthful, passionate desire, v. 27), must and will be swept away. While 
in the preceding stanza the first-person plurals point to humankind, the 
ambiguous "nous" in v. 31 may be taken as including only the speaker 
and addressee, typical usage in a standard carpe diem piece.19 The last 
lines express clearly the speaker's desire to gather rosebuds while he (and 
Idalie) may. The "bouquets" and "roses" project the reader to a body of 
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poetry whose linguistic system is far removed from that of the traditional 
consolation. The moral tone of the poem's opening has yielded to an 
invitation to pluck the roses of youth and love. The sexual connotations 
of "bouquets" and "roses" in the code of galant poetry need hardly be 
emphasized.20 By gradually shifting generic codes, Tristan's poem of con­
solation in bereavement has become a poeme atnoureux. The speaker's 
subtle proposition to Idalie to enjoy the fruits of desire with him trans­
forms his role from moral preceptor to passionate lover. 
The moral stance of the speaker in a traditional Senecan consolatio 
such as Malherbe's "Consolation a M. du Perier" can be subverted by 
devices other than the gradual infiltration of carpe diem motifs. A curious 
piece by Theophile de Viau, "A Monsieur de L., sur la mort de son pere," 
presents another example of generic modulation.21 Whereas the title of 
the poem appears to set the poetic mode, the opening stanza upsets the 
reader's expectations: 
Oste-toy, laisse-moy resver: 
Je sens un feu se souslever 
Dont mon Ame est toute embrasee, 
O beaux pres, beaux rivages verds, 
O grand flambeau de l'Univers 
Que je trouve ma veine aisee! 
Belle Aurore, douce Rosee, 
Que vous m'allez donner de vers! 
The speaker's brusque imperatives are obvious alien forms, immediately 
striking a note foreign to the firm yet gentle tone with which a consola­
tion normally begins. Indeed, this first line nullifies the most basic condi­
tion of any consolation, namely, intimate communication between 
consoler and bereaved. Here the addressee must withdraw so that com­
munication of another sort—between speaker and nature—can be initi­
ated. Although nature is not absent in the standard consolation, the 
speaker's desire for solitude, his observation of and praise for natural 
beauty as source of inspiration set the reader on another generic tack, 
that of the typical solitude. Imitating a poetic mode transmitted from 
antiquity, the traditional solitude presents the speaker seeking a balm for 
the pangs of an unrequited love far from other human beings within a 
pastoral locus amoenus.11 Contemporary poets created variations of the 
inherited model; compare for example Saint-Amant's "La Solitude," Tris­
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tan's "La Mer" and "Le Promenoir des deux amants," and Theophile's 
own "La Solitude." 
The subsequent two stanzas of this "consolation" bear motifs belong­
ing to the solitude code: 
Le vent qui s'enfuit dans les ormeaux 
Et pressant les fueillus rameaux 
Abat le reste de la nue, 
Iris a perdu ses couleurs, 
L'air n'a plus d'ombre, ny de pleurs, 
La Bergere aux champs revenue 
Moiiillant sa jambe toute nue 
Foulle les herbes et les fleurs. 
Ces longues pluyes dont l'hyver 
Empeschoit Tircis d'arriver 
Ne seront plus continuees, 
L'orage ne fait plus de bruit, 
La clarte dissipe la nuit, 
Ses noirceurs sont diminuees, 
Le vent emporte les nuees 
Et voila le Soleil qui luit. 
[vv. 9-24] 
The air of optimism following a violent storm evokes a return to mental 
equilibrium after a period of profound emotional storm and stress. The 
winter's "longues pluyes" (v. 17) which had prevented the addressee, Tir­
cis, from "arriving" reinforce this interpretation. The poem thus turns 
obliquely to the subject of consolation by reference to natural events. The 
"Soleil qui luit" (v. 24) signals a new beginning, recovery from past grief, 
and a bright future.23 The conventional motifs of the solitude—nature's 
beauty and effervescence, inspiration in solitary meditation, pastoral sen­
suality (vv. 14-16)—are here utilized to introduce a decidedly unconven­
tional consolation. 
The sun's brilliance described at the close of the third stanza leads to 
an abrupt change of subject in the following stanza, where a dialectical 
shift initiates an extended meditation on nature's apparent counterpart, 
death: 
Mon Dieu que le Soleil est beau! 
Que les froides nuicts du tombeau 
Font d'outrages a la nature! 
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La mort, grosse de desplaisirs, 
De tenebres et de souspirs, 
D'os, de vers, et de pourriture, 
Estouffe dans la sepulture 
Et nos forces, et nos desirs. 
[vv. 25-32] 
Contemporary solitudes often treated the hideousness of death. The in­
tervention of the sinister and the horrific thus maintains the solitude-like 
aura of the poem while simultaneously focusing on a subject closely 
linked to the consolation. These lines serve as transition to a series of 
stanzas which develop death-related themes familiar to standard conso­
lations: death is all-powerful; no one is immune to its rigors; Tircis, too, 
will meet death; his dead father, unaware of his son's grief, has passed on 
to inexorable oblivion. Moving from mortal mankind's irrevocable fate 
("Les Mores et les Africains," v. 34; "Cesar comme le bucheron," /. 37; 
"Vostre pere est ensevely," v. 49; "II est aussi mort qu'Alexandre," v. 55), 
the speaker magnifies his funereal vision in the last five stanzas to depict 
the ultimate dissolution of all creation. Although not a feature of the 
traditional solitude, this grandiose contemplation of Apocalypse recalls 
another famous solitude, Saint-Amant's "Le Contemplateur," which in 
turn shares elements with the contemporary devotional lyric.24 Theo-
phile's poem emerges as a curious hybrid incorporating no less than three 
well-known lyric genres, the solitude, the religious meditation, and the 
consolation. 
The Pleiade's Aristotelian dictum against mixed genres did not prevent 
the formation of subgenres derived from pre-existing models, yet the very 
creation of a genre system produced readers and writers who, in effect, 
knew what was expected in a given text.25 Such a system, however, invites 
subversion by poets desiring to break away from the Tradition. Yury Lot-
man sees this phenomenon as a means of increasing the text's informa­
tional potentialities: 
An important means for the informational activization of a structure 
is its violation. An artistic text does not merely represent the implemen­
tation of structural norms, but their violation as well. It functions in a 
dual structural field consisting of the tendency to establish order and to 
violate it. Although each tendency tries to dominate and destroy the op­
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posing one, the victory of either would prove to be fatal to art. The life of 
an artistic text depends on their mutual tension.26 
Lotman also relates the degree of violation to a text's aesthetic value: 
Thus, performing the function of "good poems" in a cultural system is 
the prerogative of only those texts which are highly informative for that 
culture. This implies a conflict with the reader's expectation, tension, 
struggle, and in the final reckoning, forces the reader to accept an artistic 
system that is more meaningful than his usual one. But in convincing the 
reader, the writer takes upon himself the obligation to go further. The 
conquered novelty is converted into cliche and loses its informativeness. 
Novelty is not always in the invention of the new. Novelty has a meaning­
ful relationship to tradition in being simultaneously the resurrection of its 
memory and non-coincidental with it.27 
The quest for innovation in a poetic generation striving to liberate itself 
from the Pleiade doubtlessly prompted the generic "instability" exam­
ined here. We see in these poems the capacity of genres to be tinted by the 
introduction of extrinsic—alien—modes. Although Malherbe's appeals 
to reason, Tristan's to love as well as lust, and Theophile's to both reason 
and emotion appear quite different, the speaker's rhetorical end remains 
the same: to console the grieving addressee. 
Within the limited consolation genre, Malherbe proves to be the most 
conservative. Tristan and Theophile reveal themselves as artists no less 
bound to their literary antecedents. They exhibit, nonetheless, a greater 
willingness for aesthetic experimentation. While it must be said that the 
reader's knowledge of generic norms is crucial in deciphering a poetic 
text, the author's expectations must also be considered. Tristan and Theo­
phile viewed their generic inheritance as a long-standing tradition ripe 
for subversion. The eminently serious—even religious—consolation be­
comes in their hands a poetic type subject to transformation. These 
poems are statements of professional conviction made by writers who 
wished to assert their own places in literary history. 
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Camera Obscura: Image and Imagination in 
Descartes's Meditations 
John D. Lyons 
For the late Renaissance and early modern period, a major tension exists 
between what can be seen and what can be said. Seeing and saying are 
acts that tend to go their own separate ways, as different and scarcely 
compatible instruments for representing the world. Foucault and others 
have given us various descriptions of this parting of the ways for a culture 
that no longer saw the world as a text. But the divorce between seeing 
and saying was a painful and embarrassed one, all the more so because 
the art of seeing, refined into artificial perspective, was in some ways the 
guiding discipline of this revolution in knowledge. Not even Rene Des­
cartes, master though he was in the art of renunciation and doubt, could 
sacrifice the concept of vision without a struggle. I would like to explore 
briefly some of the problems that Descartes encountered when he 
adopted, as criteria for truthfulness, terms that belong chiefly to the vi­
sual arts. Although Descartes did find ways to move from seeing to say-
ing—or, in other words, from visual to verbal models of truth—he had 
to travel a path marked with images of monsters and ghosts. 
When Descartes tells the story of his discovery of the principles of his 
method during a stay in Germany, he places an unaccustomed emphasis 
on the physical surroundings of his cogitations. There, he tells us, "n'ay-
ant d'ailleurs, par bonheur, aucuns soins ni passions qui me troublassent, 
je demeurais tout le jour enferme seul dans un poele . . . "1. This retreat 
from distraction and external stimulus is representative of the Cartesian 
project of discovering knowledge within the mind alone. Descartes's 
heated room can be a useful landmark for students of the rhetoric and 
history of philosophy. 
In the Discours de la methode, Descartes tells us his room was warm. 
In the Meditations he tells us that it was dark and quiet, filling completely 
his needs for the exclusion of all that was not himself. A dark room is a 
particularly apt place for Descartes to set the scene for his investigation 
into first philosophy because it is against this darkness that qualities of 
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truth can shine forth in the figurative terms that Descartes uses. For him, 
true ideas are clear and distinct ideas. By proclaiming the qualities of 
clarity and distinctness as the criteria of truthfulness, Descartes took for 
philosophical reflection terms more often associated with the description 
of images, in particular of painted images. This move incorporated into 
the procedures of his research in first philosophy a problematic trope 
borrowed from a field which was also the object of his scientific research. 
In the history of optics, Descartes enjoys a place of importance along with 
his contemporaries Snell, Fermat, and Grimaldi. His mathematical state­
ment of refraction furthered the study of light that was later advanced by 
Newton and Huygens. But Descartes's study of natural light (light from 
the outside, material world) is less central to his work in general than the 
antithetical concept of lumiere naturelle, the light of reason, or inner 
light.2 
This appropriation of optical terms in their figurative sense reveals a 
number of very fragile constructions in the Cartesian system, which can 
be thought of globally as one in which the subject flees external stimuli 
in a radical attempt not only to doubt, but also to exclude, all that is not 
the "I" of the subject.3 Philosophy is described metaphorically in the 
Principia as superior to sight: "le plaisir de voir toutes les choses que 
notre vue decouvre n'est point comparable a la satisfaction que donne la 
connaissance de celles qu'on trouve par la philosophic" (p. 558). The 
philosopher's eyes seem to be opened to a different sight, one which has 
nothing to do with notre vue in the usual sense. Sense perception is dep­
recated, and with it sight. Philosophy becomes the discipline of sight in 
the sense of the disciplining, that is, the repression, of sight. Yet the 
repression of literal sight permits the formulation of the metaphoric sight 
which is opened within. We are all familiar with the Cartesian gesture of 
retreat into an isolated and enclosed space. Yet in that space (for example, 
the heated room of the Discours de la methode) the outside world ap­
pears as image, posing the further challenge of mentally judging the clar­
ity and distinctness of all ideas that are presented as images to the faculty 
of judgment. 
In this attempt to reduce stimuli, distractions, and uncertainty, while 
maintaining clarity and distinctness as the marks of truth, Descartes 
seems to install within the mind a replica of the external, doubtful world. 
The cause of that replica becomes a question of ever greater significance, 
for outside the immediate apprehension of the cogito, the genesis of ideas 
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is paramount. Which ideas are illusions and which are not? What is the 
role of the mind (esprit) in the production of ideas? If an idea appears 
clearly and distinctly must not the cause of that idea be an existing thing 
outside the mind? Because clarity and distinctness are terms used in the 
study of optics and in the application of such optical devices as the cam­
era obscura to drawing and painting, it is not surprising to see that Des­
cartes turns to the description of painted images to help recognize and 
circumscribe sources of error and distortion.4 The purpose of the camera 
obscura, which Descartes describes in La Dioptrique (e.g., V: 214-15), 
is to project inside a chamber an inverted image of something that is 
outside. The distinctness of the internal image, as Descartes notes, is in­
creased by decreasing the size of the hole in the side of the chamber. The 
camera obscura is useful because of its combination of receptiveness and 
restriction. Distinctness is proportional to the restriction of light from the 
outside. On the other hand, the movement outward from the sure foun­
dation of metaphysical knowledge in the discovery of the essential and 
purely spiritual subject, the ego or "I," conflicts with an optically based 
model requiring the movement inward of light from outside the subject. 
The faculty governing this inward replica is the imagination. To under­
stand the role of imagination, a faculty which Descartes alternately in­
vests with a decisive importance and even describes as necessary for 
judgment or entendement to occur and, on the other hand, castigates as 
a major source of error, we must recognize that for Descartes everything 
that can be known, including everything that can be known about the 
self, must pass through the test of representation. By the test of represen­
tation, I refer to that process by which the idea to be judged is brought to 
mind or perceived. Perception includes imagination and conception 
(Principes, §32, p. 585). Imagination is the act of representing something 
to the mind in a way that resembles the stimuli of the senses, most often 
the sense of sight. The act of conceiving consists of perceiving (that is, 
representing to the understanding) what cannot be represented in any 
form resembling sensory data. Unlike seeing (that is, voir, in the ordinary 
sense), imagining produces images that are without a detectable source 
outside the mind of the subject.5 Some things can be imagined but not 
seen, other things can be seen but not imagined. Descartes's example of 
something that can be seen but not imagined is the geometrical figure of 
the chiliogon, a figure with a thousand sides. Although such a figure can 
be seen, the mind cannot, according to Descartes, produce a specific pic­
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ture of it. When the imagination fails in this way, conception is the faculty 
by which the mind represents a thing: 
[Je] remarque premierement la difference qui est entre Pimagination et la 
pure intellection ou conception. Par exemple, lorsque j'imagine un tri­
angle, je ne le conc,ois pas seulement comme une figure composee et 
comprise de trois lignes, mais outre cela je considere ces trois lignes 
comme presentes par la force et Papplication interieure de mon esprit; et 
c'est proprement ce que j'appelle imaginer. Que si je veux penser a un 
chiliogone, je conc,ois bien a la verite que c'est une figure composee de 
mille cotes, aussi facilement que je conc,ois qu'un triangle est une figure 
composee de trois cotes seulement; mais je ne puis pas imaginer les mille 
cotes d'un chiliogone, comme je fais les trois d'un triangle, ni, pour ainsi 
dire, les regarder comme presents avec les yeux de mon esprit. Et quoique, 
suivant la coutume que j'ai de me servir toujours de mon imagination, 
lorsque je pense aux choses corporelles, il arrive qu'en concevant un 
chiliogone je me represente confusement quelque figure, toutefois il est 
tres evident que cette figure n'est point un chiliogone, puisqu'elle ne dif­
fere nullement de celle que je me representerais, si je pensais a un myrio­
gone, ou a quelque autre figure de beaucoup de cotes . .  . [Meditations, 
VI: 318] 
The mind cannot easily make pictures of all things, and Descartes tests 
the boundaries of what can be pictured and what cannot be pictured. 
Like a somewhat malevolent drawing teacher, Descartes gives the mind 
tests of what it can trace. It is important to emphasize that this test ap­
plies to the picturing, not to what is pictured. Triangles and pentagons 
can be imagined, whereas chiliogons and myriogons can only be con­
ceived. This distinction does not indicate a defect in the chiliogon, some 
inherent escape from the laws of optics, but rather a limitation of the 
mind in its visualizing capacity. 
All visual perception seems to be a distancing from the essence of the 
mind. If conception as pure intellection cannot produce images, while 
imagination, which is not part of the essence of the mind, can do so, then 
the distinctness of image increases as the subject's attention moves away 
from itself or from its essence (cf., p. 321). Yet at the same time the sub­
ject is testing its capacity to produce such images, and the boundaries of 
sense, imagination and conception are located by failure of distinctness. 
The more confused the image, the closer the mind to an activity that 
passes into the pure realm of conception. The mind (esprit) seems to be a 
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failed maker of images, dependent on some other faculty or source, a 
source outside the dark chamber of the mind. 
It is repeatedly asserted in the Meditations and the Principes that prior 
to exercising judgment the mind must perceive the idea to be judged. The 
role of the subject in the genesis of these perceptions is debated. Sylvie 
Romanowski argues that the production of evidence by the thinker, and 
in particular through the imagination, is a dangerous procedure. Truth, 
she argues, should be "trouvee, non pas faite par moi, non pas l'objet de 
quelque travail imaginatif, mais etre decouverte, toute faite, prete a etre 
cueillie par ma pensee."6 This opposition between activity and passivity 
is a useful delimitation of one source of error perceived by Descartes, but 
it is perhaps not forceful enough to account for the twists and turns of 
the Cartesian description of the production and judgment of images. 
Ideas (actively imagined or conceived) can be erroneous or true, though 
the active production of ideas is only a stage in obtaining knowledge. 
Descartes's use of the verbs imaginer and concevoir seem to indicate an 
active presentation of perceptions to the judgment, a presentation in 
which these faculties replace the doubtful perceptions of the senses. Pro­
duced perceptions or perceptions which are treated as ideas of things 
rather than as the things themselves are what we would call representa­
tions. We have already seen that Descartes traces the boundaries between 
imagination and conception, the two principal faculties of representa­
tion, by locating cases in which these faculties fail to represent. The ima­
gination fails to represent a chiliogon; the conception fails to represent a 
mountain without a valley {Meditations, V: 313). Because a mountain 
cannot be represented without a valley, a mountain cannot exist without 
a valley. This is an example of the way representation becomes interesting 
to Descartes primarily in cases of failure, for successful representation 
does not guarantee existence: "comme il ne tient qu'a moi d'imaginer un 
cheval aile, encore qu'il n'y en ait aucun qui ait des ailes, ainsi je pourrais 
peut-etre attribuer l'existence a Dieu, encore qu'il n'y eut aucun Dieu qui 
existat" (p. 313). One might conceive or imagine a God, and yet that God 
might not exist, but one cannot, Descartes argues, represent God without 
representing at the same time His existence. This failure to represent a 
nonexistent God is a convincing argument in Descartes's text whereas the 
successful representation of God is not convincing. 
When we possess an image and know that we could not ourselves 
make that image, we know that the image is true, that it comes from 
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outside the camera obscura of our mind. So the "image d'une vraie et 
immuable nature" can be certified as a true image, since it surpasses the 
powers of the imagination itself, but the winged horse is a mere image, 
entirely within the power of the subject. The image itself is not called into 
question but rather the subject's ability to fabricate or feign images. 
Hence it seems appropriate to accept failed activity rather than simple 
passivity as the model of the Cartesian perception of the image. 
The image of a true and immutable nature which is the image of God 
passes this "failure-test" of imagination. Such an image is present to the 
"eyes of the mind" yet is apparently beyond the ability of the subject to 
create. "Reality" (or truth) in perception seems to coincide with the fail­
ure of conception and imagination combined (e.g., "il ne m'est pas pos­
sible de concevoir deux ou plusieurs Dieux de meme fac.on . . .  " p. 314). 
The gradual escape of the image from the will of the thinker guaran­
tees the autonomous and self-sustaining quality of the image because the 
mind is revealed as failing to invent, or be able to remove, these aspects 
of the image.7 This discovery, moreover, unfolds in time. Something 
changes between the first moment I imagine the triangle and later when I 
am forced to perceive certain properties of the image. This temporality 
of knowledge emphasizes a difference between the subject (or the mind) 
and something which is in the mind. Descartes supposes that the triangle 
is unchanging. Each time I imagine it, it is the same. But my knowledge 
of the triangle does change. The mind is cast in the role of describer of an 
image. The image remains the same, but the mind makes ever more com­
plete descriptions. 
There seems to be something curiously satisfying to Descartes in the 
initial failure to perceive the entirety of the image of the triangle. The 
contrast between the changelessness of the image across time and the 
changing description/perception of the image confers on it a status of 
"immutability," one of the properties of certain truths, while this contrast 
also consigns the subject's understanding to the realm of change. By pro­
ducing an immutable and richly describable image, imagination permits 
judgment to operate as a mutable, descriptive faculty. As a consequence 
of this, we can say that the "clarity" of an image does not preclude the 
subject's failure to grasp or recognize its implications. Because the mind 
recognizes more and more clearly the properties of a triangle, while the 
image in the imagination does not change, clarity of recognition cannot 
in itself be taken as proof of truth, for this clarity of recognition changes 
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while the truth pertaining to the triangle does not. The truth of the tri­
angle does not increase as the mind increases its knowledge of the tri­
angle. The image produced by the imagination is therefore the pretext for 
a temporally characterized translation of the image into words—the 
words of a description in which the atemporal qualities of the image are 
rendered more accessible to the "eyes of the mind." 
What appears to the eyes of the mind exists in the mind. The question 
is, does such a representation, and in particular such an image, come 
from the outside or the inside of the mind? What is there about these 
gradually described still images that can reveal their source? Do they en­
ter the camera obscura from the outside? Or are they productions from 
within the chamber? In the Discours de la methode appears one of the 
major examples of deceptive images, the chimera. Descartes returns again 
and again to the dream image as a major threat to his system, a threat 
made possible by his grounding of truth in clear and distinct perception, 
for the images in dreams are often quite distinct. How can we distinguish 
them from waking images? 
Paradoxically, imagination, which is associated with the doubtful per­
ception of a doubtful object (material nature), is associated with the per­
ception of that which has never been in material nature. In criticizing the 
proponents of the maxim that nothing is in the mind which has not first 
been in the senses, Descartes says that such people "n'elevent jamais leur 
esprit au-dela des choses sensibles, et qu'ils sont tellement accoutumes a 
ne rien considerer qu'en l'imaginant, qui est une faqon de penser parti­
culiere pour les choses materielles, que tout ce qui n'est pas imaginable 
leur semble n'etre point intelligible" (p. 151). In assigning to imagination 
the function of thinking about material things, Descartes seems to pre­
judge the existence of material nature. But the dream image poses the 
additional and converse problem that it is not sufficiently associated with 
the supposed material world. Although the dream image and the waking 
image proceed from the same faculty, the waking image is tainted by 
being excessively associated with the external world, while the dream 
image is defective because it is insufficiently associated with the external 
world. Yet this defect of the dream image is hidden by its excessive viv­
idness and distinctness, so that the dream image is in some ways the 
apogee of distinct imagery in Descartes, the triumph of the image. 
The conclusion of the fourth part of the Discours de la methode ad­
dresses this problem and attempts to exorcise the image. Descartes first 
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supposes that while sleeping, a geometer invents a new demonstration, 
then asserts that sleep alone (or the fact that the demonstration appears 
in a dream) does not prevent the demonstration from being true. But the 
argument slides back and forth—its purpose somewhat dubious. The 
paragraph begins by arguing for the validity of our waking thoughts. 
These thoughts are somehow threatened by dreams: yet "les reveries que 
nous imaginons etant endormis ne doivent aucunement nous faire douter 
de la verite des pensees que nous avons etant eveilles" (p. 152). Oddly, 
Descartes chooses to combat this threat from the images of dreams by 
defending the validity of one such hypothetical dream. The most ordinary 
error of dreams is, in a next step, described as being the similarity be­
tween dreams and sense perception. Descartes does not, however, use the 
similarity to defend the accuracy of dreams. Instead, he uses this parallel 
to attack the senses. Although the seventeenth century was a period of 
increased emphasis on making pictures correspond to actual sight, Des­
cartes finds the correspondence between mental image and sensorial im­
age a defect, not a positive quality. For Descartes such correspondence 
becomes a source of condemnation of visual perception in general: 
Et pour l'erreur la plus ordinaire de nos songes, qui consiste en ce qu'ils 
nous representent divers objets en meme fac,on que font nos sens exte­
rieurs, n'importe pas qu'elle nous donne occasion de nous defier de la 
verite de telles idees, a cause qu'elles peuvent aussi nous tromper assez 
souvent sans que nous dormions; comme lorsque ceux qui ont la jaunisse 
voient tout de couleur jaune . .  . [p. 152] 
This argument contains the basis for a defense of the dream image as no 
less accurate than the senses, but Descartes uses it to subvert the senses, 
displaying them as no more accurate than the dream image. 
At this point Descartes invokes the strangest and most ambivalent ex­
ample, the image of the chimera: 
[Et] nous pouvons bien imaginer distinctement une tete de lion entee sur 
le corps d'une chevre, sans qu'il faille conclure pour cela qu'il y ait au 
monde une Chimere; car la raison ne nous dicte point que ce que nous 
voyons ou imaginons soit veritable, mais elle nous dicte bien que toutes 
nos idees ou notions doivent avoir quelque fondement de verite . . . 
Descartes goes from listing failures of seeing "external" things (failures 
caused by jaundice and distance) to describing the case of a distinct image 
of something never seen. Having begun with the example of a geometer 
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discovering a correct (or true) demonstration in his sleep, Descartes 
moves to an image which is false despite its distinctness. But the two 
forms of validity are quite different. The demonstration is true without 
reference to material actualization. If one imagines a triangle or other 
geometrical figure, it has a certain truth even if it is never formed in the 
physical world. But the chimera is called false simply because it is not 
formed in the outside world but is only an image. Descartes realized that 
this line of argument has contradicted the self-contained validity of the 
geometrical demonstration by introducing a figure (or image) which can 
be judged false only by reference to an ontological judgment about the 
outside world. The geometrical demonstration does not have to refer to 
the world outside the dream to be true; the chimera is being judged on 
the basis of such a reference. 
Once more, Descartes sees the implications of this contrast—the par­
agraph contains the basis for the "truth" of a chimera, even if no chimera 
can be located in the material (or waking) world. Reason does not tell us 
that what we see or imagine—that is, what we possess as images—is 
true. Reason does tell us, however, that all ideas (including images) must 
have some basis (fondement) in truth. Therefore the chimera cannot be 
rejected as entirely false. Descartes is caught in the grip of the ideology of 
his camera obscura. 
Let us look at this chimera, a monster designed to alert us to some 
disturbance produced by imagination. The chimera is false; it is a form 
of incarnate or imaged fallacy. Moreover the image of the chimera is 
composite, the head of a lion on the body of a she-goat. This composite 
nature is for Descartes the mark of imperfection (p. 150), and the way 
the chimera is composed expresses the particular kind of imperfection 
that concerns Descartes—I should note that I find this passage in Des­
cartes irresistibly inviting a parallel reading with Montaigne's "De l'oisi-
vete" (I: 8). The chimera's head is that of a lion (masculine in 
grammatical and perhaps physical gender)—here the superiority of rea­
son or esprit is emblematized—and its body that of a she-goat (female) 
with all that that conventionally implies of sexuality, carnality, prolifera­
tion of matter.8 This is a clue to the major disruptive force of images in 
general in the Cartesian system. They are combinations and hence confu-
sions—things joined together. It is difficult to isolate and purify these 
things, or to "defuse" the power of the image. Jaundice infuses everything 
with a yellow color. How can that color be removed from the image 
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which it permeates and vitiates? Yet some images that come to us in 
dreams are distinct. The chimera is such a distinct product of the imagi­
nation. Its composition is clear and yet it may not exist in the world. The 
chimera is therefore, on one hand, disconcertingly like the theoretical 
constructions of geometry—it fails only by not being outside the mind. 
It is not sufficiently composite; it exists only in the mind and not in the 
body. Yet on the other hand the chimera is vastly inferior to a geometrical 
figure because it is based on images from outside the mind. The chimera 
thus blocks the distinction of inside and out. The falseness of the chimera 
can only be determined by reference outside the mind; hence the invoca­
tion of this image forces the mind to turn outside if it is to avoid the 
monster. On the other hand, if the mind wishes to remain within the 
realm of reason it must admit the "truth" of the chimera, and with the 
chimera, the status of the imagination as a faculty productive of truth.9 
In a more general and deeper sense the chimera points to Descartes's 
problem of relating mind and body and to the particular role of sight. 
"Seeing" and "imagining," here placed in a position of equivalence as 
untrustworthy guides to truth, are also described as untrustworthy guides 
to fallacy, since both sight and image-production have some basis in 
truth. They are placed, after all, in the mind by God ("car il ne serait pas 
possible que Dieu, qui est tout parfait et tout veritable, les eut mises en 
nous sans cela," p. 153). 
The image in general, of which the chimera is an example, is a graft 
(ente) of truth and fallacy, and of two natures. The divine, all-perfect and 
all-true part of the image is united to the human imperfection, which 
prevents our thoughts from being all-true. The composite and impure 
image of the chimera thus figures the nature of all human thought. Yet 
Descartes's frantic and somewhat clumsy effort to escape the chimera and 
its possible truth places waking sensory perception, especially sight, and 
dreaming or imagining in direct conflict—miming the chimera itself, with 
its conflicting pieces. The chimera can only be said to be untrue to the 
extent that a diligent search for the chimera is fruitless. Our senses do not 
offer any confirmation of the existence of the chimera represented in our 
mind. Yet our senses are not to be trusted. The dream image can only be 
disproven by the waking image, yet both are deceptive. 
In the first Meditation, Descartes again addresses the problem of 
dreams and the clarity and distinctness of the impressions dreams make. 
Attempting to locate a difference between dreams and waking, Descartes 
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turns to painted images for an analogy. His principal aim is to argue that 
the elements of dream images are derived from existing things, and that 
they are thus externally caused: 
Toutefois il faut aii moins avouer que les choses qui nous sont representees 
dans le sommeil, sont comme des tableaux et des peintures, qui ne peuvent 
etre formees qu'a la ressemblance de quelque chose de reel et de veritable; 
et qu'ainsi, pour le moins, ces choses generates, a savoir, des yeux, une 
tete, des mains, et tout le reste du corps, ne sont pas choses imaginaires, 
mais vraies et existantes. Car de vrai les peintres, lors meme qu'ils s'etu-
dient avec le plus d'artifice a representer des sirenes et des satyres par des 
formes bizarres et extraordinaires, ne leur peuvent pas toutefois attribuer 
des formes et des natures entierement nouvelles, mais font seulement un 
certain melange et composition des membres de divers animaux; ou bien, 
si peut-etre leur imagination est assez extravagante pour inventer quelque 
chose de si nouveau, que jamais nous n'ayons rien vu de semblable, et 
qu'ainsi leur ouvrage nous represente une chose purement feinte et abso­
lument fausse, certes a tout le moins les couleurs dont ils le composent 
doivent-elles etre veritables. [Meditations, I: 269] 
Even a painter attempting to represent sirens and satyrs takes as mod­
els the parts of existing animals. Images have a certain syntax, we might 
say, in which the paradigmatic selections are combined in a new and ar­
tificial way. The paradigms are true, but the combination is false. Truth 
and fallacy in painting can be measured by the correspondence of the 
image to something that exists outside the painting. Hence paintings are 
themselves only manifestations of the absence of something—e.g. of eyes 
or a head—that really exists somewhere else. A painter proceeds by 
combining absences, or the signs of absences, into something that is 
either overtly deceptive, like the recognizably fantastic siren or satyr, or 
covertly deceptive, that is, a believable picture. This whole image struc­
ture is considered by Descartes as doubtful and uncertain because of the 
syntactic operation of combination or composition. 
This devaluation of the composite—explicit in the first Meditation— 
actually overlays something more fundamental in the simile of painting 
for dream, namely, the criterion of absence. The painting, and hence the 
dream, are only syntactically flawed; the paradigmatic basis for paintings 
is true: painters, even in their most artificial fancies are constrained by 
the repertory of imagery that exists in nature. Yet this constraint, which 
makes the fragments of the image true, reveals the paradox of true image. 
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If the image truly represents something, that thing is elsewhere and hence 
absent. Conversely, if the image in a painting is not a vehicle of absence, 
a marker of something that is not entirely there in the painting, the paint­
ing is false. Should a painter, says Descartes, be so "extravagant" (i.e., 
mad) as to invent "quelque chose de si nouveau, que jamais nous n'ayons 
rien vu de semblable, et qu'ainsi leur ouvrage nous represente une chose 
purement feinte et absolument fausse" (p. 269) at least the colors would 
have to be true, that is, would have to exist elsewhere in nature. Yet at 
the same time one can argue, following the inventive genius of the extrav­
agant painter, that should he create something entirely new, its complete 
being would be in the painting—it would be entirely present, hence false, 
because nonexistent in the world outside the painting. 
The excessive presence of the paradigmatically false painting is related 
to the temporal characteristics of painting in general. Falseness is mea­
sured by reference to the past experience of the subject. Artists in general 
do not use "formes bizarres et entierement nouvelles," but reuse old 
forms. The extravagant painter, on the other hand, invents something "si 
nouveau, que jamais nous n'ayons rien vu de semblable . . .  " (p. 269). 
The excessive presence of the false image is connected to its attachment 
to the present time. The false image, even in its selective components, has 
no past, whereas paintings in general are new only in respect to their 
composition, not with regard to the elements that form their paradigma­
tic source. To the extent that the painter is limited to composition, the 
painting can claim a basis in truth. The more inventive the painter is with 
respect to the elements of selection, the more feinte and false the painting 
is. Hence the truth of the painting depends on limitations in the acitivity, 
or at least, the inventiveness, of the painter. 
In the first Meditation Descartes admitted that he could not distinguish 
conclusively between dream and waking. At the end of the Meditations, 
he pursues the attempt to eliminate the dangerous equivalency between 
the images that occur to the mind in these (perhaps) different states. In 
Meditation VI, Descartes identifies the recognition of the dream image as 
the decisive step in terminating what he calls the hyperbolic and ridicu­
lous doubt, "particulierement cette incertitude si generale touchant le 
sommeil, que je ne pouvais distinguer de la veille . . .  " (p. 334). The 
difference between dream images and waking images is based on the con­
tinuity of waking vision or of the supposed continuity of the world into 
which the waking vision is inserted: 
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Car a present j'y rencontre une tres notable difference, en ce que notre 
memoire ne peut jamais Her et joindre nos songes les uns aux autres et 
avec toute la suite de notre vie, ainsi qu'elle a de coutume de joindre les 
choses qui nous arrivent etant eveilles. Et, en effet, si quelqu'un, lorsque 
je veille, m'apparaissait tout soudain et disparaissait de meme, comme 
font les images que je vois en dormant, en sorte que je ne pusse remarquer 
ni d'ou il viendrait, ni ou il irait, ce ne serait pas sans raison que je l'esti-
merais un spectre ou un fantome forme dans mon cerveau, et semblable a 
ceux qui s'y forment quand je dors, plutot qu'un vrai homme. Mais 
lorsque j'aperc,ois des choses dont je connais distinctement et le lieu d'ou 
elles viennent, et celui ou elles sont, et le temps auquel elles m'apparais-
sent, et que, sans aucune interruption, je puis lier le sentiment que j'en ai, 
avec la suite du reste de ma vie, je suis entierement assure que je les aper-
c,ois en veillant, et non point dans le sommeil. [Meditations, VI: 334] 
Units of vision in the waking state do not appear suddenly and can be 
explained as coming from and going to someplace. At the end of the 
Meditations the image once more is distinguished from other ideas, 
which are judged on the basis of clarity and distinctness, and is evaluated 
in terms of the absences with which the image is surrounded. In the ear­
lier passage the absence concerns the elements out of which a painting is 
composed. In the closing paragraphs of the Meditations the image as a 
whole, in its composite state, is considered in terms of the absences which 
precede and follow it. A new criterion is adduced to distinguish true and 
false images, a criterion based on the invisible continuity of the seen. 
Dream images are not contested as less clear and distinct but precisely as 
too distinct (in the sense of permitting conception of them as separate 
from something else). In order to be acceptable an image is itself disre­
garded in favor of an off-stage or off-screen continuity (not unlike cine­
matographic continuity in the hors-scene). 
By emphasizing knowledge of what precedes and follows an image 
rather than its appearance in the present, Descartes moves from optical 
qualities towards narrative ones. The thinker expects to be able to say 
what happened before and what happens after the things appeared in his 
visual field. The before and after of a verbal account become more im­
portant than the presence of the image and the present tense of a descrip­
tion of the figure in the image. While the figure in a dream is just as clear 
and apparently present as the images we perceive while awake, figures 
from the two types of image differ in their resistance to questions about 
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their past and future. The temporal qualities of the image—or at least the 
temporal qualities of the figure in the image—are thus given priority. 
Presence and "the present" are identified as descriptive terms and in the 
same gesture devaluated as ontologically probative terms. 
A picture presents special difficulties of interpretation. While it may 
seem to represent an existing thing, a picture does not make an unequiv­
ocal statement about being and time. An image, unlike a sentence, does 
not declare that what it portrays "is" or "might be," "was" or "will be." 
Unlike most languages, images per se have neither tenses nor modal in­
dications. Various systems have been constructed to overcome these lim­
itations of the single, isolated image by forming image-clusters or strips 
that are read in a certain order to decode temporal sequence. Descartes, 
however, usually speaks of images as isolated and disconnected (e.g., a 
chimera, a siren, a triangle), not as part of sequences, much less as a 
perpetually changing but never broken visual continuum. Such images 
are therefore frozen moments in time, or rather without any time except 
a generalized present. 
I have already mentioned the contrast between the posited immutabi­
lity of the image and the ever-changing apprehension and description of 
the image that is made by the thinker. At the end of the Meditations, 
Descartes gives a new and different account of the discovery of the image 
in time, an account designed specifically for the image of things that are 
supposed to exist materially. In the case of the image of the triangle, the 
thinker returns repeatedly to the same, unchanging and solitary image to 
discover in more detail the contents of that image. The image exists ap­
parently outside time, while the discovery and description of the image 
occur in time. The image described at the end of the Meditations has a 
temporal quality that derives from its integration into a series of images, 
each of which has a firm and specific assignment in time. In this conclu­
ding passage of the book, the isolated image, which, in earlier sections, 
served to support geometrical demonstration, is abandoned as a para­
digm of internal vision in favor of the sequence of images made out of 
(presumed) sensory data and recapitulated by memory. With this gesture, 
Descartes has reversed the temporal situation of the viewer and the image 
that obtained in the description of triangles. A changing, learning thinker 
confronted an unchanging geometrical image. Now, at the end of the 
Meditations, an apparently unchanging thinker studies a changing scene. 
Waking images, though still thought of individually, are supposed to be 
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part of a temporal series guaranteeing their truth. On the other side— 
that is, in the thinker—is a transcendant faculty called memory which 
has no significant history of its own, but is only concerned with the his­
tory of the images which it stores and knits together. 
Such a shift in Descartes's description and evaluation of images is pos­
sible only because of a shift in the amount of certain knowledge available 
to the thinker at the end of the Meditations. It is not mere coincidence 
that the single, clear, and distinct image and the cogito are associated in 
an earlier phase of the Meditations. The cogito is a statement in the pres­
ent tense about a fact that is certain only in the present moment. As 
Descartes writes in Meditations II: "Je suis, j'existe: cela est certain; mais 
combien de temps? A savoir autant de temps que je pense . . .  " (p. 277). 
By the end of the Meditations the knowledge of God has permitted the 
thinker to advance to a reasonable certainty of the past ("pouvant user 
de ma memoire pour Her et joindre les connaissances presentes aux pas-
sees . . .  " p. 333). Therefore, in practice, clarity and distinctness in the 
present are no longer as uniquely important as they were at an earlier 
stage of the discovery process. In a way—speaking rather freely but with­
out departing too much from Descartes—we can say that the Cartesian 
God is more on the side of the writer than of the painter, or, at least, that 
He favors the narrative painter. The act of connecting times and cumu­
lating experiences modifies what is available to the judgment, thanks to 
continuity supplied by a truthful God. With this switch from an isolated 
present to a series of separate perceptions that are compared, the scale of 
Descartes's description of images is modified. 
In describing the chimera, the siren, and the satyr, Descartes indicated 
that composition, rather than the paradigms of anatomical elements, was 
the source of their novelty, and thus of their falsehood. Composition is 
also invoked in the discussion of the specter or phantom in the conclusion 
of the Meditations, but the level or scale of composition has changed. 
The whole of the individual image itself is now the paradigmatic element, 
not the details or fragments of the individual image. Descartes is not 
concerned with the way this specter looks, in fact it seems that the specter 
looks like anyone else, quelqu'un. In other words, the specter is not itself 
a grotesque composite image made out of recognizably disparate pieces 
but is a whole, an entirety, apparently received from the world outside 
the mind. The truth ascribable to paradigmatic elements derived from the 
material world now seems to inhabit the entire image and to render that 
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image (even in its combination of elements, its composition) true or at 
least indistinguishable from true, waking life. If paradigmatic qualities 
were earlier the source of truth and compositional qualities the source of 
falsehood then the dream image seems to reduce the instruments of image 
description to a state of paralysis, to deprive us of weapons against the 
chimeras and the specters. But, by a reversal of the previous approach, 
Descartes now permits the compositional or syntagmatic qualities of the 
image to serve as the determinants of truth. The individual image is the 
invariant element which, however false, can be exposed by combining it 
with appropriate images of before and after along a chronological 
sequence. 
Playing fort/da with the specter, Descartes supposes that the viewer of 
a waking image has a secondary repertory of images with which to ac­
count for the unseen part of the visualizable sequence. Being able to ima­
gine where someone came from and where that person went upon leaving 
the visual field means, in effect, not only maintaining a smooth series of 
primary images that are composed in time, but also being able to se­
quence hypothetical unseen images, that is, to suppose that the person 
does not cease to exist upon becoming invisible. This is the inverse of the 
specter, for the specter is visible but does not exist, whereas persons may 
be invisible and yet exist. The exactness of representation which is pos­
sible in an image, even a dream image, is less important at this point than 
the plausible fabulation which permits the movement of figures into and 
out of the image. The restriction of vision which is the basis for forming 
a distinct image in a camera obscura yields to a wider, less precise but 
highly comforting knowledge that the figures which disappear into the 
dark do not cease to exist, for we can make up stories about where they 
went. 
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A Reading of the First Liasse 
Peter Bayley 
Readers of Pascal's Pensees tend to skip the first liasse. This is not, of 
course, to say that a great deal of scholarly attention has not been paid 
to it in the decades since the Lafuma edition of the Copie became the 
normal classroom text;1 but it is not scholars whom I primarily have in 
mind. The first-time general reader, confronted with "Les psaumes 
chantes par toute la terre" as the first paragraph, will as likely as not 
think to himself that the title "Ordre" means something technical which 
he can learn about later, or that it relates only to the controversies con­
cerning the fragmentation and conjectural reconstructions of the text 
which he may have read about in a preface. He rapidly passes on to 
something more solid and more recognizable as prose—say the long frag­
ment (44) on Imagination—and settles down to enjoy the vertiginous 
generalizations he has been led by a long tradition of selective quotation 
to expect from a French moralist like Pascal. 
Had my untutored reader paused a little longer over the first para­
graph of Ordre, pondering it in the light of what is still not too far from 
being general knowledge in Western culture, he would have learned that 
to read and enjoy the text as a series of discontinuous generalizations 
might not be the most appropriate response or, at least, the one to which 
he is invited. For "les psaumes chantes par toute la terre" has a fairly 
specific focus. It is a reminder of that cliche of religious apologetic which 
locates the first evidence for the existence of God in man's experience of 
the visible world, a cliche summed up, in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, 
by Psalm 19: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament 
sheweth his handywork. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto 
night showeth knowlege. There is no speech or language where their 
voice is not heard. Their line is gone out through all the earth, and their 
words to the end of the world."2 It is a tenacious doctrine: the twentieth-
century television viewer is hardly less likely to have come across it than 
the seventeenth-century Frenchman; it is the foundation of vague enlight­
ened Deism and the inspiration of much amateur science. It knows no 
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sectarian boundaries: a Huguenot of Pascal's time would recall its ap­
pearance as the cornerstone of Calvin's Institutes3 just as his Catholic 
counterpart would identify it as the substance of endless hours of medi­
tation and preaching.4 As a representative and randomly selected collec­
tion of sermons reprinted throughout the period when Pascal was 
growing up puts it: "Bref, ce monde en toutes ses parties n'est autre chose 
qu'un livre qui propose, un tableau qui exprime, une voix qui presche, 
une trompette qui annonce, un heraut qui publie la Majeste, la grandeur, 
et les perfections de la Divinite."5 
Here, then, is an initial paragraph which, in its echo of this vast and 
familiar tradition, provides the reader with some purchase on the text he 
has just opened. It is going to be about religious apologetic. There is no 
clue yet as to what direction it may take—for all he knows, it may turn 
into a treatise on optics or Rosicrucianism. What will his reaction be? It 
may be complacency, if he is a believer who has never doubted the prop­
osition, or it may be a degree of rejection: this is the sort of stereotype 
which he thinks needs at the very least some sort of critical scrutiny. He 
will have to wait another five lines before he can make out how the text 
is likely to treat readers in his position; but meanwhile it is precisely that 
notion of critical scrutiny which is now introduced. 
Qui rend temoignage de Mahomet? lui-meme. J. -C. veut que son 
temoignage ne soit rien. 
La qualite de temoins fait qu'il faut qu'ils soient toujours, et partout, et 
miserables. II est seul. 
The first part of these remarks confirms, if nothing more, the opening 
impression: this is indeed a work of religious apologetic and it is going to 
take into account more than one religion, although its stance toward 
Islam (no doubt a seventeenth-century Frenchman would have said "to­
ward the Turks") is from the first a combative one. The second part is 
more intriguing, not least because it is difficult to construe. Does it mean 
that it is the nature of witnesses to be everywhere in time and space as 
well as evidently not standing to gain from their testimony? Or does the 
"toujours" merely mean that this rule applies universally? One thing is 
clear: critical scrutiny can be applied to this subject in exactly the same 
way as it is to a lawsuit. The witnesses can be questioned and their suit­
ability weighed; we can already begin to think about the sort of evidence 
that will be necessary. It is this idea of evidence that binds the three parts 
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of the first pensee together. We may for a moment suppose that the notion 
of bringing to bear on a familiar cliche the methods one is familiar with 
from the law might be particularly attractive to a sceptical robin; but we 
hardly need that sort of historical information to make some sense of the 
fragment. 
Pensee 2 confronts the untutored reader with a rather different "or­
der" of approach to such questions: it exploits the very fact that ques­
tions are running through his mind—"Que dois-je faire?"—and gives 
expression to the objection which may already be his response to the 
opening sentence: "Je ne vois partout qu'obscurites." The very invention 
of such a voice may quicken his interest in the book he has opened: it is 
not going to be a treatise, it may even be like a drama. For here we have 
appearing, not as an object of derision but as a participant in a dialogue 
which (for all we yet know) may occupy the remainder of the book, a 
voice with which he may identify.6 "Je ne vois partout qu'obscurites" may 
indeed be his reaction to the notion that creation sings psalms; it may, for 
that matter, be his reaction to the text he is reading (for it would not be 
the only occasion on which Pascal draws attention to the struggle a reader 
has in understanding a text).7 The use of "je" directs his gaze upon him­
self. And two possible consequences of self-contemplation are then 
spelled out, with that brevity and almost mathematical leap across the 
trivial steps of an argument to its logical conclusions which our reader 
may by now be coming to relish as the characteristic tone of his text: 
"Croirai-je que je ne suis rien? Croirai-je que je suis dieu?" He may guess, 
if he has any commonsense, that the answer is going to lie between these 
two extremes, but also that they will be boldly faced. He will probably 
also note that behind these two positions there lie ancient philosophical 
systems and debates that a Christian apologist is obliged to engage with 
no less than the existence of other religions. 
The exciting sense that the text is going to turn into a dialogue grows 
as we meet the third fragment, as does the play with the commonplaces 
of religious apology. The sonorous and alliterative statement that "toutes 
choses changent et se succedent" may be a grandiose expression of the 
sceptical reader's approach to religions that claim to trade in absolutes; 
the devout reader may confidently expect a denial of it; the seventeenth-
century French reader would find himself confronted again by one of the 
tired but apparently inescapable topoi of preaching, meditation and reli­
gious poetry. They are all catered for and then confounded by Pascal's 
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three points de suspension: "Vous vous trompez, il y a . . . " And the 
dialogue then becomes quite heated, at least on what seems to be the 
skeptic side: "Et quoi ne dites-vous pas vous-meme que le ciel et les 
oiseaux prouvent Dieu?" We are back where we began, with the heavens 
declaring the glory of God, a notion here evidently mocked by the skeptic 
as he trivializes creation in terms of the sky and the birds, and accuses his 
interlocutor of having said this very thing (as it might be, in the first 
fragment). We have virtually a miniature preview here of the libertine's 
response to Sganarelle's elaborate demonstrations of the great chain of 
being, the French locus classicus of foolish theologizing on this theme, in 
Act V, Scene 3 of Moliere's Dom Juan: "O le beau raisonnement!" The 
calm "non" of the reply comes as a shock, provoking what may be either 
a more serious question or a final scoff to show that the skeptic knows 
better: "Et votre religion ne le dit-elle pas?" The "non" here may discon­
cert more than just the skeptic; and the qualification that follows serves 
to reassure the devout, at the same time as it quite definitely and abruptly 
sides with those "qui ne voient partout qu'obscurites": 
Car encore que cela est vrai en un sens pour quelques ames a qui Dieu 
donna cette lumiere, neanmoins cela est faux a l'egard de la plupart. 
This is spoken with the voice of authority, such as one might expect to 
meet if one picked up an apology for the Christian religion; but what the 
voice says scythes through the tired dogmas and replaces certainty with 
doubt. It speaks confidently of God, it explains how belief in the clear 
evidences of his existence comes to be (for the believing soul is repeatedly 
reminded that he is "tres legitimement persuade"),8 but at that very mo­
ment it makes an act of faith in the sincerity of the skeptic. This exciting, 
dramatic text is not going to be one in which (save at a much later stage) 
the dice are loaded. Whether the "untutored reader" lives in the seven­
teenth or the twentieth century, the originality, freshness, and directness 
of this approach to him makes it very unlike the common run of religious 
pamphleteering. 
As indeed does the next notion to hit him: something like a plan for a 
novel (or perhaps an allegorical play) which again starts not from an easy 
assurance that God exists but that he will have to be sought. It takes us 
back to fragment 2, the systems of thought which make of man a nothing 
or a god, and it promises a hard passage: "Lettre pour porter a rechercher 
Dieu. Et puis le faire chercher chez les philosophes, pyrrhoniens et dog­
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matistes qui travailleront celui qui le recherche." The skeptic is, once 
again, going to be met on his own ground. 
As the idea of this possible scenario of a letter is more fully sketched 
out, that skeptic now becomes a friend. When we deal with any friend, 
we consult his wishes, we try to understand his motives; that is what our 
authorial voice now once again shows himself willing to do, in another 
fragment of dialogue which ends with a tantalizingly mysterious phrase: 
Une lettre d'exhortation a un ami pour le porter a chercher. Et il repon­
dra: mais a quoi me servira de chercher, rien ne parait. Et lui repondre: 
ne desesperez pas. Et il repondrait qu'il serait heureux de trouver quelque 
lumiere. Mais que selon cette religion meme quand il croirait ainsi cela ne 
lui servirait de rien. Et qu'ainsi il aime autant ne point chercher. Et a cela 
lui repondre: La Machine. 
There has been a shift of position here: the reader is taken into the 
confidence of one participant in the dialogue, he is made to see how the 
friend can be persuaded. Equally well, should he feel himself to be in 
the role of the skeptic, he is flattered by it being made clear that his 
knowledge of religion is not negligible (faith has to be absolute, he thinks, 
and his simply cannot be). Again his good will is taken for granted—"il 
serait heureux de trouver quelque lumiere"—and his guess that, for him, 
the exercise will prove to be pointless is answered by a "ne desesperez 
pas" which may console and certainly excites the curiosity: where will 
this search, this story of the letter, end? For the moment it seems to in­
volve a gnomic utterance which again incites to further inquiry: "La 
Machine." 
At this point, like Pol Ernst,9 let us mark a pause. Our untutored 
reader has been bombarded with dialogues, letters, a meditation on the 
nature of evidence, a sweeping away of the traditions of apologetic. If he 
is a Christian, he has been given hints that his position is reserved (for he 
may be one of those "quelques ames a qui Dieu donna cette lumiere"); 
more importantly, if he is a skeptic he has found himself faced not with 
condemnation but with sympathy. His sincerity has been accepted right 
from the beginning: it is going to become one of the cornerstones of the 
text, whether because his honest difficulties in finding evidence of God in 
Nature will lead to a rethinking of the mode of God's revelation and even 
of God's character, or because his curiosity and desire for the chase— 
awakened here—will form the basis for a whole depiction of human per­
sonality in general. This start to an apology, however, is highly original 
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only in terms of what we normally expect of that genre; in terms of the 
art of persuasion it is merely an application of the old rule that you must 
begin by getting the audience on your side, the captatio benevolentiae 
which is the function of any classical exordium. As Pascal puts it else­
where, in De I'art de persuader, "quoi que ce soit qu'on veuille persuader, 
il faut avoir egard a la personne a qui on en veut, dont il faut connaitre 
l'esprit et le coeur, quels principes il accorde, quelles choses il aime; et 
ensuite remarquer, dans la chose dont il s'agit, quels rapports elle a avec 
les principes avoues, ou avec les objets delicieux par les charmes qu'on 
lui donne."10 It may be stated the other way round: to persuade, you have 
to know your audience and appeal directly to them; in a work of persua­
sive apologetic, this means beginning not with God but with Man, per­
ceived as a creature of doubt but also honesty, and above all as receptive 
to modes of discourse (dialogue, drama, narrative, allusion, sententious­
ness) which stir his interest. To paraphrase a remark of Hugh Davidson's, 
one might say that Pascal begins with man and his suppositions.11 One 
might even say that here rhetoric has determined theology. 
With the mention of "La Machine," we come to a reference which is 
impenetrable to the "untutored reader." He will find it again in fragment 
11, but it is not until the famous Pari that this doctrine of man's psycho­
logical automatism, able at one and the same time to encompass and 
confound the view of man as either ange or bete, will be fleshed out. This 
is the moment, I think, when the first liasse changes direction and begins 
to set out to its reader a number of plans, or to expand some of the ideas 
contained in its first part. Thus we find the notion of other religions, the 
germ of liasse XVI, again alluded to in fragment 8, and no fewer than 
three further mentions of a letter (in 7, 9, and 11). But there is no need to 
abandon our sequential reading and adopt the quite different strategy 
implied by a genetic approach. In the classical account of rhetorical dis­
positio, the exordium with its generalities and captatio benevolentiae is 
followed by section called propositio or partitio. It is the occasion for the 
author/orator to reveal to his audience the way he intends to divide up 
his material, and is not infrequently accompanied by enumeration for 
mnemonic purposes. Fragment 6 follows this pattern precisely: 
(1.) Partie. Misere de 1' homme sans Dieu. 
(2.) Partie. Felicite de 1' homme avec Dieu. 
autrement 
(1.) Partie. Que la nature est corrompue, par la nature meme. 
(2.) Partie. Qu'il y a un reparateur, par 1' Ecriture. 
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Now, a propositio is not necessarily exhaustive; it acts as a guideline 
through the narratives, arguments, "confirmations" which constitute the 
section of the discourse primarily concerned with proof. And proof, as it 
happens, is the subject of the very next fragment, with its suggestion that 
proof is itself part of the wider art of persuasion ("Par la Machine"), and 
that proof and faith are different. Theoretically, at any rate, this brief 
reference perhaps provides an answer to the apparent disparity I noted 
earlier between Pascal's simultaneous acceptance and rejection of rhetor­
ical strategies in De I'art de persuader: while "les verites divines . . . sont 
infiniment au-dessus de la nature," that is no reason why men may not be 
guided towards them by means of those same pointers and witnesses we 
read of in the first fragment, fides ex auditu. And the quotations here 
from Romans may make us reflect on Paul's elaborate outline in chapter 
i of that Epistle of the evidences of God in Nature. Paul is there anxious 
to show that the ungodly are rightly condemned, "for the invisible things 
of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood 
by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that 
they are without excuse" (Rom. I. 20). It is perhaps at this point that our 
reader, recalling the rejection of that idea in the earlier part of the Masse, 
understands the novelty of what he is reading—a recasting of the tradi­
tion of apologetic exemplified by Paul into terms that are acceptable to 
the "modern" skeptic. He is reading a text the basis of which is to be his 
own rejection of that tradition and his own radical doubt about the 
cliches he associates with religion. 
One of these will be justice, or at least the abstract idea of it. And is 
not the radicalism of thought already noted in fragment 2 now brought 
to bear on exactly that question in fragment 9? 
Dans la lettre de 1' injustice peut venir. 
La plaisanterie des aines qui ont tout. Mon ami vous etes ne de ce cote 
de la montagne, il est done juste que votre aine ait tout. 
Pourquoi me tuez-vous? 
It is obvious that this will need to be filled in, as it is for example by 
fragment 51,12 in the same way as the elliptical "ils ont pris le divertisse­
ment" of the next pensee will be rounded out by the whole of the eighth 
liasse. But those will be merely examples—albeit magnificent and mem­
orable ones—of the rhetorical device of amplification, and in essence the 
idea of what Richard Parish calls an "anthropological" apology13 is al­
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ready sketched out in this rapid survey of the fragility of human institu­
tions, of man's persistent attempts to avert his gaze from the abyss, 
indeed of man's own psychological automatism. 
That appeal to man through a study of man, reinforced by the refer­
ences to "La Machine" in fragment 11, is now reformulated in the very 
different register of the twelfth and final fragment: 
Les hommes ont mepris pour la religion. Us en ont haine et peur qu'elle 
soit vraie. Pour guerir cela il faut commencer par montrer que la religion 
n'est point contraire a la raison. Venerable, en donner respect. La rendre 
ensuite aimable, faire souhaiter aux bons qu'elle fut vraie et puis montrer 
qu'elle est vraie. Venerable parce qu'elle a bien connu 1' homme. Aimable 
parce qu'elle promet le vrai bien. 
Again, this is programmatic, but its tone is one of exhortation rather 
than exposition. It carries the reader forward by its persuasive rhythms, 
by repetition, asyndeton, antithesis, isocolon: what may be technically 
identified as the schemes appropriate to the "sublime style" of a perora­
tion, in fact, just as the personfication of "la religion" is the appropriate 
trope of prosopopoeia. The text speaks of two levels of persuasion— 
"montrer" and "faire souhaiter"—and at the same time operates on 
those two levels. The intellectual and the emotional are not separated but 
fused into a single, though complex, appeal. 
Throughout the Pensees that appeal will be based firmly and in the 
best rhetorical traditions on an analysis of those to whom it is made. The 
dogmatistes will be confounded by the pyrrhoniens, and vice-versa; the 
Jews will be confronted with their own venerated prophecies of a Mes­
siah; the gambling man will be offered a wager; the lawyer concerned 
with title will be handed a bulky brief of preuves. Each group, however, 
will be approached by a captatio benevolentiae, their cherished beliefs or 
particular emphases will be adopted, nor will they be refuted. Since all 
types of libertin are men, how could it be otherwise in a religion which is 
"venerable parce qu'elle a bien connu l'homme"? Like its phrasing, the 
method will be antithetical, and breathtaking in its use of the figure of 
concessio: 
Tous leurs principes sont vrais, des pyrrhoniens, des stoiques, des athees, 
etc. . . . mais leurs conclusions sont fausses, parce que les principes op­
poses sont vrais aussi. [619] 
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In a sense this extends the question of voices in the Pensees beyond 
those who actually speak in it, for Pascal peoples the text with what John 
Cruickshank has called the "ideas and sentiments which he expressed not 
to represent his own outlook but that of the libertins to whom his 
apology was addressed."14 To return to our untutored reader, the play of 
mirrors which confronted him when he opened the first liasse continues 
far beyond it: his own possible opinions are reflected or refracted back to 
him, though constantly modified by his growing sense of a controlling 
authorial presence. I spoke earlier of the vertiginous generalizations he 
might have opened the book to seek. When he finally comes to the most 
anthologized remark of all—"Le silence eternel de ces espaces infinis 
m'effraie" (fr. 201)—will he not recognize in it not some autobiographi­
cal Angst on the part of his author but his own inability (now subtly 
tinged with terror) to discern those evidences of God in Nature with 
which the liasse began? 
This cardinal aspect of free thought has, then, been seized upon as a 
starting-point, and by the end of the liasse has been conjoined with many 
and various others. What links them is not merely the demonstrable rhe­
torical dispositio of the piece, important though it is if we are to grasp 
the coherence of the moves from general to particular points and back 
again to a general one, nor even the traces of a systematic elocutio which 
can modulate from the striking question and the sonorous allusion to the 
"division en points" and then to the oratio numerosa of fragment 12. 
This apparent disorder in fact shows the unity of the liasse and its au-
thor's attentiveness to the precept that "Peloquence continue ennuie"; its 
fragmented nature exemplifies in some detail the profoundly writerly per­
ception that "la nature agit par progres, itus et reditus. Elle passe et re­
vient, puis va plus loin, puis deux fois moins, puis plus que jamais, etc."15 
The formal rhetorical organization of this brief text is however but one 
manifestation of the larger meditation which it contains: a meditation 
which includes in its sweep the traditions of apologetic that constrain St. 
Paul as well as Pascal's more immediate predecessors, the traditions of 
radical free thought which encompass Montaigne as well as Lucretius, 
and yet which remains firmly based upon a precept (of rhetorical theory 
rather than form) which will guide the inquiry to its end—the principle 
that one's audience is to be treated as if sincere. The implications for a 
Christian apologetic addressed primarily to those who do not believe (as 
opposed to a ratification for the faithful) are immense. Since it is com­
monplace to exploit the "mere jottings" of the first liasse as a gloss on 
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"later" longer pensees, I hope it will be permitted to conclude by citing 
one of the papiers non classes, or pensees melees (n° 781) as a gloss which 
unfolds those implications, more particularly those of its very first sen­
tences, and prefers Matthew and Isaiah to Paul: 
Preface de la seconde partie. 
Parler de ceux qui ont traite de cette matiere. 
J'admire avec quelle hardiesse ces personnes entreprennent de parler de 
Dieu. 
En adressant leurs discours aux impies leur premier chapitre est de 
prouver la divinite par les ouvrages de la nature. Je ne m'etonnerais pas 
de leur entreprise s'ils adressaient leurs discours aux fideles, car il est cer­
tain que ceux qui ont la foi vive dedans le coeur voient incontinent que 
tout ce qui est n'est autre chose que l'ouvrage du Dieu qu'ils adorent, mais 
pour ceux en qui cette lumiere est eteinte et dans lesquels on a dessein de 
la faire revivre, ces personnes destitutes de foi et de grace, qui recherchant 
de toute leur lumiere tout ce qu'ils voient dans la nature qui les peut mener 
a cette connaissance ne trouvent qu'obscurite et tenebres, dire a ceux-la 
qu'ils n'ont qu'a voir la moindre des choses qui les environnent et qu'ils y 
verront Dieu a decouvert et leur donner pour toute preuve de ce grand et 
important sujet le cours de la lune et des planetes et pretendre avoir a­
cheve sa preuve avec un tel discours, c'est leur donner sujet de croire que 
les preuves de notre religion sont bien faibles et je vois par raison et par 
experience que rien n'est plus propre a leur en faire naitre le mepris. Ce 
n'est pas de cette sorte que l'Ecriture qui connait mieux les choses qui 
sont de Dieu en parle. Elle dit au contraire que Dieu est un Dieu cache et 
que depuis la corruption de la nature il les a laisses dans un aveuglement 
dont ils ne peuvent sortir que par J.-C, hors duquel toute communication 
avec Dieu est otee. Nemo novit patrem nisi filius et cui filius voluit 
revelare. 
C'est ce que l'Ecriture nous marque quand elle dit en tant d'endroits 
que ceux qui cherchent Dieu le trouvent. Ce n'est point de cette lumiere 
qu'on parle comme le jour en plein midi. Ou ne ditpoint que ceux qui 
cherchent le jour en plein midi ou de l'eau dans la mer en trouveront et 
ainsi il faut bien que Pevidence de Dieu ne soit pas telle dans la nature. 
Aussi elle nous dit ailleurs: vere tu es deus absconditus. 
N O T E  S 
1. Most recently by A. R. Pugh {The Composition of Pascal's Apologia, To­
ronto: U. of Toronto P, 1984, pp. 29-45), w n  o notes that "one naturally assumes 
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[this bundle] to have been the basis of an opening chapter," calls it "puzzling," 
and then goes on somewhat confusingly to attack Pol Ernst's treatment of it as 
"by definition a first chapter." My sympathies go to Pol Ernst's attempts, in 
Pugh's words, to build "a hypothetical introduction out of these twelve fragments 
alone" (Pugh, p. 29); indeed, what I am attempting is a restatement of Ernst, 
Approches pascaliennes (Paris: Gembloux, Duculot, 1970, pp. 17-47). The dif­
ference is that I am pretending, for the moment, that there is no need to try to 
reconstruct Pascal's "project" but merely to try to understand his "notes." The 
question I explicitly ignore here has been neatly put by Jean Massard: "Faut-il 
voir dans cette liasse un simple dossier de travail, sorte d'echafaudage qui aurait 
disparu de l'oeuvre achevee? Ou bien Pascal avait-il l'intention de s'expliquer 
devant ses lecteurs de l'ordre suivi? {Les Pensees de Pascal, Paris: Sedes, 1976, p. 
179). If this were a sermon, my text would be Hugh Davidson's remark that 
"Pascal seems intent on introducing not systematically but succinctly all the ter­
minology necessary for his apologetic argument" {The Origins of Certainty: 
Means and Meaning in Pascal's "Pensees,n Chicago and London: 1979, p. 75). 
Quotations are from Pascal's Oeuvres completes, ed. Louis Lafuma (Paris: 1963). 
2. The King James Bible version, vv. 1-4 (my emphasis); the psalm is n° 18 in 
the Vulgate. In view of Pascal's echo of the last sentence, Sellier's (unsubstan­
tiated) gloss on this text seems to me excessively narrow: "Le peuple juif," he 
says, "disperse dans tout le monde connu, chante, sans en comprendre la portee 
reelle, les Psaumes ou le Messie est annonce. Hostiles aux chretiens, les Juifs sont 
a leur insu les meilleurs temoins de la verite du christianisme" {Pensees, ed. Phi-
lippe Sellier, Paris: 1976, p. 40, n. 1). This interpretation connects the sentence 
neatly to the non-Christian religion mentioned in the next, and I should certainly 
not want to exclude it; but it offers none of the cross-references to fragments 2 
and 3 which I hope to demonstrate. Ernst's reading {Approches pascaliennes, pp. 
3 5—3 7) is much wider. 
3. For example, Institution de la religion chrestienne, I: 5, i: "non seulement 
il a engrave ceste semence de religion que nous avons dite en l'esprit des hommes, 
mais aussi il s'est tellement manifeste a eux en ce bastiment tant beau et exquis 
du ciel et de la terre . . .  " (ed. J.-D. Benoit, Paris: 1957-63,1: 68). 
4. See my French Pulpit Oratory (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980), chap. 7 
("Nature, that universal and publick Manuscript"). 
5. Etienne Molinier, Le Mystere de la Croix (Toulouse; 1635), P- 63. First 
published in 1628, this collection was reprinted in 1635 anc^ r^43-
6. The most recent and fascinating discussion of these potentially very vexed 
questions of dialogue and identification is by Richard Parish: "«Mais qui parle?» 
Voice and Persona in the Pensees" Seventeenth-Century French Studies (VIII: 
1986), pp. 23-40. 
7. See n° 257. 
8. N° no;cf. n°382. 
9. See his graphic plan {Approches pascaliennes, p. 40) where he marks a 
break here between the "preliminaires a PApologie" and the outline or "dessein 
de PApologie elle—meme" which follows it. 
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10. Oeuvres completes, 356. This contrasts with Pascal's apparent disavowal 
of the principle earlier in the same text: "tout ce qu'il y a d'hommes sont presque 
toujours emportes a croire non pas par la preuve, mais par l'agrement. Cette voie 
est basse, indigne et etrangere: aussi tout le monde le desavoue [. . . ] Je ne parle 
pas ici des verites divines, que je n'aurais garde de faire tomber sous l'art de 
persuader, car elles sont infiniment au-dessus de la nature . . ." (Ibid., 355). 
11. The Origins of Certainty, pp. 4-5: "Pascal appears to see proof as implied 
in a play of suppositions and what may be advanced as suitable presuppositions. 
Since he is not discovering the truth but defending it, he starts logically with 
suppositions and moves backward to what they presuppose [ • . . ] Pascal char­
acteristically begins with Nature and Scripture, with man and God; the proofs 
we find relate to these two." 
12. And, of course, its simple meaning will have to be explored. Ernst (Ap­
proches pascaliennes, p. 34) reads: "Dans la Lettre «De l'Injustice» peut venir la 
plaisanterie . .  . "; this enables him to speculate at some length about the differ­
ence between this and other Lettres. Pugh follows him (The Composition of Pas-
cal's Apologia, p. 32). Sellier places a comma after "venir," yet somewhat 
perversely makes the words that follow it into a separate paragraph. One might 
construe "de l'injustice" in the Lafuma text as a partitive. 
13. "Voice and Persona," 23. 
14. Pascal: Pensees (London: 1983), p. 35. 
15. Here I have preferred Sellier's punctuation (ed. cit., 319, n° 635). The 
fragment is n° 771 in Lafuma. 
Toward a Semiotics of Blaise Pascal's Pensees: 
A Model for Geometrical and 
Rhetorical Persuasions 
Roland A. Champagne 
Tout auteur a un sens auquel tous les passages contraires s'accor-
dent ou il n'a point de sens du tout. 
BLAISE PASCAL, Pensees1 
L'important n'est done pas le temps ou l'espace mais, comme 
l'ecrit Khlebnikov, "la mesure, Pordre et l'harmonie." Son but 
premier est de denoncer le "soi-disant hasard," de montrer qu'il 
n'y a rien de fortuit, que Parbitraire n'est rien d'autre qu'une re­
lation encore ignoree. L'harmonie universelle regne; l'homme 
doit l'honorer par un calcul generalise, qui en revelera les regies. 
TZVETAN TODOROV, Poetique de la prose2 
The Pensees of Blaise Pascal constitute a rich document for the applica­
tion of computer technology to the semiotics of epistemology. "Semio­
tics" is understood here to mean the rhetorical communication used by 
Pascal, and epistemology is the progress toward certitude he was dem­
onstrating to his Interlocutor. The content of the Pensees was concerned 
with the attainment of certain knowledge by the Interlocutor, and yet its 
fragmentary and incomplete form apparently vitiates the coherence of the 
presentation. This form, however, is also an ideal testing ground for the 
assimilating and organizational potential of the computer to confirm 
the deceptiveness of appearances and the bedrock of underlying unity in 
Pascal's presentation of the struggle for knowledge. 
As a mathematician and "moraliste," Pascal certainly had the inclina­
tion in the Pensees to examine the ties between his mathematical and his 
rhetorical concerns. Prior to this work, he had published an essay on the 
geometrical properties of cones (1640) and also a proposal for an "arith­
metic machine" called a "pascalien" (1642). These mathematical con­
cerns give us some of the keys to unlock his Penstes from the apparent 
confusion of its fragmented appearance. We may thereby gain access to 
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the unity of this rhetorical piece and to Pascal's insights into the mathe­
matical precision of human understanding. In seeking this unity, the com­
puter, as exemplified by the Davidson-Dube Concordance to the Pensees,3 
has indeed already revealed subtle components and patterns among Pas-
cal's reflections. In this essay, I will concentrate on Pascal's presentation 
of the problems with time because Pascalian time contains the vital prop­
erties of knowledge in that he used his spatial or geometrical sensitivity 
to reveal the existential bond between time and being. 
In his earlier work, Pascal observed that "la geometrie . .  . a explique 
l'art de decouvrir les verites inconnues; et ce qu'elle appelle analyse."4 
But even prior to analysis, the information in question must be gathered 
and organized in a certain manner so that the perspectives of geometry 
can be applied and studied in discovering "les verites inconnues." A case 
in point is Pascal's own Pensees whereby he sought to convince an unsym­
pathetic Interlocutor of the need for religious faith. Prior to this work, 
Pascal had learned from geometry what he called "l'art de persuader."5 
He later distinguished geometrical proofs from syllogistic and dialectical 
ones. In his concerns with the nature of time in the Pensees, Pascal linked 
all three types of proof in order to isolate the quantitative and qualitative 
certainties about time, a phenomenon which appeared to be relative to 
the observer. Quantitatively, time engaged the Interlocutor thus: "Com-
bien de temps faut-il? Un temps proportionne a notre duree vaine et che­
tive" (31). Likewise, a qualitative perception of time appears arbitrary. 
For example, Pascal noted that "toute histoire qui n'est pas contempo­
raine est suspecte" (436). 
However, Pascal set out to engage the Interlocutor in a discussion that 
would lead toward certainty. The geometrical, syllogistic, and dialectical 
modes of reasoning about time were especially appropriate. Professor 
Davidson, in his Origins of Certainty, gave us one of his now classic 
"schemas," used in this case as a graphic means to "promote the intelli­
gibility" of Pascal's nuances in the procession toward certainty: 
geometrical 
by reasoning— syllogistic mind 
Proofs dialectical from above reason; i
 n e a r  t 
by intervention agent = God J 
of an agent —pragmatic from below reason; n 
agent = habit6 J body 
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Within this "schema," we isolate the model of geometrical proof lay­
ing the basis for a procedure whereby the human mind could proceed in 
an architectural fashion, building a pyramidal scaffold (figure i) pointing 
toward KNOWLEDGE at the apex of the structure. The pyramid is based 
(figure 2) on axioms, demonstrations, and definitions. Each of its three 
sides (figures 3, 4, and 5) has a method to attain KNOWLEDGE. Episte­
mology, rhetoric, and argumentation are all modes in the procession to­
ward certainty. For epistemology, intuition provides the resolution for the 
conflict between reason and sense-perception. For rhetoric, thesis and 
antithesis can be attenuated through analogy. For argumentation, in this 
case about the problem of time, the contrary views of time as present 
moment and movement can be absorbed within the larger framework of 
time as duration. This pyramidal form exemplifies Pascal's ternary logic 
in the Pensees and enables us to understand his insights into time and 
being therein. 
The use of definitions, axioms, and demonstrations as a model of ter­
nary logic has survived Pascal's own geometrical sensibility to be a sign 
of modern times also. Anthony Wilden for example discusses this ternary 
logic as the heart of the analog and digital language of computer tech-
nology.7 Hence, the "pascalien," which may have seemed impractical to 
seventeenth-century society, may be lurking in the structure of the rheto­
ric in the Pensees. For example, there is a scientific model for Pascal's 
dialogical presentation of time. Louis Marin noted in his semiological 
studies of Pascal that "the Pensees constitute a sort of text-laboratory that 
permits the production of a text to be tested against its form which is the 
fragment, against its discursive mode which is interruption, and against 
its own logic which is digression."8 The test for us here is to discover how 
Pascal's rhetoric, with its triangular structure (figure 3), is viable as per­
suasion within such a context. 
In his essay on the "art of persuasion," Pascal observed that disagree­
ment is a common human problem because of the inconstancy of human 
whims.9 However, his Pensees also point out that the multiplicity of opin­
ions is necessary: "La multitude qui ne se reduit pas a Punite est confu­
sion; Punite qui ne depend pas de la multitude est tyrannie" (604). The 
computer respects this tension by providing us with a concordance that 
allows us to see the unity of the text without disavowing its components. 
Appropriately, Pascal recalled Zeno of Elea's Paradox in explaining ap­
parent spatial contradictions in geometry through temporal infinity (part 
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Pascal's Ternary Logic 
THE PYRAMID OF RHETORIC 
Figure I 
demonstrations analogy 
explicit BASE self- thesis SIDE I antithesis 
& univocal Figure II evident Figure III 
definitions 
intuition duration 
sense SIDE 1 reason present SIDE 1, movement 
Figure IV moment Figure V 
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of Parmenides' argument for essential being rather than the plurality of 
change). 
In order to allow his Interlocutor to see the unity of argument in the 
Pensees, Pascal utilized the scientific method of geometrical certitude. His 
discursive grasp of "time" exemplified the rigor of this method and uni­
fied his discourse. The notion of time was crucial for Pascal because by it 
the interlocutor could use the three faculties of knowing—sense-
perception, reason, and intuition (figure 4)—in order to measure and 
observe the proportions and disproportions of the universe. 
The Davidson-Dube Concordance to the Pensees is especially helpful 
in orienting the reading of time in Pascal's work. This concordance gives 
us the principal allusions to time both by frequency lists of the predomi­
nant temporal themes and by their location in certain sections of Pascal's 
discussions. With this information, the reader can return to the Pensees 
and be more apprehensive about the pivotal references to time and to the 
contexts of their occurrences. The ternary logic of geometry then surfaces 
as Pascal views the paradoxical nature of human time. 
On the one hand, the human faculty of sense perception (figures 4 and 
5) influences humanity to prefer the isolated present moment when re­
flecting upon time. Georges Poulet, in his presentation of Pascal's sense of 
time, identified such a human feeling thus: "la tragique et l'absurde de la 
condition humaine, c'est que l'homme apparaisse comme incapable de 
renoncer a son present et d'opter pour le futur."10 Hence, time is defined 
as the present moment. The Concordance isolates significant recurrences 
of such words as "durer" (35 times) and "present" (26 times). Pascal 
observed in one of his reflections (199) that humanity needs time to en­
dure. The Interlocutor's own life could well be measured in this manner. 
Yet Pascal was not content with such a definition because he was aware 
that "le present d'ordinaire nous blesse" (47). The word "temps" occurs 
on 144 occasions within the Pensees. However, the contexts of that word 
indicate Pascal's need for precision. The most frequent words associated 
with time—"meme" (16 times), "a" (19 times), and "qui" (16 times)— 
indicate Pascal's concern with specifying the word further. He observed 
that " . .  . nous errons dans des temps qui ne sont point notres . . ." (47). 
So the present moment is an illusion about what time appears to be to 
our sense perceptions. 
On the other hand, the human faculty of reason, the second means of 
epistemological apprehension (figure 4), provides proofs that time is a 
dialectical problem of moment and movement. Haunted by his rhetorical 
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need for "le renversement continuel du pour et du contre,'11 Pascal real­
ized that rational proofs can be given for "Pecoulement du temps" (131) 
from the past (human memory as proof, 47), to the present (which can't 
be sustained despite the human predilection for an eternal present, 489), 
and on to the future (the moment about which we have no assurance 
of attainment, only a faint glimmer of a dream). Humanity is caught 
in a vortex of infinite time, within which human time dialogically con­
tains man. The Dasein or Awareness of Being, so well-conceived 
by Martin Heidegger in his Being and Time,11 was already understood 
by Pascal in his rhetorical sense of engaging the Interlocutor with the 
authenticity of living ("ex-istence" and "ec-stasy" literally point to 
stepping outside of infinite time while still being involved in human 
time). 
Humanity is so haunted by "Pecoulement du temps" that distractions 
must be sought. Ironically, "ils croient chercher sincerement le repos et 
ne cherchent en effet que l'agitation" (136). Time does not appear to 
console in the long run: "Le temps guerit les douleurs et les querelles 
parce qu'on change; on n'est plus la meme personne; ni l'offensant, ni 
l'offense ne sont plus eux-memes" (802). However, the human aging pro­
cess is measured against time also. Time as history-in-the-making allows 
us to measure our human shortcomings and weaknesses. Pascal referred 
to Biblical history for ample evidence of predictions which, when ful­
filled, prove the rational contradiction of time as moment and movement. 
The word "predit" recurs on 63 occasions throughout the Pensees to 
reinforce the importance of prophecies as testimonies to the dialectic of 
time. The Scriptures thus depict "le mouvement infini, le point qui rem­
plit tout, le moment de repos" (682). The Interlocutor is called upon to 
respect the prophetic fulfillment of "Jesus Christ predit et predisant" 
(462). While Pascal observes that "tous les hommes passeront et seront 
consommes par le temps" (483), he points to the example of Christ as 
"un homme qui predit clairement des choses qui arrivent et qui declarent 
son dessein .  . ." (344). Although reason allows us to read and to learn 
from the Bible, that human faculty does not take us beyond the contra­
diction which is human time. It is within human time where the uncer­
tainties of life are encountered by Pascal, portraying that condition in this 
way: 
Voila notre etat veritable. C'est ce qui nous rend incapables de savoir 
ccrtainement et d'ignorer absolument. Nous voguons sur un milieu vaste, 
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toujours incertains et flottants, pousses d'un bout vers l'autre; quelque 
terme ou nous pensions nous attacher et nous affermir, il branle, et nous 
quitte, et si nous le suivons il echappe a nos prises, nous glisse et fuit d'une 
fuite eternelle; rien ne s'arrete pour nous. [199] 
Hence, Pascal must look elsewhere because, as Professor Davidson has 
noted: "Pascal cannot start with religious beliefs, but he must locate 
something equally firm; and we know that he eventually finds it in the 
instabilities and contradictions of human nature, in the everlasting con­
flict between what man wants and thinks he is entitled to—truth and 
happiness—and what he can actually have."13 
It is the third order of human learning, that of intuition (also called 
the order of will, 933), which allows Pascal to take the Interlocutor be­
yond the contradictions of finite time. Having established the axioms of 
time as moment and as contradictory events (figure 5), Pascal moves to 
the third side of his geometrical base—that of demonstration (figure 2). 
Not being able to resolve the contradiction about time by the powers of 
sense-perception or reason, he moves into an analogical discussion (figure 
3) whereby the apparent contradiction is understood within the larger 
context of nonhuman, that is, divine, duration. 
The proportions of human time become upset when presented in a 
larger framework as Pascal noted "la petite duree de ma vie absorbee 
dans l'eternite precedente et suivante" (68). Gradually, we begin to realize 
that "tout cet ecoulement de temps, de la vie, et ces divers corps que nous 
sentons, ces differentes pensees qui nous y agitent n'etant peut-etre que 
des illusions pareilles a Pecoulement du temps et aux vains fantomes de 
nos songes" (131). In this section on the "Disproportion of Humanity," 
Pascal also discussed the two infinities of massive and minute size. The 
introduction of the two infinities into the discussion takes the Interlocu­
tor into another epistemological order wherein intuition plays a key role. 
Time is relevant to the infinities because perpetuity is posited as the con­
text of human time just as infinity is the context for finite human propor­
tions. Before this "secret impenetrable" (199) of the most minute part of 
a second on the one hand and the most expansive epoch on the other 
hand, Pascal invited the Interlocutor to observe the security of Christian 
Law (149) and Religion (281) which endured because of divine presence 
among men. Such a context created by divine time transforms the appar­
ent contradiction previously identified in human time. The duration of 
eternity encompasses human time such that "rien ne peut fixer le fini 
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entre les deux infinis qui l'enferment et le fuient" (199). Instead of the 
contradiction observed by reason, there is a unity within the universe. 
That unity is the intuitive order of eternity which leads Pascal the apolo­
gist to his wager. The cohesive structure of that eternity ("Je ne vois que 
des infinites de toutes parts, qui m'enferment comme un atome et comme 
une ombre qui ne dure qu'un instant sans retour," 427) is thus demon­
strated by the ternary logic of geometrical definitions, axioms, and dem­
onstrations (see figure 5) as well as the three-dimensional pyramidal form 
rather than a simple triangular argument on a single plane. 
Similar to the multiplicity of fragments and the twenty-seven struc­
tured chapters of the Pensees linked by the geometrical rhetoric of Pascal, 
the problem of human time is likewise governed by a unity which subtly 
leads the Interlocutor toward certainty. Thus, Pascal's celebrated "esprit 
de geometrie" gave a formal identity to the more obvious stylistic proce­
dure of the "esprit de finesse." Pascal himself observed that "la multitude 
qui ne se reduit pas a l'unite est confusion" (604). Yet his conscious de­
sign for the Pensees was not concerned with imposing that unity as he 
remarked: "J'ecrirai ici mes pensees sans ordre et non pas peut-etre dans 
une confusion sans dessein. C'est le veritable ordre et qui marquera tou­
jours mon objet par le desordre meme" (532). Nevertheless, there is a 
geometrical strain that unites the rhetoric of the Pensees despite Pascal's 
conscious aims. It was Pascal himself who pointed out that "tout auteur 
a un sens auquel tous les passages contraires s'accordent ou il n'a point 
de sens du tout" (257). His own example suggests that we can learn much 
about the proportion and order of discourse from mathematics. There is 
more that needs to be discovered so that we can establish, with the aid of 
a computer, a calculus of the rules of rhetoric. Jacques Derrida, in his De 
la grammatologie, announced the hopes of such studies for those of us 
interested in semiotics: "Mais au-dela des mathematiques theoriques, le 
developpement des pratiques de l'information etend largement les possi­
bilites du 'message,' jusqu'au point ou celui-ci n'est plus la traduction 
ecrite d'un langage, le transport d'un signifie qui pourrait rester parle 
dans son integrite."14 Pascal's Pensees exemplify this extended under­
standing of the "message" in a written document. As we discover the 
subtle principles of rhetorical organization in the structure of this docu­
ment, we begin to appreciate Pascal's sensitivity to how our being inter­
acts with time by exemplifying how his Interlocutor interacts with 
learning. 
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Resisting the Pull: 
Pierre Nicole on the Inclination to Sin 
Bruce H. Davis 
A major concern of Pierre Nicole's in his Essais de morale is the soul's 
preference for the world and its objects, as opposed to God, a problem 
that he poses in terms of man's insensitivity to the Creator: 
II est d'autant plus important, que Tame s'applique a considerer les causes 
de son insensibilite pour Dieu. . .  . Car c'est ce qui nous donne entree dans 
Tame, aux impressions des objets des sens, qui seraient peu capables de la 
toucher, si elle l'etait autant qu'elle le devrait etre des choses de l'autre 
v i e . . .  . [C]'est cette insensibilite pour Dieu, qui la rend sensible pour les 
creatures, parce qu'elle ne saurait etre sans quelque pente, et qu'il faut 
toujours qu'elle s'attache a quelque objet. Ainsi un de ses principaux de­
voirs, c'est de tacher d'en reconnaitre les causes, et d'y apporter tous les 
remedes qui lui sont possibles.1 
The indifference for God that Nicole talks about here and the soul's vul­
nerability to sense impressions are constant reflexes of his thought. Man's 
indifference to the Creator, however, does not necessarily explain the 
soul's preference for the world and its objects, a preference that distin­
guishes fallen nature, according to Nicole. This "insensibilite," as one 
might expect, is merely symptomatic of a more profound disorder, a dis­
order that is not limited to heathens. Indeed, the susceptibility of Chris­
tians to the objects of the world, "quelque innocents qu'ils puissent etre" 
("De la Vigilance chretienne," IV: 296; hereafter cited as "VC"), seems 
equally widespread; even the men "que Dieu a eclaires par de si pures 
lumieres" remain subject to the "bagatelles du monde" ("De la Faiblesse 
de Phomme," I: 62; hereafter cited as "FH"). Furthermore, we know that 
innocent Adam was subject to these same sense impressions without pre­
ferring the world to God. What is different about the soul of post­
peccatum man? 
In analyzing this problem the theologian or moralist inspired by St. 
Augustine reveals few hesitations. According to Augustine, the perfect 
rectitude of the soul of innocent Adam has been replaced in fallen man 
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by a disorder in which a sick and evil will (and/or heart) dominates. Sin 
has become, as it were, instinctive in fallen man, and the natural inclina­
tion to sin reveals itself whenever a man chooses the world and its objects 
over God. This preference or, more precisely, this desire for the world is 
what Augustinians call concupiscence. From an Augustinian perspective, 
of course, God is the only proper object of man's desire—all other ob­
jects, if they are desired and loved for themselves, are necessarily evil. 
Augustine thus distinguishes, in the familiar passage from the City of 
God, two categories of objects and two types of love: "Two loves have 
thus built two cities: the love of self to the point of despising God has 
built the earthly City; the love of God to the point of despising oneself 
has built the heavenly City."2 Since men desire and love those objects that 
please them the most, the law of delectation,3 and since the man without 
grace necessarily finds temporal objects more pleasing than spiritual ob­
jects (because of the evil will/heart), it follows that in every instance and 
at every moment fallen man will reject God in favor of the world, unless 
the will is healed by grace. 
Given the eclectic nature of his thought and the unsystematic arrange­
ment of the Essais, it is not always clear to what extent Pierre Nicole 
subscribes to Augustine's analysis of the springs governing human choice, 
which is to say, the factors that determine the human appetite. While on 
the one hand endorsing the Augustinian law of delectation, which makes 
choice more or less synonymous with the pleasure that one finds in an 
object, Nicole on the other hand often appears to have been influenced 
by the Thomist model according to which the will follows, or at least 
should follow, the recommendations of the reason.4 Despite this hesita­
tion or confusion, there is little doubt that Nicole's conception of the 
sensitive appetite is inspired by Augustinian and biblical psychology. He 
gives expression to the dynamic nature of this psychology in numerous 
passages in the Essais de morale: 
. .  . il ne s'y faut pas tromper. II faut que Dieu, ou le diable, regne en nous. 
II n'y a point de milieu. Quiconque ne travaille point a etablir en soi le 
regne de Dieu, travaille a y etablir le regne du diable. Dieu y regne quand 
son Esprit y regne, quand c'est par son Esprit que nous agissons. . . . Le 
diable y regne quand nous nous laissons conduire a nos passions . . . , en 
un mot quand ce n'est que la cupidite qui agit en nous. ["Des Quatre 
Dernieres Fins de 1'homme," IV: 78; hereafter cited as "QDF"]5 
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.  . . il [l'homme] est oblige . . . de reconnaitre qu'il a dans le fond du coeur 
une pente contraire a cet amour [la charite], qui le porte a aimer les crea­
tures, a s'y attacher, et a en jouir. Cette pente est un effet de la corruption 
originelle, qui domine dans ceux qui ne sont pas encore justifies, et qui 
reste, quoiqu'elle ne domine pas dans ceux qui le sont. C'est cette pente 
qu'on appelle la concupiscence, qui sollicite au mal les plus justes, qui 
excite en eux de mauvais desirs, qu'ils sont continuellement obliges de 
reprimer. ["L'Emploi d'une maitresse des novices," V: 217-218] 
Nicole poses in the starkest of terms here the choice confronting man— 
God or Satan, the Creator or the creation—and the expression is an un­
mistakable echo of Augustine's (and Port Royal's)6 "either/or" perspec­
tive on the human condition. The antithesis that Nicole expresses so 
powerfully in these passages is at the very center of the Augustinian dia­
lectic. Indeed, one might argue convincingly that Augustine's thought, 
reduced to its essential components, is only about this choice confronting 
all men. From another point of view, however, it might be asserted that 
although Augustine's thought is about a choice—God or the world— 
words like "choice" and "choose" really have no place in his lexicon. 
Men of course do make choices and do perform free acts; but, for the 
Augustinian, all choices ultimately fall into one of two categories: those 
inspired by a love of God or those inspired by a love of the world. Because 
of a choice made by the first man, all men born into this world, unless 
aided by divine grace, infallibly—although freely7—choose objects that 
are temporal in nature and therefore inappropriate to their end. Given 
this unhappy situation, words like "orientation" and "inclination" seem 
to represent the Augustinian psychological framework more accurately 
than a word like "choice." According to this view, which synthesizes Au-
gustine's psychology and theology, men are oriented in one of two direc-
tions—toward the Creator or toward the creation—and inclined to love 
one or the other. For a moralist like Nicole, however, the apparent inevi­
tability of the choice—and here we are close to the whole question of 
determinism in the thought of Augustine—does not release men from 
choosing and from striving to choose correctly: "La vie presente par la­
quelle on doit passer, ne lui [a l'homme] est donnee que pour choix de 
1'un ou de l'autre de ces deux etats [l'Enfer ou le Paradis]; et ce choix doit 
etre l'unique emploi et l'unique exercice de sa vie" ("QDF," IV: 180). 
In the two passages quoted above, Nicole reproduces with absolute 
accuracy all the elements of the Augustinian view of nature: original sin, 
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concupiscence, the theory of the two loves—everything is present. This 
pessimistic view of things is of course explained by the doctrine of the 
Fall, a doctrine that informs and colors all Nicole's thinking on the rela­
tion between nature and supernature. Central to this doctrine is the 
notion that all men share in Adam's sin—even the most righteous 
(-appearing) among them. The somewhat puzzling phenomenon of the 
inclination to sin found in justified Christians, alluded to earlier, as well 
as their apparent nonchalance in the face of eternal damnation,8 surprises 
less when we learn that such a tendency persists in all of Adam's heirs 
and "stimulates evil desires" whenever it is not opposed by the contrary 
orientation of charity. 
Although it might seem that one could easily identify the two orienta­
tions or "pentes" (Nicole's preferred word) that "determine" our behav­
ior, by analyzing and classifying the acts proceeding from them, such is 
not always the case. In theory, we would assume that those men whose 
acts are virtuous, as the world commonly understands that word, are 
turned in the direction of God, while the opposite would be true of men 
whose actions are vicious. For an Augustinian like Nicole, such an anal­
ysis is simply naive. While it is true that those acts that men recognize as 
vicious are performed by individuals estranged from the Creator, it is by 
no means certain that "good" acts are performed by men of virtue and 
are thus meritorious. The key to sorting this out lies in the distinction 
between exterior and interior acts, between what we "feel" in our heart 
and what we do; a man who gives alms in order to gain the admiration 
of his fellow men, with no thought to helping the poor, is, many of us 
would agree, performing a "good" work, but his intention is vicious, 
because his end is himself ("De PHumilite dans les oeuvres de charite," 
VI: 59).9 Thus, there is seldom, as Nicole recognizes, a direct correlation 
between a man's exterior and interior actions, between what the world 
sees and what lies in a man's heart: 
II y a cette difference entre les actions exterieures et les interieures, que 
Ton connait beaucoup mieux si les actions exterieures sont conformes ou 
contraires a loi [sic] de Dieu, que Ton ne le sait des interieures, qui sont 
couvertes souvent par les nuages, que la concupiscence y repand; en sorte 
que nous ne saurions assurer si nous avons le fond du coeur dans Petat ou 
Dieu veut que nous l'ayons. ["De la Soumission a la volonte de Dieu," I: 
89; hereafter cited as "SVD"] 
. . . cette innocence exterieure, qui ne consiste que dans l'observation des 
devoirs exterieurs de la Religion Chretienne est un signe fort equivoque 
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de la grace, et de l'innocence interieure, puisque ce peut etre un pur effet 
de la coutume, de l'habitude, de la vue des creatures, et d'une crainte 
purement humaine. ["CD," I: 163—64] 
This discrepancy between what others see and what lies in our heart is 
often paralleled by the language that we use. We say one thing, but mean 
another, and thereby risk falling into that category of men about whom 
God says, " 'Ce peuple m'honore des levres, et son coeur est fort eloigne 
de moi'" (Isa.xxix.13; quoted in "CD," I: 164). This is a serious and 
frightening charge, but a charge that is completely justified by the content 
of a man's heart. We give alms, but for the wrong reason. On the other 
hand, however, the desire to deceive God conceals itself with such finesse 
that men are often unaware of its existence; thus, the man who denies 
that there is a contradiction between what he says (or feels) and does is, 
paradoxically, both lying and telling the truth. Hearts have reasons of 
their own, as Pascal knew and as we shall see. 
The attempt to learn more about the discrepancy between what men feel 
and do requires a descent to the level of the inner person. According to 
Nicole's topography of the soul, the heart is located in the most profound 
depths of the individual. Here, Nicole makes an unsettling discovery con­
cerning the ancient philosophic rule that urges men to know themselves.10 
While the moralist certainly agrees that this principle is the foundation 
of virtue—he quotes St. Bernard and St. Augustine to this effect ("CSM," 
III: 39)—he also reveals more than a little pessimism regarding the suc­
cessful outcome of the endeavor: "II ne faut pas . . . pretendre, quelque 
progres qu'on fasse, de pouvoir jamais arriver a se connaitre parfaite­
ment; il y a toujours dans le coeur de l'homme, tant qu'il est en cette vie, 
des abimes impenetrables a toutes ces recherches" ("CSM," III: 1 1 6 -
17).11 Even given these natural limitations (natural only since the Fall), 
men could know more about themselves than they normally do, asserts 
Nicole. If men do not know themselves better, it is often because they 
reject such knowledge: " . .  . ce qui fait qu'on ne se connait pas, c'est 
qu'on ne le desire pas pleinement; et qu'on nourrit dans le fond de son 
coeur un eloignement secret de la verite" ("CSM," III: 54). Regarding 
this aversion for the truth, Nicole recalls Paul's appeal to the Colossians: 
. . . il [Paul] nous apprend . . . que lorsqu'on demande a Dieu de connaitre 
sa volonte, il faut avoir un desir sincere de la connaitre toute entiere, et 
qu'il ne faut pas avoir dans le coeur des reserves volontaires, par lesquelles 
nous souhaitions de ne la pas connaitre en quelque point, de peur de nous 
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croire obliges de Paccomplir. . . . Nous avons presque tous de certains 
defauts auxquels nous ne voulons pas toucher, et que nous cachons . .  . a 
Dieu et a nous-memes. Et c'est pourquoi saint Paul ne souhaite pas seule­
ment aux Colossiens, qu'ils connaissent la volonte de Dieu; mais il leur 
souhaite encore qu'ils soient remplis de cette connaissance . . . c'est-a-dire, 
qu'il n'y ait point de replis secrets dans leur esprit, et dans leur coeur, ou 
cette divine lumiere ne penetre, et qu'ils n'aient point d'attaches volon­
taires qui empechent que Dieu ne les remplisse de sa lumiere et de sa grace. 
["SVD," I: 82-83] 
We see in this passage, with its depiction of wills in conflict (divine will 
vs. human will), what some of the heart's reasons might be. First Nicole 
tells us that self-knowledge depends on the extent to which the heart 
recognizes and renounces its "volontary attachments"—something it is 
loathe to do—and welcomes the divine light that illumines its interior in 
such a way that hiding places for favorite vices become impossible. The 
metaphor of the heart as a vessel is not only traditional, but is also effec­
tive in showing how knowledge of God's will must fill the heart (we recall 
that either God or Satan must reign there). We also see here that self-
knowledge (awareness of what lies in our heart) and knowledge of God's 
will (what God wants) are merely different aspects of the same endeavor, 
which is to know the truth. One implies the other; when we know God's 
will, we know ourselves, and, consequently, when we reject knowledge 
of the one, we reject the other. There are among Christians, Nicole be­
lieves, men who show some signs of desiring to know the truth, that is, 
who wish to abandon the world in order to know God more perfectly. 
However, because the resistance to truth inspired by concupiscence is too 
powerful, there coexists with the desire to know and love God an equal 
or greater desire to hold on to the world at all costs. Now, while this 
attachment for the world is certainly inappropriate, it is also, in Nicole's 
view, understandable. Men are weak, and this is true of Christians as well 
as of heathens. As Nicole often observes in the Essais, echoing Pascal, 
they are seeking an "assiette,"12 which will give them a feeling of stability 
in an unstable world. As I understand Nicole's use of this word, the as­
siette depends for its steadiness on the world of familiar objects that sur­
rounds men.13 To abandon the attaches volontaires (in the passage quoted 
above), which confer a sense of security in an alien universe, requires a 
stronger desire to love God and a steadier faith than most men have. 
For—and this is essential—the commitment to God must be or become 
total; otherwise, the heart will remain "partage" ("CSM," 111: 55): "On 
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cherche Dieu et le monde ensemble; le coeur est bien-aise de plaire a Pun 
et a l'autre . . ." ("De la Charite et de Pamour-propre," III: 168-69 ; here­
after cited as "CAP"). Thus, while there are some men, observes Nicole, 
who are praying to God to receive the divine illumination that will pene­
trate the soul's deepest recesses, shining light into shadowy places and 
replacing blindness with sight and insight, all too often these prayers 
emanate from a divided heart, which resists abandoning those vices and 
objects that comfort: 
Us exposent a Dieu tout le reste de leur coeur; mais pour ce repli ou ils 
ont mis ces imperfections qu'ils cherissent, ils se donnent bien de garde de 
le decouvrir. . .  . Ils recitent tous les jours ce Psaume qui ne contient que 
cette unique priere [de connaitre la volonte de Dieu], et il leur semble 
qu'ils le font de tout leur coeur. Mais c'est qu'outre ce coeur qui prononce 
ces prieres, ils en ont encore un autre qui les desavoue. Ils en ont un pour 
Dieu, et un pour eux-memes. Ils en ont un qui desire d'obeir a Dieu dans 
quelques actions qui ne leur sont pas fort penibles; et ils en ont un autre, 
qui voulant demeurer attache a certaines choses, ne veut pas connaitre 
qu'elles soient mauvaises. ["SVD," I: 84] 
The antithetical tendency of Nicole's way of looking at human nature 
is nowhere more evident than in this analysis of the ways in which man's 
heart deceives him and tries to deceive God. Just as there are two oppos­
ing cities and two contrary loves, we now learn that there are also two 
hearts, one for the world and one for God. There is, however, another 
antithesis at work here, this one within the larger context of Nicole's 
morale. Although the author of the Essais condemns the coeur double 
described above (he quotes Ecclesiastes ii.14 at the end of the cited pas­
sage: "'Malheur a ceux qui ont le coeur double.'"), confirming once 
again his Augustinianism, it does seem that his account of two loves and 
two hearts coexisting within the soul—this coexistence is, granted, prob-
lematic—indicates an important shift in perspective.14 The law of the two 
loves, with its implicit notion of their mutual incompatibility, has been 
somewhat moderated. Man loves God or the world becomes man loves 
(or is trying to love) God and the world. However, while this transcend­
ence of the Augustinian law is an important movement in Nicole's dialec­
tic, it is only temporary. For Nicole recognizes that a heart divided 
between a love of the world and a love of God is not going to carry a man 
very far on the road to the Creator; indeed—and on this point Nicole is 
not in the least equivocal—the tendency of our love for God must be in 
the direction of exclusiveness: "Dieu ne demande proprement des 
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hommes que leur amour: mais aussi il le demande tout entier, et il n'y 
veut point de partage . . ." ("De la Comedie," III: 229). Nicole must be 
firm about this because, as he goes on to say, man's end is God and God 
alone. It does seem, however, that the divided heart could be a necessary 
point of departure for the rehabilitation that must take place. In any case, 
Nicole's analysis of what is happening on the level of the inner man seems 
inspired by acquaintance with real men living in a dangerous world of 
difficult moral choices. And when they examine their heart, these men 
find, Nicole suggests, an uneasy balance where the desire to know and 
love the world is accompanied by a desire to know and love God. 
At the beginning of this discussion we saw that concupiscence is that love 
of the world and its objects that competes in the soul of fallen man with 
the love of God. The man who undertakes the self-examination urged by 
Nicole soon discovers, however, that concupiscence is more than a simple 
love of the world. It is first of all a love of self whose tendencies are so 
singular and whose hold on fallen man is so tyrannical that Nicole has 
no doubt that this unfortunate legacy of the first man is the principle of 
all human crimes "depuis les plus legers jusqu'aux plus detestables," 
("CAP," III: 124). "Adam," Nicole reminds us, "ne s'est perdu dans son 
innocence qu'en oubliant Dieu, et en s'attachant dans cet oubli a la con­
templation de la beaute des creatures et de soi-meme. Combien l'homme 
pecheur est-il plus capable de se corrompre par la meme voie?" ("Dan­
gers des entretiens des hommes," II: 56; hereafter cited as "DEH"). Thus, 
sin after the Fall continues to be an imitation of the sin of the first man. 
Although one might be tempted to compare amour-propre to the prin­
ciple of self-preservation,15 thereby demonstrating that love of self is a 
completely natural and necessary law of the human condition, there is, 
however, at least one radical difference here. If it is true that amour­
propre is a law of nature, it is also true that it is a law of a fallen and 
corrupt nature whose desires and love became focused on the self only 
when Adam turned away from God. It is the loss of original happiness, 
and the resulting void, that explains man's attraction to the world and 
love of self.16 
Given the horror that the concept of self-love exercises on the Augus­
tinian imagination, we should not be too surprised by the violence of the 
images chosen by Nicole to convey concupiscence's despotic nature: 
Voila le monstre que nous renfermons dans notre sein, il vit et regne ab­
solument en nous, a moins que Dieu n'ait detruit son empire, en versant 
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un autre amour dans notre coeur; il est le principe de toutes les actions 
qui n'en ont point d'autre que la nature corrompue; et bien loin qu'il nous 
fasse de l'horreur, nous n'aimons et ne haissons toutes les choses qui sont 
hors de nous, que selon qu'elles sont conformes ou contraires a ses incli­
nations. ["CAP," III: 124] 
Despite the familiarity of the theme here, Nicole's expression is stirring 
and fresh, with the power of his description deriving from the aptness of 
the metaphor. The comparison to a monster is apt because concu­
piscence, like a monster, is an all-powerful, even overpowering, force 
and, more importantly, is a force for evil. The energy of the image is 
reinforced by the words, "empire," "vit," and "regne." The two verbs are 
especially disturbing. For Nicole, amour-propre is a living and, we as­
sume, growing thing; it reigns "absolutely" in the heart in such a way 
that a man is, for the most part, impotent to control its movements. 
While the notion of concupiscence as a dynamic and uncontrollable 
force—pulling man away from God in the direction of the world—is in 
itself unsettling, amour-propre frightens Nicole and should frighten his 
reader for another, more basic reason. We know of course that this fun­
damental orientation, which inclines men to find delight in themselves 
and in the world, is changed only by the unmeritable gift of divine grace. 
The Augustinian moralist, never forgetting the seriousness of Adam's sin, 
has an additional reason for his pessimism. Not only is man corrupt from 
head to toe ("CSM," III: 63), but this corruption, this insensibilite for 
God, is, quite simply, an irremediable defect of fallen nature: 
On a deja fait voir que cette malheureuse inclination etait devenue natu­
relle a l'homme depuis le peche; et il faut ajouter ici, que la grace ne la 
detruit jamais entierement; et que quelque desir qu'elle nous inspire de ne 
nous pas aveugler nous-memes, il reste toujours . .  . dans le fond du vieil 
homme une pente vers cet aveuglement volontaire. . .  . ["CSM," III: 54] 
We see in this passage, and elsewhere in the Essais, one of the fundamen­
tal principles of Nicole's view of man after the Fall; Adam's sin caused a 
profound mutation in human nature. Consequently, the roots of corrup­
tion plunge themselves to such depths within the heart and resist efforts 
to destroy them so successfully that they are always producing, Nicole 
maintains, "quelque gout pour les biens de la terre, et quelque degout 
pour les biens du Gel" ("QDF," IV: 185). In reading these passages, 
which faithfully echo Augustine,17 we begin to understand that for every 
movement of concupiscence (the passions) that a man may succeed in 
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repressing, a new one is born to take its place. Nicole finds this reality 
utterly demoralizing; to know that the fundamental principle of sin in 
man can never be completely vanquished in this life is perhaps the most 
tragic aspect of the Augustinian vision: 
Quelle misere de n'etre maitre ni de son esprit ni de son coeur, et de voir 
Tun occupe de mille pensees ridicules et dereglees, et l'autre agite d'une 
infinite de mauvais desirs et de sentiments corrompus, sans pouvoir arre­
ter cette malheureuse fecondite! d'etre oblige de vivre avec cette foule 
d'ennemis interieurs, d'etre toujours aux mains avec eux, sans pouvoir 
jamais les exterminer! ["QDF," IV: 210-11] 
Nicole's tour of the heart's secret places makes it clear that Adam's 
heirs have been burdened with a legacy whose implications are tragic for 
the pilgrim concerned to stay on the road to the Creator: "Nous naissons 
tous dans l'ignorance de Dieu et de nous-memes, des vrais biens et des 
vrais maux. Nous apportons de plus en naissant une volonte toute plon­
gee dans l'amour de nous-memes, et incapable de rien aimer que par 
rapport a nous" ("DEH," II: 45). This "natural" corruption which we 
bring with us into the world makes the pursuit of virtue a difficult and 
unlikely enterprise, impelling man as it does to find pleasure in himself 
and directing him away from his true end. 
Despite this bleak picture of the consequences of the Fall, however, 
Nicole's analysis does not stop at mere description of the corruption that 
fills the heart of man. The author of the Essais, in a powerfully drawn 
image, refuses to conclude that nothing can be done to resist the gravity-
like pull of concupiscence: 
II est difficile d'arreter un poids qui se precipite par un lieu penchant, 
lorsqu'il est dans le milieu ou dans la fin de son mouvement, et qu'il a 
deja acquis beaucoup d'impetuosite et de violence. Mais souvent il n'y 
avait rien de si aise que de l'arreter au commencement, et la moindre force 
qui l'eut pousse de l'autre cote, aurait ete capable de le retirer. II en est de 
meme des passions qui produisent les plus grands renversements dans les 
ames. Elles sont d'ordinaire assez faibles dans leur naissance. Ce sont des 
etincelles qu'il aurait ete aise d'eteindre avec un peu d'eau. .  . . [M]ais 
quand on laisse enflammer ces etincelles, elles causent ensuite de terribles 
embrasements que Dieu impute souvent a la negligence de ceux qui n'y 
ont pas remedie quand ils le pouvaient. ["Des Superieures," V: 166-67] 
The comparison here between the operations of the passions and the law 
of gravity is striking. It is especially interesting to note that the same 
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vocabulary describes both phenomena; we have, in fact, seen the words 
(or their synonyms) here depicting the motion of an object in space ap­
plied to the activities of concupiscence: "mouvement," "impetuosite," 
"violence." While the first comparison (to a weight responding to gravi-
ty's pull) may be a more natural one for an Augustinian (we recall Au-
gustine's dictum: "Amor meus pondus meum."), the second analogy 
(fire), though trite, may be more apt in representing the implications of 
uncontrolled passions. 
It is clear, I think, that we are touching on a fundamental aspect of 
Nicole's morale here.18 In contrast to the pessimistic view detailed earlier, 
we now learn, in another example of Nicole's habit of envisaging the 
human soul as existing in a state of tension between conflicting forces, 
that control of the passions, in theory at least, can be a relatively simple 
affair. Just as the motion of a falling weight can be arrested at the begin­
ning of its descent by the slightest push in the opposite direction and 
sparks of fire can be extinguished by the tiniest amount of water, the 
movements inspired by concupiscence can be controlled with minimal 
effort, if such control is begun soon enough. 
While Nicole's remedy is by no means original, the Senecan echo, com­
ing from so loyal an Augustinian, is somewhat unexpected.19 The author 
of the Essais is suggesting that the orientation that we can call concupisc­
ence, the seemingly irresistible inclination in man to act according to 
what pleases him, may be no more than just that: a "tendency" to act in 
ways that are certainly predictable, but not necessarily inevitable. And 
while Nicole does not deny that it is much easier to act in accordance 
with a natural bent, than to resist, he seems to be telling us that resistance 
is possible. It is true that as Adam's heirs we come into this world instinc­
tively finding pleasure in its objects and in ourselves. But the impulses of 
fallen nature can be controlled.20 
However, what appears simple in theory, control and repression of the 
passions, seems less so when viewed in terms of men engaged in the dis­
tracting and tempting activities of the world. Nicole's analysis has shown 
us that the heart, as the seat of concupiscence, is a region of tremendous 
energy manifesting itself as spontaneous movements which tend to pull 
us away from our true end with all the force of gravity: 
Les effets extraordinaires des passions . . . dependent de mouvements qui 
ne sont pas entierement volontaires. Nous ne pouvons pas exciter en nous 
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quand nous voulons ces emotions violentes; elles dependent des objets, et 
meme de certaines dispositions du corps qui ne sont pas en notre pouvoir. 
["Reflexions sur la traite de Seneque: De la Brievete de la vie," II: 332­
33] 
While it may be true that the coming into being of the emotions is a 
spontaneous phenomenon, these movements within the soul are not ex­
empt from all control. If such were the case, the possibility of moral 
behavior would vanish.21 Although a man may be unable on the one hand 
to will anger, for example, thus demonstrating that emotions are not vo­
lontary, he can at least choose to avoid those objects and situations that 
provoke this emotion.22 Even when this is not possible, a man can con­
demn and contain within himself the movements of these disruptive 
forces: 
Mais si nous ne pouvons pas nous empecher de les [mauvais desirs, mau­
vaises pensees] sentir, nous pouvons au moins les condamner et les des­
avouer sitot que nous les sentons, et retenir ce tumulte au-dedans de nous, 
sans qu'il en eclate rien au-dehors. ["VC," IV: 343] 
Nicole's censorship of the passions derives not, I think, from their inher­
ent evil, but from what they indicate about the status of a man's soul— 
love of self and desire for the objects of the world—and from the inter­
ference that they pose for the soul's uninterrupted movement toward the 
Creator. This latter consideration has special importance for the moralist. 
Although the operations of divine grace remain inscrutable, Nicole, like 
Pascal, never doubts that when God speaks to us, it is through the heart: 
" . .  . veiller selon l'esprit, c'est aussi avoir les oreilles du coeur attentives 
a la voix de Dieu" ("VC," IV: 293); thus, a soul and a heart whose emo­
tions are constantly aroused will be deaf to His voice. The goal that Ni­
cole has in mind for men is a "solid and unshakable peace" ("Des 
Moyens de Conserver la paix," I: 297) where the soul, no longer dis­
tracted by the objects of the world (it may still prefer them—this is an 
important point), can give its full attention to its only proper object. Ni­
cole reminds us of God's command to avoid "human movements like 
anger" in order to enter a state of calm and tranquility ("De la Prepara­
tion a la mort," V: 308).23 The means to this end is the acquisition of 
moral dispositions, which is to say, habits of right doing.24 The role of 
these habits is to function as regulators, repressing unruly passions. As 
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Nicole tells us repeatedly, it is only in a state of calm that a man can make 
the difficult choices the virtuous life requires. 
We must not be deceived, however, by the apparent simplicity of Ni-
cole's remedy. The good life remains a fragile enterprise. We are, after all, 
fallen creatures, a reality that Nicole never allows us to forget. Thus, even 
when the desire to know God is present and even when the emotions have 
been quieted for the moment, the movements of concupiscence are al­
ways latent. Repressed and quieted passions are always capable of being 
awakened. While they sometimes appear to be "healed" (Nicole com­
pares them to "wounds"), their cure is no more than an illusion: 
Mais il ne faut pas s'y [a la guerison] fier absolument: car jamais elles [les 
plaies] ne se referment si bien qu'elles ne puissent s'envenimer de nouveau. 
Quelque eloignement que nous ayons de certains vices, il reste pourtant 
toujours en nous assez de penchant pour nous y faire tomber. . .  . 
["CSM," III: 65] 
The crudest epithet that Nicole can find to label human behavior that 
fails to conform to the divine will is "animal-like"/"maniere toute ani-
male" ("VC," IV: 361). By this, as we have seen, the moralist means the 
natural inclination of fallen man to act without reflection, in accordance 
with the movements and impulses of his lower appetite. 
Although the Nicolean morale is predicated to an important degree on 
the view that men do those things that give them greatest pleasure, a 
careful reading of the Essais de morale reveals that man is (or can be) 
more than an appetite seeking the satisfaction of its desires. We may say, 
then, that if the point of departure of this morale is the Augustinian law 
of delectation, with its profoundly pessimistic view of nature, its point of 
arrival is a certain optimism in the intellect's capacity to monitor the 
movements of the sensitive appetite (the moral dispositions discussed 
above depend on this vigilance). For, despite the similarity in their behav­
ior, men and animals are different. Alone of all creatures, man has been 
endowed with a reason that allows him to act with consideration. Al­
though it is obvious that men can and do sin with premeditation, Nicole 
believes that sin is often merely a question of inattention to what God 
wants: 
.  . . ceux qui ont un veritable desir d'etre a Dieu parfaitement, ne sont 
d'ordinaire detournes de la pratique des vertus, que parce qu'ils n'y pen-
sent pas. . .  . ["VC," IV: 385] 
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Of course—and here we return to the point where we began this 
discussion25—the burden of original sin acts as a powerful deterrent to 
the reflective way of conducting one's life recommended by Nicole. Men 
prefer to act without thinking: "On ne peut nier que . . . le penchant de 
l'ame fut d'agir sans tant de reflexions, en se donnant entierement a ce 
qui lui plait . . ." ("VC," IV: 362-63). So the tension remains and will 
continue to remain. Given the disproportion between God and His crea­
tures, between the eternal and temporal orders, man's desire to know the 
Creator and to conform his behavior to the divine will is never sufficient 
in this life to overcome in an absolute way (there are few absolutes in 
Nicole's moral universe) the pull of concupiscence. Restoring reason's 
ante peccatum hegemony over the passions is a process and the work of 
a lifetime, for, as Nicole asserts in another gravity image, we are always 
on the brink: 
Dieu ne l'emporte souvent que de bien peu sur les objets de concupiscence. 
Nous ne laissons pas d'estimer encore les avantages du monde infiniment 
plus qu'ils ne meritent d'etre estimes. Nous sommes encore pres de l'equi-
libre, et en changeant un peu la balance, c'est-a-dire en augmentant un 
peu Pimpression des choses du monde sur notre esprit, elles reprendraient 
facilement leur empire, et l'emporteraient sur Dieu. ["DEH," II: 54] 
N O T E  S 
1. All references to the Essais de morale are to the 1730 edition published in 
Paris by Deprez. The first four volumes of this work appeared between 1671 and 
1678; volumes V and VI appeared posthumously, in 1700 and 1714-15, respec­
tively. References to the text will be given as follows: treatise or discourse title, 
volume in the 1730 edition, and page number; here, for example: "De la Crainte 
de Dieu," I: 142-43; hereafter cited as "CD." I have modernized Nicole's spelling 
in quoting from his works. All further references to the Essais will appear in the 
text. 
2. Quotations from Augustine's works are from the Bibliotheque augusti­
nienne: Oeuvres de saint Augustin, 85 vols. (projected), (Paris: Desdee de Brou­
wer, 1945-). This edition gives the Latin text and a French translation; I shall 
give my own English translation. References will be given as follows: treatise title 
in Latin, book or chapter, subchapter, volume in the BA, page. Here, for ex­
ample: De Civitate Dei, XIV: 28, BA XXXV: 464. 
3. "Quod enim amplius nos delectat secundum id operemur, necesse est." 
This fundamental law of human behavior, cited repeatedly in the literature on 
Augustine, appears in the Expositio Epistolae ad Galatas. The key word is, of 
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course, "delectare." According to the Augustinian analysis, the will is moved to 
act because of the delight it takes in a thing. As J. Carreyre observes in his sum­
mary of the Augustinus in the Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, "Qu'on de­
mande a quelqu'un pourquoi il a fait et voulu tel acte; a travers des detours, il 
arrivera a repondre: parce que cela m'a plu, me faisait plaisir." "Jansenisme," 
DTC (1930-50), VIII, iere partie, col. 419. 
4. "Les hommes ne seraient pas hommes, s'ils ne suivaient quelque sorte de 
lumiere, fausse ou veritable. Leur nature est tellement formee, que la volonte 
n'embrasse rien qui ne lui soit presente par l'esprit sous l'apparence de quelque 
bien. Us sont done obliges en quelque sorte de suivre la conduite de la raison." 
"Discours sur la necessite de ne pas se conduire au hasard, et par des regies de 
fantaisie," II: 6. Cf. St. Thomas: "Since the object of the will is the good, or at 
least the apparent good, the will is never attracted by evil unless it appears to 
have an aspect of good about it, so that the will never chooses evil except by 
reason of ignorance or error." Summa Theologiae (New York and London: 
Blackfriars, 1969), ia, 2ae, 77, 2, XXV, 165. Here, at least, Nicole seems firmly 
anchored in Thomist/Scholastic philosophical psychology. 
5. Cf. E. D. James's treatment of this essential passage: Pierre Nicole, Jansen­
ist and Humanist: A Study of His Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 
pp. 113-14.1 am indebted to James's excellent study for showing me some of the 
possible ways of looking at Nicole's thought. 
6. Although I agree with those who hold the view that French Jansenism was 
not "monolithic" (there were many Jansenisms and many Jansenists), I shall use 
the terms "Jansenist" and "Port-Royal" to refer, nevertheless, to a view of the 
relation between nature and supernature common to many of the figures asso­
ciated with Port-Royal. 
7. Although fallen man retains use of the libre arbitre, it is effective only in 
choosing evil, for he no longer finds delight (delectatio) in good as he did when 
the will was healthy. In other words, man after the Fall is free, but less so than 
Adam, since his freedom exists only for evil. For penetrating discussions of the 
complex problem of freedom vs. determinism in the thought of St. Augustine, see 
F.-J Thonnard, "La Vraie Liberte selon saint Augustin," BA, XXIII: 753-762; 
and John Rist, "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," in Augustine: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. R. A. Markus (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972). 
8. II [le Chretien] jouit tranquillement des plaisirs qu'il sait etre la cause de 
son malheur. Ces connaissances que la foi lui donne malgre lui, demeurent sans 
action et sans effet. Elles ne le troublent point. II agit, il park comme un homme 
qui n'a rien a faire qu'a se divertir en cette vie, et qui n'aurait rien a craindre en 
l'autre." "CD," I: 149-50. 
9. Cf. James, p. 125 and Bernard Chedozeau: "L'action humaine naturelle est 
entierement interessee, meme si elk ne le parait pas au-dehors. . . ." "Religion et 
morale chez Pierre Nicole (1650-1680)," Diss. University of Paris (Sorbonne), 
10. "Le precepte le plus common de la philosophic, tant paienne que Chre­
tienne, est celui de se connaitre soi-meme. . . ." "De la Connaissance de soi­
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meme," III, i; hereafter cited as "CSM." In his treatment of this fundamental 
theme in the Essais, E. D. James emphasizes Nicole's notion that "it is through 
the observation of others that we can best come to know ourselves" p. 130. 
Bernard Chedozeau also devotes careful attention to "les limites de cette con­
naissance de soi" (p. 437) and shows that Nicole, in his discussion of the soul's 
"replis interieurs," was pointing to modern theories of the unconscious: "Les 
'replis interieurs,' le rappel permanent de l'impossibilite d'une parfaite connais­
sance de soi, sont autant de formulations de l'inconscient psychologique" p. 437. 
11. Cf. La Rochefoucauld: "Quelque decouverte que Ton ait faite dans le 
pays de l'amour-propre, il y reste encore bien des terres inconnues." Maximes, 
ed. Jacques Truchet (Paris: Editions Gamier Freres, 1967), p. 7. 
12. " . .  . c'est une chose commune a tous les hommes, d'avoir en quelque 
temps de leur vie une assiette tranquille. Mais cette assiette est si peu ferme, qu'il 
ne faut presque rien pour la troubler." "FH," I: 49. Cf. Pascal: "Nous brulons du 
desir de trouver une assiette ferme. . . ." Oeuvres completes, ed. L. Lafuma (Paris: 
Seuil, 1963), Fr. 199 (Br. 72), p. 527. 
13. Although Nicole normally condemned any manifestation of amour­
propre, he was not, however, insensitive to its utility for those who are extremely 
vulnerable to the attractions of the world. In a Pascalian-like reversal, Nicole 
recognizes that the human condition is such that some men cannot do without 
the "satisfaction of self-love" and recommends a "nourishing" of this love which 
will maintain a certain state of equilibrium in the soul. "Pensees diverses," 7, VI: 
178-79. Cf. James's examination of this same passage, pp. 108-9 a n ^ P- 113­
14. B. Chedozeau, in a similar discussion, talks about Nicole's "correctif" to 
the Augustinian law. See pp. 401-3. 
15. According to James, Voltaire, as well as other eighteenth-century think­
ers, gave in to this temptation, thereby confusing self-love with self-preservation, 
p. 169. 
16. "L'amour de nous-memes . . . nous donne une inclination violente pour 
les plaisirs . .  . afin de remplir par la le vide effroyable que la perte de notre bon­
heur veritable a cause dans notre coeur." Essais, "CSM," III: 64. 
17. " . .  . concupiscence of the flesh is forgiven at baptism, not in such a way 
that it does not exist anymore, but in such a way that it is no longer imputed as 
sin. But, although its guilt is removed, this concupiscence remains nevertheless, 
until our sickness is completely cured. This will take place when, the rehabilita­
tion of the inner man progressing from day to day, the external man has put on 
incorruptibility. For, concupiscence does not remain in the manner of a substance, 
like a body or spirit, but is a kind of evil disposition which affects us like a 
languor." De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia, XXV: 28; BA XXIII: 116-19. 
18. Although the passage quoted above is addressed to those responsible for 
the moral behavior of inferiors, it seems possible and appropriate to extend the 
rule described here to personal self-control as well. 
19. B. Chedozeau suggests that we should not be too surprised by the affini­
ties between the thought of thinkers like Nicole and certain elements of Stoicism: 
"Tout le XVIIe siecle a ete fascine par le regard de vigilance que le sage stoicien 
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porte sur lui-meme, et saint Francois de Sales, Nicole et Malebranche, par exem­
ple, ont fonde leur morale sur cette exigence premiere," p. 416. 
20. My analysis depends on the distinction between moral and infused vir­
tues. This Scholastic distinction, though never explicitly articulated by Nicole, is, 
I think, a fundamental principle of his moral theology. 
21. "Un acte est moral, ou proprement humain, en tant qu'il est volontaire; 
or les passions, prises en elles-memes, ne sont pas volontaires, et la preuve en est 
que les animaux ont des passions mais n'ont pas de morale. . . .  " Etienne Gilson, 
Saint Thomas: Moraliste, 2nd ed. (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1974), 
pp. 121—22. 
22. A knowledge of which objects and situations provoke our emotions is 
one of the most important fruits of the self-examination recommended by Nicole. 
23. Cf. Chedozeau, pp. 416-17. 
24. Cf. Aristotle: "Moral goodness . .  . is the result of habit.. . . This fact 
makes it obvious that none of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, 
since nothing that is what it is by nature can be made to behave differently by 
habituation. For instance, a stone, which has a natural tendency downwards, 
cannot be habituated to rise, however often you try to train it by throwing it into 
the air. . . . The moral virtues, then, are engendered in us neither by nor contrary 
to nature; we are constituted by nature to receive them, but their full development 
in us is due to habit. 
Men will become good builders as a result of building well, and bad ones as a 
result of building badly. Otherwise there would be no need of anyone to teach 
them: they would all be born either good or bad. Now this holds good also of 
the virtues. . .  . In a word . . . like activities produce like dispositions. Hence we 
must give our activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that 
determine the resulting dispositions. So it is a matter of no little importance what 
sort of habits we form from the earliest age—it makes a vast difference, or rather 
all the difference in the world." The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thom­
son, ed. Hugh Tredennick (New York: Penguin Classics, 1976), pp. 91-92. Al­
though there is no evidence that Aristotle shaped Nicole's thinking on the role of 
habit in moral behavior, Nicole's comments in the Essais, especially in the treatise 
"De l'Education d'un prince," are certainly reminiscent of the Aristotelian (and 
Thomist) notion of moral dispositions. In the "De l'Education d'un prince," (ana­
lyzed by James and Chedozeau), Nicole shows how the body has the capacity to 
acquire through repetition certain postures which allow men to act in a consistent 
manner. 
25. The "renversement du pour au contre. . . ." is as characteristic of Nicole's 
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